SUNNI TAWAFUQ BLOC NEGOTIATING A RETURN TO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003800 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2027 TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ SUBJECT: SUNNI TAWAFUQ BLOC NEGOTIATING A RETURN TO GOVERNMENT: TOUGH ROAD AHEAD REF: A. BAGHDAD 3308 (TAWAFUQ/DPM ZOUBAI CABLE) ¶B. BAGHDAD 3538 (SAI CANDIDATES CABLE) Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) Our contacts among senior GOI and Tawafuq officials confirm that negotiations over a return to government by the Tawafuq Coalition of Sunni political parties recently commenced, with a (likely flexible) deadline set by PM Maliki of "two weeks" starting on November 9. Tawafuq leaders delegated a committee to conduct the talks with Maliki's staff. In principle, Tawafuq leaders are prepared to return to government, provided Maliki makes meaningful concessions on (at least some of) its eleven demands, particularly the release of detainees and genuine power sharing on the national security portfolio. Maliki, according to at least one source, is under pressure from Tehran to bring the Sunnis back to government in order to calm the tense political situation. The PM's tactics, however, including a mix of threats and enticements to Tawafuq members and Anbar tribal leaders, appear aimed at keeping Tawafuq weak and divided. Given deep divisions among Tawafuq's rank-and-file, and Maliki's continuing hard-ball tactics, the likelihood of talks succeeding appears low. If talks collapse, Maliki already stated publicly that he will fill Tawafuq's six Cabinet seats with technocrats of his own choosing. Should this come to pass, continued stalemate is likely at the national level on benchmark legislation and service delivery. End summary. -------------- Sunni Bloc/PM Negotiations Commence -------------- ¶2. (S) A variety of senior contacts confirmed that exploratory talks recently commenced between Tawafuq and PM Maliki over a possible return by the 3-party Sunni bloc to government. During a November 9 meeting of the Political Council for National Security (PCNS),Maliki announced that he was giving Tawafuq "two weeks" to present a list of ministers to replace those who walked out on August 1. After that, he told reporters during a November 11 press conference, should Tawafuq fail to present a list, he will select his own ministers from among "professionals and independents who are well-known for their capabilities." Among those from whom he may choose are 11 Anbari notables that Sahawat al Iraq's (SAI) Sheikh Ahmad offered in a private letter to Maliki, shared privately with the Embassy (Ref B). President Talabani, who informed the Embassy of Maliki's announcement after the November 9 PCNS session, saw the offer as a "good compromise" by Maliki. Talabani told the Ambassador that he had succeeded in walking Maliki back from making several retaliatory threats to "fire" Tawafuq's ministers, thus depriving them of pensions and other benefits. ¶3. (S) An advisor to Deputy Prime Minister Salam al-Zoubai, Dhia Zoubai, told poloff that Tawafuq leaders met on November 13 for five hours to hash out a negotiation strategy. Although the group already agreed in principle on a return to government, he said, deep divisions existed among the leaders over negotiation strategy and selection of replacement ministers. DPM Zoubai, anxious to return to his position, complained to PolCouns on November 13 about Tawafuq leaders Adnan Dulaymi and Tareq Hashimi, accusing them of being opposed to a return and being "too old" to effectively lead the group. Zoubai said that if the talks fail, he will depart Tawafuq and form his own party. ¶4. (S) Tawafuq Leader, and head of the Iraqi People's Conference Party, Adnan Dulaymi, told PolCouns during a separate November 14 meeting that the PM must permit sharing of the security portfolio with the Sunnis - a core priority for the bloc. Likewise, he said, the PM must formally accept the resignations of Tawafuq's ministers (Note: Although he said this issue was motivated by a desire to protect pensions and other benefits, a more likely explanation is that once the resignations are formally accepted by the PM, Tawafuq will have control over which names are submitted as replacements, thereby allowing Tawafuq leaders to oust DPM Zoubai, Defense Minister al Mufragi, Planning Minister Ali Baban, and Higher Education Minister Al Ajili -- all who defied Tawafuq's August 1 walk-out. End note). Dulaymi singled out DPM Zoubai for especially harsh criticism, saying that his protege was "working in private" and not negotiating with the PM on behalf of Tawafuq. BAGHDAD 00003800 002 OF 003 -------------- -- Tawafuq: Maliki Govt "Knows What it Has to Do" -------------- -- ¶5. (S) Aside from the list of 11 demands it made public at the time of its August 1 walk-out from government, Tawafuq's demands for returning to the Maliki government were described in an October 30 "Weekly Statement" published on the Iraqi Islamic Party's (IIP) website. In addition to a host of complaints about the Maliki government, it listed its concerns as follows: the Maliki government's "inability to check financial and administrative corruption, the eruption of tension in all parts of Iraq, the government's low credibility in the eyes of the region, and its refusal to make concessions and respond to demands of the