SUNNI TAWAFUQ BLOC NEGOTIATING A RETURN TO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003800

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2027
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: SUNNI TAWAFUQ BLOC NEGOTIATING A RETURN TO
GOVERNMENT: TOUGH ROAD AHEAD

REF: A. BAGHDAD 3308 (TAWAFUQ/DPM ZOUBAI CABLE)

B. BAGHDAD 3538 (SAI CANDIDATES CABLE)

Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

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Summary
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1. (S) Our contacts among senior GOI and Tawafuq officials
confirm that negotiations over a return to government by the
Tawafuq Coalition of Sunni political parties recently
commenced, with a (likely flexible) deadline set by PM Maliki
of "two weeks" starting on November 9. Tawafuq leaders
delegated a committee to conduct the talks with Maliki's
staff. In principle, Tawafuq leaders are prepared to return
to government, provided Maliki makes meaningful concessions
on (at least some of) its eleven demands, particularly the
release of detainees and genuine power sharing on the
national security portfolio. Maliki, according to at least
one source, is under pressure from Tehran to bring the Sunnis
back to government in order to calm the tense political
situation. The PM's tactics, however, including a mix of
threats and enticements to Tawafuq members and Anbar tribal
leaders, appear aimed at keeping Tawafuq weak and divided.
Given deep divisions among Tawafuq's rank-and-file, and
Maliki's continuing hard-ball tactics, the likelihood of
talks succeeding appears low. If talks collapse, Maliki
already stated publicly that he will fill Tawafuq's six
Cabinet seats with technocrats of his own choosing. Should
this come to pass, continued stalemate is likely at the
national level on benchmark legislation and service delivery.
End summary.

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Sunni Bloc/PM Negotiations Commence
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2. (S) A variety of senior contacts confirmed that
exploratory talks recently commenced between Tawafuq and PM
Maliki over a possible return by the 3-party Sunni bloc to
government. During a November 9 meeting of the Political
Council for National Security (PCNS),Maliki announced that
he was giving Tawafuq "two weeks" to present a list of
ministers to replace those who walked out on August 1. After
that, he told reporters during a November 11 press
conference, should Tawafuq fail to present a list, he will
select his own ministers from among "professionals and
independents who are well-known for their capabilities."
Among those from whom he may choose are 11 Anbari notables
that Sahawat al Iraq's (SAI) Sheikh Ahmad offered in a
private letter to Maliki, shared privately with the Embassy
(Ref B). President Talabani, who informed the Embassy of
Maliki's announcement after the November 9 PCNS session, saw
the offer as a "good compromise" by Maliki. Talabani told
the Ambassador that he had succeeded in walking Maliki back
from making several retaliatory threats to "fire" Tawafuq's
ministers, thus depriving them of pensions and other
benefits.


3. (S) An advisor to Deputy Prime Minister Salam al-Zoubai,
Dhia Zoubai, told poloff that Tawafuq leaders met on November
13 for five hours to hash out a negotiation strategy.
Although the group already agreed in principle on a return to
government, he said, deep divisions existed among the leaders
over negotiation strategy and selection of replacement
ministers. DPM Zoubai, anxious to return to his position,
complained to PolCouns on November 13 about Tawafuq leaders
Adnan Dulaymi and Tareq Hashimi, accusing them of being
opposed to a return and being "too old" to effectively lead
the group. Zoubai said that if the talks fail, he will
depart Tawafuq and form his own party.


4. (S) Tawafuq Leader, and head of the Iraqi People's
Conference Party, Adnan Dulaymi, told PolCouns during a
separate November 14 meeting that the PM must permit sharing
of the security portfolio with the Sunnis - a core priority
for the bloc. Likewise, he said, the PM must formally accept
the resignations of Tawafuq's ministers (Note: Although he
said this issue was motivated by a desire to protect pensions
and other benefits, a more likely explanation is that once
the resignations are formally accepted by the PM, Tawafuq
will have control over which names are submitted as
replacements, thereby allowing Tawafuq leaders to oust DPM
Zoubai, Defense Minister al Mufragi, Planning Minister Ali
Baban, and Higher Education Minister Al Ajili -- all who
defied Tawafuq's August 1 walk-out. End note). Dulaymi
singled out DPM Zoubai for especially harsh criticism, saying
that his protege was "working in private" and not negotiating
with the PM on behalf of Tawafuq.


