EXPANDING TAILORED NATO-IRAQ COOPERATION

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SIPDIS

SIPDIS

USNATO PASS TO ALEX BAEZ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2017
TAGS: IZ MARR MASS MOPS PGOV PINS PREL
SUBJECT: EXPANDING TAILORED NATO-IRAQ COOPERATION

REF: A. A. USNATO 592


B. B. USNATO 596

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Classified By: Ambassador Ryan Crocker for reasons 1.4 (a) and (d)


1. (S) Summary: USNATO forwarded an Italian non-paper (ref
A) for Embassy Baghdad and Department consideration about the
future role of the NATO Training Mission - Iraq (NTM-I) in a
post-UNSCR environment. NTM-I fills a critical niche in the
training and mentoring of mid-level leadership of the Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) and Embassy Baghdad concurs that the
training mission should be continued and expanded in 2009 to
include advisory and mentoring elements at the strategic
level. Regarding the political basis for its continuation
without a UNSCR, Embassy Baghdad does not assess the need for
a comprehensive Afghanistan-like security agreement; rather,
it would be more appropriate to negotiate a limited
partnership based on NTM-I and possibly moving towards
inclusion in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). We
concur that a visit by Prime Minister Maliki to NATO would be
helpful in developing an expanding role for the Alliance in
Iraq. End Summary.


2. (S) Embassy Baghdad appreciates the opportunity to
comment on the Italian non-paper on expanding cooperation
between NATO and Iraq as well as subsequent implementation
proposals by USNATO. The non-paper raises three fundamental
issues for consideration: effectiveness of the NTM-I, its
future role beyond 2008, and the political basis for its
continuation beyond the UNSCR 1723.

NTM-I Effectiveness
--------------


3. (S) According to NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I)
Commanding General Dubik, the rapid expansion of the Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) placed greatest demand on development
of a mid-level management cadre. We assess NTM-I as an
essential element in reducing this deficit among the
multitude of training programs provided to the ISF. An
important NTM-I success story is the transformation of the
Ar-Rustamaya (AR) Military Academy which focused on
national-level, officer leadership training. Reaching Full
Operational Capability (FOC) in July, NTM-I's mentorship
initiative at AR filled a critical niche not covered by other
training programs. The same holds true for the Italian-led
gendarmerie training which began in October; it is a unique
program--not offered by any other source--intended to provide
Iraqi National Police with key civil-military leadership
skills necessary in this hostile security environment. Though
small in number, these leadership programs have an enormous
positive impact on the future of the ISF.

NTM-I Expansion
--------------


4. We concur with General Dubik's focus in the current
Program Management Review (PMR) on developing programs in the
near term focused on officer and non-commissioned officer
professional development as well as building a robust
training and doctrine command. For future expansion in 2009,
we assess the Italian non-paper as right-on-target with its
suggestions to extend NTM-I's training activities to include
the Iraqi Navy and Air Force as well as broader
strategic-level management training in logistics,
administration, and defense procurement. This is a
straight-forward "next step" which builds on already existing
NATO elements here in Iraq.

Political Basis for Continuation of NATO Missions in Iraq
-------------- --------------


5. (S) These new training initiatives come at a critical time
for the GOI as it closely examines its future security
relationships, especially renewal of UNSCR 1723. Based on
discussions with senior Iraqi leaders, we do not expect the
GOI to request UNSCR renewal beyond 2008. As the Alliance
based its decision to launch NTM-I on UN Security Council
resolutions that may not apply beyond 2008, it is appropriate
to examine the political basis by which the Alliance will
continue to operate in Iraq (Ref B). Along these lines, the
Italian non-paper and USNATO response (Ref A) suggest two
different frameworks for continued operations: either a

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structured security cooperation agreement with NATO, similar
to that with Afghanistan, or a partnership program under the
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). We do not believe
either is the right fit for Iraq at this time.


6. (S) The first case, an Afghanistan-like agreement, does
not seem appropriate for Iraq in scope, purpose, or timing.
NTM-I and its 160-person "training-only" detachment is
considerably smaller than the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, which numbers over
40,000 personnel and conducts both kinetic and non-kinetic
operations. Additionally, the time and effort required to
secure this agreement would come at a difficult juncture for
Iraq since lengthy and complicated discussions on Status of
Forces arrangements with the Coalition Forces will commence
in January. Introducing another complex agreement to the GOI
during this same timeframe may overtax Iraq's limited
capacity.


7. (S) The second case, an ICI partnership, comes closer in
scope and purpose to GOI requirements but with the same
timing issues noted in paragraph 6. An ICI partnership
program offers an attractive menu of bilateral activities
which would be useful for the ISF, but many of these are
similar to programs already underway with NTM-I or which
could be undertaken under its current auspices. We would
prefer to build on an already successful NTM-I unless it
proves impossible to develop the political consensus within
the Alliance for continuation beyond 2008. In that case, an
ICI partnership is preferable to no Alliance program at all.
We defer to Embassy Riyadh about political implications for
Saudi Arabia concerning Iraqi ICI membership (ref A).


8. (S) For the near term, Embassy Baghdad suggests a middle
road between these two alternatives. We believe the most
appropriate way-ahead is expansion of the NTM-I mission
initially along the lines of the Italian non-paper, but with
increasing expansion toward activities conducted under the
ICI. This transition period would maintain the basic
structure of NTM-I but would expand some of its activities
beyond the current "training-only" limitation. We defer to
USNATO, but this type of limited partnership that builds on
already existing NTM-I structures would not require approval
at the April summit; rather, it could be postponed for
consideration by the NAC in the fall.

Maliki Visit to NATO
--------------


9. (S) Post concurs that a visit by Prime Minister Maliki to
NATO would be helpful in developing an expanding role for the
Alliance in Iraq.
CROCKER