MALIKI PLANS GENERAL AMNESTY; BASRA PIC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003772

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2017
TAGS: IZ MARR MOPS PGOV PHUM PREL PTER
SUBJECT: MALIKI PLANS GENERAL AMNESTY; BASRA PIC
CHALLENGES; DIYALA CLC INTEGRATION LOOMS LARGE; BUDGET

REF: BAGHDAD 03721

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Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Ryan Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: At the November 11 Ministerial Council on
National Security (MCNS) meeting, PM Maliki stated his
intention to proclaim a general amnesty; Ambassador Crocker
responded that this was a bold move that the U.S. supported
and could work with the GoI on the details. Maliki also
pushed the Armed Forces commander to proceed with targeted
security operations in Basra and prepare for the likely
reaction to increased operations. A long general discussion
on integration of Concerned Local Citizen (CLC) groups into
security structures in Diyala revealed ongoing confusion in
the GOI on its relationship with CLCs and which Iraqi
authorities could hire police. Maliki resolved the issue by
stating clearly that the National Reconciliation Committee,s
remit, and its procedures, should be applied countrywide.

Amnesty Plans Announced
--------------


2. (S) Late in the meeting, while discussing integration of
CLCs into Iraqi security structures, Maliki declared his
intention to proceed with a general amnesty for those who had
been detained for bearing arms against the GOI. He implied
that many of these had been duped. Ambassador Crocker
expressed support for a general amnesty, calling it a bold
move. He also noted that it was an important and complex
issue and looked forward to further discussions on the
matter. (Note: Maliki had raised this issue on November 8
with LTG Odierno, REFTEL. End Note.)

Basra
--------------


3. (S) Maliki had opened the meeting asking for an update on
the security situation in Basra, in particular operations by
ISF in preparation for Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) in mid
to late December. CHOD Babakir Shawkt responded that Basra
security had not been discussed as planned at the last Crisis
Action Cell (CAC) due to other pressing matters. (Note:
During the CAC, topics discussed were the vetting process for
transitioning CLCs into the Iraqi Police, transitioning CLCs
into civil service type jobs, movement of Iraqi forces out of
Baghdad, and the security situation in Diyala. End Note.)
CHOD reminded Maliki he had agreed to extend Gen. Mohan's
mandate in Basra.


4. (S) The Counter-Terrorism Director noted that 21 targets
had been identified in Basra and ISF, in particular Special
Operation Forces and Counter-Terrorism squads, were preparing
to act against them. Maliki instructed CHOD to take action
as quickly as possible but also to prepare for the reaction
of the opposition forces and/or their supporters in the
populace. All agreed that being prepared for a reaction was
a good practice and part of standard operations planning.
The Counter-Terrorism Director also sought support,
specifically air support, from coalition forces for the
operations to which LTG Odierno agreed.

Diyala CLCs
--------------


5. (S) National Security Advisor Muwaffaq Rubaie turned the
discussion to Diyala and questions on the CLCs, noting that
intel reports had raised concerns about the situation in
Diyala. He noted that MNC-I hosted a visit to the province
earlier that day, which included S/I Director David
Satterfield, the Minister of Interior, Iraqi Ground Forces
Command, the National Reconciliation Committee, the Diyala
Operations Center, and the Provincial Governor. The field
visit had been very successful for gaining firsthand
knowledge of the situation. Violence was down, delivery of
service (water, electricity, etc.) was improved, and some 300
families had returned.


6. (S) Turning to next steps, Rubaie opined that the CLCs
were a temporary solution, and thought must be given on what
to do with them. How many could be put on the government
payroll? He also note friction between the CLC volunteers
and the police, and that some of the CLC groups had been
infiltrated by Al-Qaeda, with 48 CLC volunteers having been
arrested for abuse of power, theft, or other crimes. LTG
Odierno intervened, noting that most of the members of these
groups are good people. Agreeing that there are of course
some bad volunteers, he highlighted the fact that those
arrested are usually turned in by other volunteers. The CHOD
concurred with this assessment.

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7. (S) Rubaie shifted his comments to questions about hiring
practices for police in Diyala province, especially the need
for balance (sectarian) in the police force. A long
discussion then ensued on how many more police the province
needs, how many will be drawn from the CLCs, whether to shift
them from outside the city of Baquba into the city. The
Diyala Support Committee is hiring thousands of police from
the rural areas and not working through the Provincial
Director of Police or MoI, outside of the policy developed by
the National Reconciliation Committee. PM Maliki emphasized
the need to purge the current police of bad actors before
hiring more from CLCs or self-established armed groups. LTG
Odierno suggested that the process being used in Baghdad be
taken out to the provinces, to get the National
Reconciliation Committee involved in the police vetting and
hiring process. Ambassador Crocker emphasized the critical
importance of these Committees, underlining the need to
provide them the resources and personnel to do their work.
Maliki agreed that this vetting should take place under the
remit of the National Reconciliation Committee, whose
procedures should be applied countrywide.


