VP ABDEL MEHDI ON STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003780 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SUBJECT: VP ABDEL MEHDI ON STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP DECLARATION AND SADR'S INTENTIONS Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a November 14 meeting, Vice President Adel Abdel Mehdi expressed pronounced reluctance to persuade Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to come to closure on the proposed bilateral Strategic Partnership Declaration (SPD). Claiming that such persuasion would be counter-productive, Adel advised us repeatedly to deal directly with Maliki on the agreement and stated that the only SPD opponents are among Maliki's inner circle. Adel opined that Moqtada al-Sadr feels "encircled" and is laying low after the JAM's murderous August escapades in Karbala but would emerge again at a time of his choosing as the wily leader of a "revolutionary" movement. In the meantime, Adel said that Sadr followers are growing disenchanted with Sadr's "wrong path" as evidenced by a break-away group formed recently by a disaffected Sadrist. Adel detects new-found flexibility among senior Tawafuq officials about their return to the GOI, as well as willingness by Maliki to take steps necessary to facilitate such a return. He was less optimistic about resolving a lingering Maliki/Presidency Council dispute over the disposition of the Anfal execution judgments against "Chemical Ali" and two other defendants. End Summary. Deal Directly with Maliki -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador opened the meeting by emphasizing the importance the President places on concluding the declaration this week and our openness to proposed GOI textual suggestions so long as they do not alter the main points of our shared vision. He asked that Adel and the other two members of the GOI Presidency Council make clear to Maliki their support for the declaration, possibly by writing a short note to the Prime Minister. Adel said that he and ISCI support the declaration, but the USG should deal directly with Maliki and obtain his direct agreement. Adel claimed that opposition to the declaration is coming from within Maliki's inner circle, not from the legislature or the media. To illustrate his point, he recounted a recent meeting between Maliki, his Council of Ministers, and the CoR Political Committee to discuss the SPD in which the only declaration opponents were not Sadrists or Fadhila Party legislators but rather Oil Minister Shahristani, Labor Minister Radi, and Parliamentary Affairs Minister Safa. ¶3. (C) Adel repeatedly advised us to bypass this opposition by appealing directly to Maliki, who he described alternately as "hesitant," "suspicious," and "embarrassed" regarding the SPD process, and noted that Maliki had traveled recently to Najaf to seek the counsel of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani (Comment: Maliki did not visit Najaf). He predicted that a note from the Presidency Council would "create two camps -- the Council camp and the Maliki camp" and lead to a situation like the current Council/Maliki stalemate over execution of the Anfal case defendants. Similarly, he claimed that if he were to engage Maliki on the SPD issue, Maliki would agree with him in private and disagree with him in public. "Don't let him play games and hide behind the Presidency Council," Adel warned, imploring us to instead engage with Maliki directly lest the Prime Minister draw out and "complicate the process like he did on the leaders' agreement on the De-Baathification Law." (Note: As reported septel, Maliki and the Council of Ministers finally pushed forward a draft bill that summarized the leaders' August De-Baath agreement on November 14 after nearly three months of obfuscation that ended only after a full-court U.S. lobbying press.) ¶4. (C) Adel reiterated that the partnership declaration had his full support and said he and other Presidency Council members were willing to sign the declaration but would honor Maliki's preferences regarding the identity of GOI signatories. He also said that he was ready to brief the Council of Representatives on the process if Maliki wanted. Notes from the South, Sadr Playing for Time -------------- ¶5. (C) Speaking about a recent visit to Nassariyah for the successful Dhi Qar Province Economic Forum, Adel said he had heard rumors of active USG backing for Shia tribal "Awakening" movements in the southern provinces (including alleged volunteer recruitment on the streets of Basrah) and added that such activity was "very dangerous." Noting the irony that the USG has now been accused of arming both Sunni and Shia tribal movements, the Ambassador replied that the USG was not supporting southern Shia tribal "Awakening" movements, and he urged the GOI to take the initiative on such a program in order to confront the growing strength of the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and other criminal groups in the far south. As an example, the Ambassador cited JAM control of Basrah's ports and encouraged Adel and his fellow Islamic BAGHDAD 00003780 002 OF 002 Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) officials to consult closely with Maliki to ensure that Basrah's scheduled transition to PIC status is conducted in an orderly fashion. ¶6. (C) Adel proposed a future session of the USG-ISCI "Strategic Dialogue" and groused that instead of releasing ISCI detainees as Abdel Aziz al-Hakim had requested, MNF-I is arresting even more people such as ISCI heavyweight Jalaladdin al-Saghir's bodyguard. The Ambassador replied that we should wait until the return of Gen. Petraeus to Iraq before scheduling an upcoming meeting, and that our check of detainees showed that many were arrested on very serious charges. ¶7. (C) In reply to the Ambassador's question about Moqtada al-Sadr's current thinking, Adel surmised that Sadr feels "encircled" and is laying low after the JAM's murderous August escapades in Karbala, just as he did in 2003 when the CPA issued a warrant for his arrest on murder charges and in 2004 after the JAM was thrashed by coalition forces in Najaf, but would emerge again at a time of his choosing as the shrewd and ambitious leader of a "revolutionary" movement. While Sadr bides his time, Adel said, "something serious is taking place among his people" regarding their perceptions of Sadr and his "wrong path" of lawless ways. noting that one-time Sadr aide Adnan Shahmani had already broken away from the Sadr Trend to start a rival popular movement. Tawafuq Flexibility, Anfal Gridlock -------------- ¶8. (C) Adel said he detected new-found flexibility among senior Tawafuq officials about their return to the GOI, as well as willingness by Maliki to take steps necessary to facilitate such a return. "If Tawafuq maintain its current position it will break," he stated, "but I think we can solve this." The Vice President was less optimistic about resolving a lingering Maliki/Presidency Council dispute over the disposition of the Anfal execution judgments against "Chemical Ali" Hassan Majeed, former Defense Minister Sultan Hashim, and a third defendant. The Ambassador told Adel that the current situation was not satisfactory and urged Adel to work with his colleagues on the Presidency Council and Maliki to sort out their differences and come to a common GOI position. CROCKER