NSA RUBAIE RESISTS BASRA'S GOVERNOR SIGNING PIC MOU

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 003776 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS MARR IZ UK AS SUBJECT: NSA RUBAIE RESISTS BASRA'S GOVERNOR SIGNING PIC MOU Classified By: Pol-Mil Minister-Counselor Marcie B. Ries for reasons 1. 4 (a),(b) and (d) ¶1. (S REL UK AS) MNF-I Deputy CG LTG Rollo (UK) and Political-Military Minister-Counselor (PMMC) Ambassador Marcie Ries met November 14 with National Security Advisor (NSA) Muwaffaq Rubaie to discuss the modalities of Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) for Basra. Rubaie,s opening position was that the GOI did not recognize Mohammed Waeli as the governor of Basra, and was not happy that the U.S. and the UK were dealing with him. The security file for Basra would be passed directly from the PM to Iraqi Army General Mohan with the PM providing the civilian authority. This state of affairs could continue until provincial elections. Mohan, and his Iraqi Police counterpart MG Jallil, had been further extended in their posts, he added. ¶2. (S REL UK AS) PMMC and LTG Rollo pressed the US/UK view that the principle of handing over provincial control to a duly elected civilian was important. There was no extant legal challenge to Waeli - he was therefore the governor. The political parties in Basra, including ISCI, had accepted Waeli and were prepared to work with him. The outcome of the court case leaving Waeli in office had given the GOI an opportunity to move forward on PIC. The outcome we wanted in Basra was a good PIC and a political arrangement in Basra that would allow further local political and economic progress. Alternatives that did not provide this were unsatisfactory for everyone, nor did we want a broken administration in the province until provincial elections. ¶3. (S REL UK AS) Rubaie, who did not appear particularly well-briefed, initially responded that one alternative would be to delay PIC until provincial elections. He later said, however, that if the Provincial Council voted by a majority to retain Waeli, the PM might accept it, and that there might be other options (though none of these are without difficulty for us). He agreed to consult his own lawyers and to talk to the PM in preparation for a further meeting at the end of next week. (Note: Rubaie's attorneys had supported the option of the governor of Basra signing the PIC MOU earlier that day in a meeting of the Joint Committee to Transfer Security Responsibility (JCTSR). End note.) ¶4. (S REL UK AS) UK Ambassador Christopher Prentice noted that other avenues to pursue this with the PM also exist. He understands that Vice President Adl Abd al-Mahdi has indicated that he would be willing to speak to PM Maliki to encourage him to work with Waeli. ¶5. (S REL UK AS) Meanwhile further work continues to establish the exact legal position. After the meeting, Prentice went to see the Chief Justice on another matter. The Chief Justice told Prentice that the Chief Justice was due to review the issue of whether the decision to replace Waeli was legal. The Chief Justice said that he expected to hear the case in two weeks. CROCKER