BLAMING VICE PRESIDENT HASHIMI FOR LEGISLATIVE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003798 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2027 TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ SUBJECT: BLAMING VICE PRESIDENT HASHIMI FOR LEGISLATIVE BACK-LOG REF: A. BAGHDAD 3766 (CROCKER-HASHIMI MEMCON) ¶B. BAGHDAD 3749 (DRAFT PENSION LAW VETO) ¶C. BAGHDAD X (JAPANESE LOAN ISSUE) Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) Many of our Shia contacts in the Iraqi government have complained to us and the media for the past two weeks, that Iraqi Islamic Party head and Sunni Vice President Tareq al Hashimi is deliberately delaying and interfering with passage of legislation. One Shia parliamentarian put the number of laws Vice President Hashimi has allegedly "vetoed" at 52, while others claimed a number between 22 and 28. Hashimi's senior staff, when asked about the allegations, which also appeared in the press at the same time we began to hear complaints, assert the actual number is 14 (see list at paragraph three). Many of these draft laws (including a draft pensions law),they say, were returned to Parliament for technical amendments vice political objections. The "smear campaign" against Hashimi, they believe, is intended to damage his reputation with Washington and weaken his ability to negotiate a return by the Sunni coalition to government. After reviewing available evidence, it seems clear that there is a deliberate effort to damage Hashimi's reputation based on exaggeration and misinformation. With pressure and frustration mounting over GOI failure to pass benchmark legislation, finger pointing is understandable. Other possible motives include efforts to weaken Hashimi in negotiations with the PM over a Tawafuq return to governmemt, and anger with Hashimi for delaying approval of a package of Japanese development loans. Oddly, Hashimi's office -- normally very active in the media -- has been slow to defend their boss on the issue. End summary. -------------- Hashimi Smear Campaign In Full Swing -------------- ¶2. (S) In a November 4 conversation with Poloff, Aram Yarweissi, advisor to Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, accused VP Hashimi of blocking Council of Representatives (CoR) passage of legislation. He said Hashimi was responsible for preventing Presidency Council approval of "52" draft laws. He said that by changing "one word" in a draft law, Hashimi's office could return a bill to Parliament for further work. Yarweissi promised, but did not deliver, additional detail on the laws that Hashimi allegedly blocked. Shortly thereafter, in separate meetings, CoR member Humam Hamoudi told an Embassy officer that Hashimi had "vetoed" 28 draft laws, Deputy CoR Speaker Attiya told another Poloff the number was 23, and PM Advisor Ali al Adib told another officer the number was 28. Concurrently, the Iraqi media began to report similar numbers. Oddly, Hashimi's media office, normally quick and opportunistic in its attempts to promote its boss' efforts on detainee releases, Concerned Local Citizens, and other issues, remained silent. In fact, Hashimi's Chief of Staff told poloff on November 15 that he only became aware of the accusations two days earlier when a UK diplomat casually mentioned it in conversation (Note: The absence of a public response likely indicates a reluctance by Hashimi's staff to deliver bad news to their boss. End note). Nonetheless, Hashimi's staff provided poloff a detailed accounting on the question of the VP's "vetoes." -------------- List of Hashimi "Vetoes" on Draft Laws -------------- ¶3. (S) Upon request, Hashimi's staff on November 15 provided poloff a detailed list of the 14 bills they said the Vice President's office returned to Parliament for additional action (emailed to NEA/I) during his term of office (beginning April 2006). Five of the 14 bills, they said, were legally irrelevant as they were repeals of Saddam-era laws that had already been officially rescinded. The remaining vetoes, they said, dealt with mostly administrative questions of duplication and/or legal clarification which were raised by the VP's lawyers. The last bill returned by the VP's office, the draft Pension Law (Ref B),he said was returned for technical adjustments on one point "at the request of the Cabinet of Ministers." When the Ambassador raised the issue with Hashimi in person on November 12 (Ref A),an uncertain Hashimi was informed by his staff that his office indeed vetoed the bill only recently. The other laws that Hashimi returned to the CoR address the following: (SBU) Hashimi's List of draft bills that he sent back to Parliament: BAGHDAD 00003798 002 OF 002 - 1: Dissolution of Revolutionary Command Council Res. 1283 of 1980 - 2: Amending CPA Order 63. - 3: Dissolution of Revolutionary Command Council Res. 690 of 1980 - 4: Dissolution of Revolutionary Command Council Res. 206 of 1994 - 5: Amending Disciplinary Law for State Employees No. 14 of 1991 - 6: Dissolution of Revolutionary Command Council Res. 222 of 1987 and Res. 540 of 1981 - 7: Dissolution of Revolutionary Command Council Res. 91 of 1977 - 8: Amending of Law of the Academy of Science No 3 of 1995 - 9: Amending High Criminal Court Law No. 10 of 2005 -10: Amending draft Law for Private Investment in Refining Crude Oil -11: Dissolution of Revolutionary Command Council Res. 130 of 1994 -12: Dissolution of Revolutionary Command Council Res. 56, 70, 74 of 1994 -13: Amending draft law considering period of practice by state lawyers. -14: Draft Pension Law -------------- Constitutional Powers of the Presidency -------------- ¶4. (U) Draft laws from the CoR must have unanimous consent by the Presidency Council (PC) for ratification. If any one of the three PC members (the President or the two Vice Presidents) object, the bill is considered "vetoed" by the entire PC. The CoR can override a first veto with a simple majority and resend to the PC. If vetoed a second time, the CoR can override the veto with a three-fifths absolute majority. Given the low turnout at most CoR sessions, this is an unlikely scenario. According to the constitution, the consensus arrangement between the three PC members applies only during this "interim," or first, term of government. Following the next general election, the new President alone will wield exclusive authority over the veto power. ¶5. (S) According to Hashimi's staff, Vice President Adel Abdel Mahdi vetoed five bills during his term, three of the same 14 that Hashimi had sent back to the CoR. One of Abdel Mahdi's vetoes, they pointed out, was a key anti-corruption measure that would have allowed ministerial staff to be brought before the judiciary in cases of corruption charges. One of Abdel Mahdi's advisors, Farid Yassin, told poloff on November 18 that one possible explanation for the campaign against Hashimi is residual anger over the latter's lengthy delay via the Presidency Council to approve a package of Japanese government development loans that Yassin characterized as tremendously favorable to Iraq. The Ambassador raised the issue with Hashimi during an October 25 meeting (Ref C),at which time the VP said he had approved the loan package, despite his disappointment that the projects were almost exclusively in Shia provinces in the South. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶6. (S) It appears clear from available information that Hashimi's detractors are trying hard to discredit him in the eyes of the Embassy, Washington, political blocs, and the Iraqi people. By not responding quickly or publicly, Hashimi has allowed himself to be painted as an impediment to legislative progress -- a charge his enemies know strikes a nerve with us. Clearly Hashimi and his lawyers are gumming up the works on a variety of legislative initiatives, although the extent of his trouble-making appears exaggerated for political, or possible retributive purposes by his enemies. With the exception perhaps of the Pension law, we do not see any significant damage done by his vetoes on mostly administrative issues. The most likely explanation for the campaign against Hashimi is anger over his hold-up of Japanese development funds, and efforts by Maliki and his Shia (and Kurdish) compatriots to undermine him ahead of negotiations over a return by the Sunni bloc to government. CROCKER