BLAMING VICE PRESIDENT HASHIMI FOR LEGISLATIVE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003798

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2027
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: BLAMING VICE PRESIDENT HASHIMI FOR LEGISLATIVE
BACK-LOG

REF: A. BAGHDAD 3766 (CROCKER-HASHIMI MEMCON)


B. BAGHDAD 3749 (DRAFT PENSION LAW VETO)

C. BAGHDAD X (JAPANESE LOAN ISSUE)

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (S) Many of our Shia contacts in the Iraqi government
have complained to us and the media for the past two weeks,
that Iraqi Islamic Party head and Sunni Vice President Tareq
al Hashimi is deliberately delaying and interfering with
passage of legislation. One Shia parliamentarian put the
number of laws Vice President Hashimi has allegedly "vetoed"
at 52, while others claimed a number between 22 and 28.
Hashimi's senior staff, when asked about the allegations,
which also appeared in the press at the same time we began to
hear complaints, assert the actual number is 14 (see list at
paragraph three). Many of these draft laws (including a
draft pensions law),they say, were returned to Parliament
for technical amendments vice political objections. The
"smear campaign" against Hashimi, they believe, is intended
to damage his reputation with Washington and weaken his
ability to negotiate a return by the Sunni coalition to
government. After reviewing available evidence, it seems
clear that there is a deliberate effort to damage Hashimi's
reputation based on exaggeration and misinformation. With
pressure and frustration mounting over GOI failure to pass
benchmark legislation, finger pointing is understandable.
Other possible motives include efforts to weaken Hashimi in
negotiations with the PM over a Tawafuq return to governmemt,
and anger with Hashimi for delaying approval of a package of
Japanese development loans. Oddly, Hashimi's office --
normally very active in the media -- has been slow to defend
their boss on the issue. End summary.

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Hashimi Smear Campaign In Full Swing
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2. (S) In a November 4 conversation with Poloff, Aram
Yarweissi, advisor to Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, accused
VP Hashimi of blocking Council of Representatives (CoR)
passage of legislation. He said Hashimi was responsible for
preventing Presidency Council approval of "52" draft laws.
He said that by changing "one word" in a draft law, Hashimi's
office could return a bill to Parliament for further work.
Yarweissi promised, but did not deliver, additional detail on
the laws that Hashimi allegedly blocked. Shortly thereafter,
in separate meetings, CoR member Humam Hamoudi told an
Embassy officer that Hashimi had "vetoed" 28 draft laws,
Deputy CoR Speaker Attiya told another Poloff the number was
23, and PM Advisor Ali al Adib told another officer the
number was 28. Concurrently, the Iraqi media began to report
similar numbers. Oddly, Hashimi's media office, normally
quick and opportunistic in its attempts to promote its boss'
efforts on detainee releases, Concerned Local Citizens, and
other issues, remained silent. In fact, Hashimi's Chief of
Staff told poloff on November 15 that he only became aware of
the accusations two days earlier when a UK diplomat casually
mentioned it in conversation (Note: The absence of a public
response likely indicates a reluctance by Hashimi's staff to
deliver bad news to their boss. End note). Nonetheless,
Hashimi's staff provided poloff a detailed accounting on the
question of the VP's "vetoes."

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List of Hashimi "Vetoes" on Draft Laws
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3. (S) Upon request, Hashimi's staff on November 15 provided
poloff a detailed list of the 14 bills they said the Vice
President's office returned to Parliament for additional
action (emailed to NEA/I) during his term of office
(beginning April 2006). Five of the 14 bills, they said,
were legally irrelevant as they were repeals of Saddam-era
laws that had already been officially rescinded. The
remaining vetoes, they said, dealt with mostly administrative
questions of duplication and/or legal clarification which
were raised by the VP's lawyers. The last bill returned by
the VP's office, the draft Pension Law (Ref B),he said was
returned for technical adjustments on one point "at the
request of the Cabinet of Ministers." When the Ambassador
raised the issue with Hashimi in person on November 12 (Ref
A),an uncertain Hashimi was informed by his staff that his
office indeed vetoed the bill only recently. The other laws
that Hashimi returned to the CoR address the following:

(SBU) Hashimi's List of draft bills that he sent back to
Parliament:

BAGHDAD 00003798 002 OF 002



- 1: Dissolution of Revolutionary Command Council Res. 1283
of 1980
- 2: Amending CPA Order 63.
- 3: Dissolution of Revolutionary Command Council Res. 690
of 1980
- 4: Dissolution of Revolutionary Command Council Res. 206
of 1994
- 5: Amending Disciplinary Law for State Employees No. 14 of
1991
- 6: Dissolution of Revolutionary Command Council Res. 222
of 1987 and Res. 540 of 1981
- 7: Dissolution of Revolutionary Command Council Res. 91 of
1977
- 8: Amending of Law of the Academy of Science No 3 of 1995
- 9: Amending High Criminal Court Law No. 10 of 2005
-10: Amending draft Law for Private Investment in Refining
Crude Oil
-11: Dissolution of Revolutionary Command Council Res. 130
of 1994
-12: Dissolution of Revolutionary Command Council Res. 56,
70, 74 of 1994
-13: Amending draft law considering period of practice by
state lawyers.
-14: Draft Pension Law

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Constitutional Powers of the Presidency
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4. (U) Draft laws from the CoR must have unanimous consent
by the Presidency Council (PC) for ratification. If any one
of the three PC members (the President or the two Vice
Presidents) object, the bill is considered "vetoed" by the
entire PC. The CoR can override a first veto with a simple
majority and resend to the PC. If vetoed a second time, the
CoR can override the veto with a three-fifths absolute
majority. Given the low turnout at most CoR sessions, this
is an unlikely scenario. According to the constitution, the
consensus arrangement between the three PC members applies
only during this "interim," or first, term of government.
Following the next general election, the new President alone
will wield exclusive authority over the veto power.


5. (S) According to Hashimi's staff, Vice President Adel
Abdel Mahdi vetoed five bills during his term, three of the
same 14 that Hashimi had sent back to the CoR. One of Abdel
Mahdi's vetoes, they pointed out, was a key anti-corruption
measure that would have allowed ministerial staff to be
brought before the judiciary in cases of corruption charges.
One of Abdel Mahdi's advisors, Farid Yassin, told poloff on
November 18 that one possible explanation for the campaign
against Hashimi is residual anger over the latter's lengthy
delay via the Presidency Council to approve a package of
Japanese government development loans that Yassin
characterized as tremendously favorable to Iraq. The
Ambassador raised the issue with Hashimi during an October 25
meeting (Ref C),at which time the VP said he had approved
the loan package, despite his disappointment that the
projects were almost exclusively in Shia provinces in the
South.

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Comment
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6. (S) It appears clear from available information that
Hashimi's detractors are trying hard to discredit him in the
eyes of the Embassy, Washington, political blocs, and the
Iraqi people. By not responding quickly or publicly, Hashimi
has allowed himself to be painted as an impediment to
legislative progress -- a charge his enemies know strikes a
nerve with us. Clearly Hashimi and his lawyers are gumming
up the works on a variety of legislative initiatives,
although the extent of his trouble-making appears exaggerated
for political, or possible retributive purposes by his
enemies. With the exception perhaps of the Pension law, we
do not see any significant damage done by his vetoes on
mostly administrative issues. The most likely explanation
for the campaign against Hashimi is anger over his hold-up of
Japanese development funds, and efforts by Maliki and his
Shia (and Kurdish) compatriots to undermine him ahead of
negotiations over a return by the Sunni bloc to government.
CROCKER