Tawafuq Front." The solution, its statement read, "lies in a comprehensive reform process that reflects positively on all Iraqi ministries which should not collapse after each ministerial change. The government must cancel all recent unfair and arbitrary measures to get back at Tawafuq, including preventing its participation in security committees, restore powers to the Office of Deputy Prime Minister (Zoubai),release budgets, cancel administrative orders related to these budgets, stop expulsion of employees, and special protective measures for the Ministry of Culture, and ending the unconstitutional appointments of Under Secretaries and advisors." These measures, the statement SIPDIS concluded, "are intended to spike the wheels of any solution to the political crisis; the ball is in the government's court - it knows what is has to do." -------------- Iran Pressing Maliki to Bring Sunnis Back? -------------- ¶6. (S) While deep suspicion and frustration pervade Shia views toward Tawafuq generally, details of its strategic negotiating strategy with the Sunnis is unclear. One explanation for the PM's decision to launch new talks with Tawafuq -- whose ministers he threatened with legal ex-communication only days earlier -- was offered by one of VP Hashimi's senior advisors during a November 15 meeting. He alleged that he learned from private sources that the PM's Chief of Staff, Tareq Abdullah, and a Member of Parliament close to Maliki, Sami Al-Askari, were summoned to Tehran on November 10 where they were told that Maliki should bring Tawafuq back into government. Asked to speculate on Tehran's probable motive (if true),he said the Iranians had likely concluded it was better to have the Sunnis inside government, from where they can be more easily manipulated, especially in light of the rapid establishment of local "Awakening" movements and Concerned Local Citizen groups in Sunni areas, as well as to calm the political/security situation with an eye toward facilitating a U.S. troop draw-down. -------------- Deep Splits Characterize Sunni Bloc -------------- ¶7. (S) From all accounts, senior figures in the Tawafuq camp are deeply divided over strategy and substance. On one side is DPM Zoubai and other Tawafuq ministers who wish to return to government, believing the bloc's departure was both ill-timed and ill-conceived. On the other side are Adnan Dulaymi and other skeptics who blame Maliki for all Iraq's wrongs, and who believe significant concessions are required from the PM to warrant Tawafuq's return. Most of Tawafuq's members fall somewhere in the middle, disliking the current limbo status, but suspicious of Maliki and his advisors. For them, negotiations must produce at least the impression of sincerity from Maliki, and some genuine, face-saving concessions on issues of import to the Sunni constituency. According to senior Tawafuq contacts, however, officials appointed by Maliki to conduct talks on his behalf -- former Minister of State Saad al Hashimi, Zuhair al Chalabi, and Minister of State for National Security Affairs Sherwan al Waili -- have been generally dismissive and difficult to reach. -------------- Anbar Sheikhs Challenge Tawafuq -------------- ¶8. (S) Complicating Tawafuq's negotiation strategy even further, the Sahawat al Iraq (SAI) led by Ahmed Abu Reesha, is negotiating its own deals with PM Maliki on issues of relevance to Anbar Province. Last month it offered Maliki a list of 11 ministerial nominees for seats vacated by Tawafuq (Ref B). SAI's apparent motive is to wrest control over the Anbar Provincial Council and Anbar's Governorship, both controlled by the Iraqi Islamic Party of VP Tariq al Hashimi. Highlighting the extent of the split, during a November 15 BAGHDAD 00003800 003 OF 003 USAID-funded conference in Amman, Jordan, SAI boycotted the event and issued a statement demanding replacement of the Provincial Council Chairman, an "active role of SAI members" in the Council, and a reorganization of the Council to ensure active participation of SAI. This critical split between SAI and the IIP has given Maliki a golden opportunity to exert leverage on Tawafuq, and decreases the likelihood that Tawafuq, as currently constituted, will return to government. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (S) From an initial review, it would appear the deck is stacked against a Tawafuq return, given the Sunni bloc's deep divisions and relatively weak hand. Absent announcement soon of significant conciliatory gestures by the PM, we are likely to see new faces chosen by Maliki filling Tawafuq's six empty seats. Should Tawafuq fail to return, its days as a coalition of Sunni Arab parties are likely numbered. Such a scenario could allow for a recomposition of the Sunni power bases, to include a more powerful and likely more effective combination of nascent tribal awakening forces from Anbar and elsewhere (i.e., Baghdad's CLCs),Tawafuq's strongest component - the IIP - and whatever develops in talks in Amman and elsewhere by insurgent groups considering playing a new role in Iraqi politics. However, we should not rule out the possibility that high-handed actions by Maliki and his Shi'a and Kurdish bloc allies will further alienate the Sunni community, setting back internal reconciliation efforts and setting back nascent outreach to the GOI from its Arab neighbors. End comment. CROCKER