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Tawafuq: Maliki Govt "Knows What it Has to Do"
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5. (S) Aside from the list of 11 demands it made public at
the time of its August 1 walk-out from government, Tawafuq's
demands for returning to the Maliki government were described
in an October 30 "Weekly Statement" published on the Iraqi
Islamic Party's (IIP) website. In addition to a host of
complaints about the Maliki government, it listed its
concerns as follows: the Maliki government's "inability to
check financial and administrative corruption, the eruption
of tension in all parts of Iraq, the government's low
credibility in the eyes of the region, and its refusal to
make concessions and respond to demands of the Tawafuq
Front." The solution, its statement read, "lies in a
comprehensive reform process that reflects positively on all
Iraqi ministries which should not collapse after each
ministerial change. The government must cancel all recent
unfair and arbitrary measures to get back at Tawafuq,
including preventing its participation in security
committees, restore powers to the Office of Deputy Prime
Minister (Zoubai),release budgets, cancel administrative
orders related to these budgets, stop expulsion of employees,
and special protective measures for the Ministry of Culture,
and ending the unconstitutional appointments of Under
Secretaries and advisors." These measures, the statement

SIPDIS
concluded, "are intended to spike the wheels of any solution
to the political crisis; the ball is in the government's
court - it knows what is has to do."

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Iran Pressing Maliki to Bring Sunnis Back?
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6. (S) While deep suspicion and frustration pervade Shia
views toward Tawafuq generally, details of its strategic
negotiating strategy with the Sunnis is unclear. One
explanation for the PM's decision to launch new talks with
Tawafuq -- whose ministers he threatened with legal
ex-communication only days earlier -- was offered by one of
VP Hashimi's senior advisors during a November 15 meeting.
He alleged that he learned from private sources that the PM's
Chief of Staff, Tareq Abdullah, and a Member of Parliament
close to Maliki, Sami Al-Askari, were summoned to Tehran on
November 10 where they were told that Maliki should bring
Tawafuq back into government. Asked to speculate on Tehran's
probable motive (if true),he said the Iranians had likely
concluded it was better to have the Sunnis inside government,
from where they can be more easily manipulated, especially in
light of the rapid establishment of local "Awakening"
movements and Concerned Local Citizen groups in Sunni areas,
as well as to calm the political/security situation with an
eye toward facilitating a U.S. troop draw-down.

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Deep Splits Characterize Sunni Bloc
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7. (S) From all accounts, senior figures in the Tawafuq camp
are deeply divided over strategy and substance. On one side
is DPM Zoubai and other Tawafuq ministers who wish to return
to government, believing the bloc's departure was both
ill-timed and ill-conceived. On the other side are Adnan
Dulaymi and other skeptics who blame Maliki for all Iraq's
wrongs, and who believe significant concessions are required
from the PM to warrant Tawafuq's return. Most of Tawafuq's
members fall somewhere in the middle, disliking the current
limbo status, but suspicious of Maliki and his advisors. For
them, negotiations must produce at least the impression of
sincerity from Maliki, and some genuine, face-saving
concessions on issues of import to the Sunni constituency.
According to senior Tawafuq contacts, however, officials
appointed by Maliki to conduct talks on his behalf -- former
Minister of State Saad al Hashimi, Zuhair al Chalabi, and
Minister of State for National Security Affairs Sherwan al
Waili -- have been generally dismissive and difficult to
reach.

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Anbar Sheikhs Challenge Tawafuq
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8. (S) Complicating Tawafuq's negotiation strategy even
further, the Sahawat al Iraq (SAI) led by Ahmed Abu Reesha,
is negotiating its own deals with PM Maliki on issues of
relevance to Anbar Province. Last month it offered Maliki a
list of 11 ministerial nominees for seats vacated by Tawafuq
(Ref B). SAI's apparent motive is to wrest control over the
Anbar Provincial Council and Anbar's Governorship, both
controlled by the Iraqi Islamic Party of VP Tariq al Hashimi.
Highlighting the extent of the split, during a November 15

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USAID-funded conference in Amman, Jordan, SAI boycotted the
event and issued a statement demanding replacement of the
Provincial Council Chairman, an "active role of SAI members"
in the Council, and a reorganization of the Council to ensure
active participation of SAI. This critical split between SAI
and the IIP has given Maliki a golden opportunity to exert
leverage on Tawafuq, and decreases the likelihood that
Tawafuq, as currently constituted, will return to government.

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Comment
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9. (S) From an initial review, it would appear the deck is
stacked against a Tawafuq return, given the Sunni bloc's deep
divisions and relatively weak hand. Absent announcement soon
of significant conciliatory gestures by the PM, we are likely
to see new faces chosen by Maliki filling Tawafuq's six empty
seats. Should Tawafuq fail to return, its days as a
coalition of Sunni Arab parties are likely numbered. Such a
scenario could allow for a recomposition of the Sunni power
bases, to include a more powerful and likely more effective
combination of nascent tribal awakening forces from Anbar and
elsewhere (i.e., Baghdad's CLCs),Tawafuq's strongest
component - the IIP - and whatever develops in talks in Amman
and elsewhere by insurgent groups considering playing a new
role in Iraqi politics. However, we should not rule out the
possibility that high-handed actions by Maliki and his Shi'a
and Kurdish bloc allies will further alienate the Sunni
community, setting back internal reconciliation efforts and
setting back nascent outreach to the GOI from its Arab
neighbors. End comment.
CROCKER