8. (S) Rubaie then laid out thirteen points for progress with
CLCs in Diyala (Note: this is still a working list that
differed somewhat from the twelve points Rubaie laid out
earlier in the day during the Diyala visit. End Note)
Several points generated extended discussion, especially
point 10.

--1. there has been very good security progress in those
areas where CLCs are operating
--2. a positive role for CLCs exists
--3. note there have been CLC violations that must be
addressed
--4. GOI needs to develop a vision for the role of the
National Reconciliation Committee and Diyala Support
Committee, in order to deconflict responsibilities
--5. form a cleansing committee or procedure to weed out bad
actors in the CLCs
--6. enhance Rule of Law within the police forces
--7. greater coordination is needed between all parties;
involve the Governor
--8. a political format is needed to absorb the leadership of
the &armed groups8 into the political process (Maliki noted
with would need Council of Representatives (COR) discussion
and concurrence)
--9. ISF are responsible for security; voluntary groups are
in a supportive role only
--10. expedite the process for police hiring and ensure full
vetting of the CLC individuals
--11. extend the work of the National Reconciliation
Committee outside of Baghdad
--12. define the roles and authorities of provincial and
local governments in the CLC process.
--13. expedite the General Amnesty policy and be clear on who
is to be included


9. (S) In discussion on increased hiring, Maliki and Rubaie
raised questions about the vetting process, noting that
someone could pass the criminal background check but there
might be intelligence that would disqualify someone for
service in the police forces. LTG Ali, IGFC Commander,
cautioned against using allegations to disqualify otherwise
acceptable candidates. Maliki also noted that a general
amnesty from criminal prosecution would not protect from
civil suits. Responding to the CHOD, the PM suggested police
might be hired on a probationary basis to ensure bad actors
do not infiltrate the ISF. He closed his comments by stating
that the GOI must stand with the voluntary groups but vet the
police force candidates carefully to avoid problems.

Budget Issues
--------------


10. (S) The Minister of Finance (FinMin) outlined the overall
budget for 2008 as well as the reasons behind a nine billion
USD allotment for the MOD and MOI vice ten billion requested.
This includes funding for the intel services and the Counter
Terrorism directorate. He noted that the nine billion USD
represented 23 percent of the national budget, while the
average in the Gulf Region is 5-6 percent of national budgets
are used for security. (Note: 23 percent appears incorrect:
9 Bn USD is about 19 percent of 48 Bn USD. End Note.) He
also noted that Iraq continues to deposit five percent of its
oil revenue to pay compensation for the 1991 invasion of
Kuwait. Negotiations with the IMF had allowed Iraq to use a
higher benchmark oil price for budget planning purposes, up
to 57 USD/barrel vice 50 USD/barrel.

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11. (S) The Minister of Interior (IntMin) raised questions
about the method for distributing funds to the provinces,
expressing a desire to have leftover funds from a previous
budget year provided to MOI to buy equipment. The FinMin
replied that he only had authority to shift five percent of
the budget, explaining this is how he had paid for the
Chinese weapons. LTG Dubik intervened, noting that the
Ministry of Interior needs funds for its forces, in
particular for equipment, training, and personnel. Whether
it is new funding or funding transferred from previous years
is irrelevant - the MOI needs increased funding. LTG Odierno
added that to build up the Army and Police from scratch is
expensive, but the sustainment of those forces will cost less
in future years. In response to the PM's question on how to
fix the problem, the FinMin suggested that the IntMin talk to
the appropriate COR Committees and to the political party
blocs in the COR.

Good News
--------------


12. (U) MG Scott presented a short briefing outlining the
success of MNF-I in identifying and using local
vendors/contractors. He reported that from August through
October 2007, over 3000 contracts had been awarded to 1035
vendors throughout Iraq at a total value of 624 million USD -
331 million for construction, 172 for services, and 121 for
commodities. MG Scott also noted that these contracts had
generated 58,000 jobs for Iraqis. PM Maliki welcomed the
good news.

Accountability and Justice Law
--------------


13. (S) Wrapping up the meeting, the Deputy Minister of State
for National Security noted that the Accountability and
Justice Law (De-Baathification Law) will be passed this week
or at the latest next week. He explained that the first
draft would be presented and voted down, thus allowing the
second draft to be voted on and passed. S/I Ambassador David
Satterfield interjected that it had taken 10 weeks for this
legislation to move forward from the August 26 declaration of
intention. He noted that President Bush was very concerned
about the long delay in passing this very important
legislation, adding that its passage will be a strong signal
of political progress. Maliki took the point and assured
Satterfield that the legislation would pass this week or next.


14. (U) Ambassador Satterfield did not have an opportunity to
clear this message.
CROCKER