AMBASSADOR URGES PM TO PUSH FORWARD WITH SPD

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003782

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR URGES PM TO PUSH FORWARD WITH SPD
SIGNATURE


Classified By: Ambassador Ryan Crocker. Reasons: 1.4 (b) & (d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: Ambassador Crocker urged PM Maliki November
14 to meet the November 20 deadline for signature of the
Strategic Partnership Declaration (SPD). Ambassador said
conclusion of the SPD was an important effort that will set
the stage for the UNSCR renewal and will define the bilateral
relationship for coming years. It also was the USG
understanding that bilateral agreement on the actual text had
been reached, making the November 20 signing possible.
Maliki countered that while there was political agreement in
principle, the current political situation in Iraq was an
obstacle, citing politicians who opposed SPD and could
portray the signing as the PM ceding Iraqi sovereignty to the
U.S., thus weakening his government.


2. (S) Maliki said he needed overwhelming support in the
Council of Representatives (CoR) for SPD. He was scheduled
to brief the Political Council on National Security and the
CoR over the next few days, but reiterated the need for CoR
support and voiced concern about emphasis on meeting the
November 20 deadline for signing, rather than the general
goal of signature. Maliki raised the issue of continued
MNF-I custody of condemned former regime figures Ali Hassan
al-Majid, Sultan Hashem Ahmed and Hussein Rashid al-Tikriti,
warning of future constitutional problems if the U.S.
maintained its current stance. Ambassador pointed out to
Maliki that continued custody was the result of the GOI's
inability to reach consensus on legal interpretation of the
Iraqi court ruling against the three, underscoring that the
U.S. would not be drawn into arbitration of this internal
Iraqi matter. END SUMMARY.


3. (S) In their weekly meeting, Ambassador Crocker urged PM
Maliki November 14 to meet the November 20 deadline for
signature of the Strategic Partnership Declaration (SPD).
Noting that he had briefed POTUS on the extensive work of USG
and GOI representatives to reach agreement on a final SPD
text, Ambassador said POTUS saw conclusion of the SPD as an
important effort that will set the stage for the UNSCR
renewal and will define the bilateral relationship for coming
years. It also was the USG understanding that bilateral
agreement on the actual text had been reached, thus making
possible the November 20 signing.


4. (S) PM Maliki said that while there was political
agreement in principle on the SPD text, the current political
situation in Iraq was an obstacle, i.e., politicians who said
that they supported signature of the SPD but acted contrary
to that position. Maliki elaborated that as much as he was
working to normalize the political situation, others were
working to undermine it. Of specific note was the Council of
Representatives (CoR),which he feared would scuttle an SPD
signing unless he was able to muster "an overwhelming
majority," which he gauged as 60-70 percent support in the
CoR. Maliki said he also was concerned that some
representatives would portray PM signature as ceding Iraqi
sovereignty to the U.S. and use it to undermine his
government.


5. (S) Ambassador pointed out that that the signatures of
the five leaders on the August 26 declaration constituted
CoR support, and the Kurds were solidly behind the SPD, as
was ISCI. Nothing would embody a more concrete demonstration
of Iraqi sovereignty than signature of the SPD, given the
tenets of sovereignty enshrined in the last paragraph of the
document. Ambassador underscored to Maliki that the SPD was
important to the U.S., Iraq, and the stability of the region.



6. (S) Maliki acknowledged the support of the Kurds, but
reiterated that work needed to be done to win over the CoR.
He said that he planned to brief the Political Council for
National Security on SPD November 16, followed by a briefing
to the CoR November 17. Maliki suggested that the U.S. could
help build SPD support in the CoR by having concurrent
meetings with these two bodies.


7. (S) Ambassador said that he had met with VP Adel Abdel
Mehdi and with VP Tariq Hashemi, noting that Adel said he not
only supported the SPD, but he would accompany Maliki to the
CoR if Maliki requested, and ensure that the Presidency
Council signed the SPD. Ambassador urged Maliki to exercise
leadership, as he had done in previous difficult moments,
such as his recent successful effort to obtain a cabinet vote
to send the correct version of the de-ba'athification law to

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the CoR.


8. (S) Dwelling on the need to build CoR support, Maliki
complained that the CoR was inconsistent in exercising its
political responsibilities, instead, randomly choosing when
to step in and when to refrain from involvement. He cited
CoR President Mashadani's recent complaint that presentation
of the de-ba'athification law to the CoR was not handled
according to procedures. Ambassador told Maliki that he had
seen Mashadani prior to his meeting with the PM; Mashadani
said that he would support the SPD.


9. (S) Maliki resisted agreement on November 20 as the date
certain for signing the SPD, claiming that it was not his
understanding that he had reached a firm date with POTUS, and
that a delay in the SPD signing beyond that date would
reflect poorly on him with POTUS. The goal was to sign the
SPD, not to sign by a certain date. Turning to the SPD
itself, Maliki noted one sentence in the most recent draft on
continued support for Iraqi Security Forces which he wanted
modified. Ambassador said that the U.S. was ready to address
all concerns that the GOI might have on the text, but added
that it was possible to reach final agreement on a text that
day, underscoring the November 20 deadline.


10. (S) At the end of the meeting, Maliki raised continued
U.S. custody of condemned former regime figures Ali Hassan
al-Majid, Sultan Hashem Ahmed, and Hussein Rashid al-Tikriti.
Maliki warned that the USG unwillingness to turn over the
three to the GOI could lead to constitutional problems down
the road, adding that he understood that the Embassy Legal
Advisor supported the PM's position that the three should be
turned over to the GOI. Ambassador pointed out that in fact,
the Embassy's legal team believed concluded that the
Presidency Council's insistence on its concurrence was more
consistent with Iraqi law. Continued USG custody of the
three was the result of the Office of the Prime Minister and
the Presidency Council's inability to reach agreement on the
legal interpretation of the Iraqi court ruling against the
three. The U.S. could not turn the three men over to the GOI
in the absence of adherence to Iraqi law. The U.S. had no
role or responsibility to arbitrate what is a wholly GOI
internal dispute, and would not be made a party to this
dispute. On that note, Maliki closed the discussion,
reiterating his concern over continued MNF-I custody of the
three and future problems that this situation would bring.


11. (S) At the end of the meeting, Ambassador secured a
commitment from Maliki to work towards an agreed-upon SPD
text and signature on November 20. Maliki said, however,
that he wished to keep the date silent, so as not to create
expectations. (NOTE: Embassy is working with the Presidency
Council and other leaders to secure the political support
Maliki claims he needs to move forward. END NOTE)
CROCKER