VP ABDEL MEHDI ON STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003780

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: VP ABDEL MEHDI ON STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
DECLARATION AND SADR'S INTENTIONS

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a November 14 meeting, Vice President Adel
Abdel Mehdi expressed pronounced reluctance to persuade Prime
Minister Nuri al-Maliki to come to closure on the proposed
bilateral Strategic Partnership Declaration (SPD). Claiming
that such persuasion would be counter-productive, Adel
advised us repeatedly to deal directly with Maliki on the
agreement and stated that the only SPD opponents are among
Maliki's inner circle. Adel opined that Moqtada al-Sadr
feels "encircled" and is laying low after the JAM's murderous
August escapades in Karbala but would emerge again at a time
of his choosing as the wily leader of a "revolutionary"
movement. In the meantime, Adel said that Sadr followers are
growing disenchanted with Sadr's "wrong path" as evidenced by
a break-away group formed recently by a disaffected Sadrist.
Adel detects new-found flexibility among senior Tawafuq
officials about their return to the GOI, as well as
willingness by Maliki to take steps necessary to facilitate
such a return. He was less optimistic about resolving a
lingering Maliki/Presidency Council dispute over the
disposition of the Anfal execution judgments against
"Chemical Ali" and two other defendants. End Summary.

Deal Directly with Maliki
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador opened the meeting by emphasizing the
importance the President places on concluding the declaration
this week and our openness to proposed GOI textual
suggestions so long as they do not alter the main points of
our shared vision. He asked that Adel and the other two
members of the GOI Presidency Council make clear to Maliki
their support for the declaration, possibly by writing a
short note to the Prime Minister. Adel said that he and ISCI
support the declaration, but the USG should deal directly
with Maliki and obtain his direct agreement. Adel claimed
that opposition to the declaration is coming from within
Maliki's inner circle, not from the legislature or the media.
To illustrate his point, he recounted a recent meeting
between Maliki, his Council of Ministers, and the CoR
Political Committee to discuss the SPD in which the only
declaration opponents were not Sadrists or Fadhila Party
legislators but rather Oil Minister Shahristani, Labor
Minister Radi, and Parliamentary Affairs Minister Safa.


3. (C) Adel repeatedly advised us to bypass this opposition
by appealing directly to Maliki, who he described alternately
as "hesitant," "suspicious," and "embarrassed" regarding the
SPD process, and noted that Maliki had traveled recently to
Najaf to seek the counsel of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani
(Comment: Maliki did not visit Najaf). He predicted that a
note from the Presidency Council would "create two camps --
the Council camp and the Maliki camp" and lead to a situation
like the current Council/Maliki stalemate over execution of
the Anfal case defendants. Similarly, he claimed that if he
were to engage Maliki on the SPD issue, Maliki would agree
with him in private and disagree with him in public. "Don't
let him play games and hide behind the Presidency Council,"
Adel warned, imploring us to instead engage with Maliki
directly lest the Prime Minister draw out and "complicate the
process like he did on the leaders' agreement on the
De-Baathification Law." (Note: As reported septel, Maliki
and the Council of Ministers finally pushed forward a draft
bill that summarized the leaders' August De-Baath agreement
on November 14 after nearly three months of obfuscation that
ended only after a full-court U.S. lobbying press.)


4. (C) Adel reiterated that the partnership declaration had
his full support and said he and other Presidency Council
members were willing to sign the declaration but would honor
Maliki's preferences regarding the identity of GOI
signatories. He also said that he was ready to brief the
Council of Representatives on the process if Maliki wanted.

Notes from the South, Sadr Playing for Time
--------------


5. (C) Speaking about a recent visit to Nassariyah for the
successful Dhi Qar Province Economic Forum, Adel said he had
heard rumors of active USG backing for Shia tribal
"Awakening" movements in the southern provinces (including
alleged volunteer recruitment on the streets of Basrah) and
added that such activity was "very dangerous." Noting the
irony that the USG has now been accused of arming both Sunni
and Shia tribal movements, the Ambassador replied that the
USG was not supporting southern Shia tribal "Awakening"
movements, and he urged the GOI to take the initiative on
such a program in order to confront the growing strength of
the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and other criminal groups in the far
south. As an example, the Ambassador cited JAM control of
Basrah's ports and encouraged Adel and his fellow Islamic

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Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) officials to consult closely
with Maliki to ensure that Basrah's scheduled transition to
PIC status is conducted in an orderly fashion.


6. (C) Adel proposed a future session of the USG-ISCI
"Strategic Dialogue" and groused that instead of releasing
ISCI detainees as Abdel Aziz al-Hakim had requested, MNF-I is
arresting even more people such as ISCI heavyweight
Jalaladdin al-Saghir's bodyguard. The Ambassador replied
that we should wait until the return of Gen. Petraeus to Iraq
before scheduling an upcoming meeting, and that our check of
detainees showed that many were arrested on very serious
charges.


7. (C) In reply to the Ambassador's question about Moqtada
al-Sadr's current thinking, Adel surmised that Sadr feels
"encircled" and is laying low after the JAM's murderous
August escapades in Karbala, just as he did in 2003 when the
CPA issued a warrant for his arrest on murder charges and in
2004 after the JAM was thrashed by coalition forces in Najaf,
but would emerge again at a time of his choosing as the
shrewd and ambitious leader of a "revolutionary" movement.
While Sadr bides his time, Adel said, "something serious is
taking place among his people" regarding their perceptions of
Sadr and his "wrong path" of lawless ways. noting that
one-time Sadr aide Adnan Shahmani had already broken away
from the Sadr Trend to start a rival popular movement.


Tawafuq Flexibility, Anfal Gridlock
--------------


8. (C) Adel said he detected new-found flexibility among
senior Tawafuq officials about their return to the GOI, as
well as willingness by Maliki to take steps necessary to
facilitate such a return. "If Tawafuq maintain its current
position it will break," he stated, "but I think we can solve
this." The Vice President was less optimistic about
resolving a lingering Maliki/Presidency Council dispute over
the disposition of the Anfal execution judgments against
"Chemical Ali" Hassan Majeed, former Defense Minister Sultan
Hashim, and a third defendant. The Ambassador told Adel that
the current situation was not satisfactory and urged Adel to
work with his colleagues on the Presidency Council and Maliki
to sort out their differences and come to a common GOI
position.
CROCKER