Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD3750
2007-11-14 18:02:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

KURDISTAN REGION PRIME MINISTER ON PKK AND OIL

Tags:  PGOV PTER EPET ENRG TU IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6254
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3750/01 3181802
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 141802Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4351
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003750 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2017
TAGS: PGOV PTER EPET ENRG TU IZ
SUBJECT: KURDISTAN REGION PRIME MINISTER ON PKK AND OIL

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

This is an Erbil Regional Reconstruction Team message.

Summary
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003750 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2017 TAGS: PGOV PTER EPET ENRG TU IZ SUBJECT: KURDISTAN REGION PRIME MINISTER ON PKK AND OIL Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). This is an Erbil Regional Reconstruction Team message. Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) Ambassador Crocker told Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani on November 8 in Erbil that violent acts by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) must now be permanently stopped, and that the KRG must take strong, visible and effective actions against the PKK throughout the Kurdistan Region. The Ambassador outlined a process through which the PKK could be neutralized, and he stressed the key role to be played by the KRG in that process. PM Barzani stated that all KRG leaders have agreed to move against the PKK as an enemy of the Kurdistan Region. He referred to the PKK as threatening the Kurdistan Region's security and damaging to the KRG's relationships with both Turkey and the United States. He also noted the Kurdistan Region's significant dependence on investments and goods from Turkey. The KRG's Minister of Natural Resources, Ashti Hawrami, defended his ministry's production sharing contracts with international oil companies, stating they serve the Iraqi national interest and are in full compliance with the Iraqi constitution. Hawrami said the KRG fully supports speedy enactment of national hydrocarbons legislation, but he said GOI Oil Minister al-Shahristani remains the "key obstacle" to a comprehensive agreement. Both the PM and Hawrami recognized the value of national legislation and indicated their willingness to use an amended version of the Shura Council text as a basis for discussion. End Summary. ¶2. (U) Undersecretary Jeffery and Ambassadors Crocker, Satterfield and Ries held discussions on November 8 in Erbil with KRG officials including Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, Foreign Minister Falah Mustafa Bakir, and Minister of Natural Resources Ashti Hawrami. The group's same day meeting with KRG President Massoud Barzani is described in septel. Permanent Solution Needed for PKK Problem -------------- ¶3. (C) Ambassador Crocker thanked PM Barzani for the KRG's recent efforts to secure the release of eight Turkish soldiers held hostage by the PKK. The PM called it "a good step in the right direction." He emphasized that the KRG prevented journalists from witnessing the soldiers' release and h
andover to Turkish authorities, in order to prevent potential embarrassment of the Turkish military. The Ambassador highlighted the KRG's level of cooperation with the GOI on PKK-related issues, as it represents a good example of joint action to serve Iraqi national interests. ¶4. (S) The trend of increasing PKK violence must be stopped on a permanent basis, the Ambassador said; this desired state will be best achieved through political rather than military means. He said the KRG must immediately take additional visible steps against the PKK. These should include stopping the flows of PKK terrorists and materials through the Kurdistan Region, impeding financial support for the PKK, detaining PKK personnel whenever possible, and preventing the treatment of wounded PKK fighters in medical facilities. The Ambassador emphasized that the situation has reached a "tipping point," with strong, visible and effective countermeasures now required of the KRG against the PKK. ¶5. (S) Such steps, the Ambassador said, could launch a three-phased approach to addressing the PKK problem. Under Phase 1, the KRG would boost its efforts against PKK personnel and infrastructure, in order to create breathing room for the GOT as it addresses elements of the Turkish population that demand a cross border operation. If Phase 1 were successful, Phase 2 with Turkey would involve expansion of the coordination efforts to encompass the "Eastern part of the problem" -- PJAK and its low intensity fight with Iran. A permanent solution, to be obtained in Phase 3, would likely involve a political agreement, possibly to include a conditional offer of amnesty to PKK members. The Ambassador noted that any discussions of a potential amnesty would be very premature at this point. ¶6. (S) While encouraging the KRG to immediately take visible and meaningful steps against the PKK, Ambassador Crocker said the KRG should also examine "other means" of addressing the PKK problem, if the PKK's violent attacks continue. Should the use of force be required against the PKK, he said the KRG's peshmerga forces could possibly combat the PKK more effectively than the Turkish military, with less damage to civilians and the economic infrastructure of the Kurdistan Region. The PM promised to carefully consider this option. BAGHDAD 00003750 002 OF 003 KRG Promises Stronger Action Against PKK -------------- ¶7. (C) PM Barzani reiterated the KRG's public criticism of the PKK. He said, "the PKK started to be our enemy since ¶1992. Their actions threaten us and what we're trying to build. We will never trust them." PM Barzani admitted the KRG did not aggressively combat the PKK during the past four years, as the KRG feared the PKK would retaliate by supporting attacks by Arab extremists against the Kurdistan Region. He stated the situation has now changed and that the KRG does not want to "be seen as supporting or defending the PKK." He said, "All Kurdish leaders have agreed to move against the PKK." ¶8. (C) The PM acknowledged that the KRG,s economic dependence on Turkey plays a significant role in KRG leaders' deliberations regarding the PKK. The PM said, "a good relationship with Turkey is extremely important to us, and we want the United States to bring Turkey and the KRG closer." He described a nascent trend toward significant Turkish foreign direct investment (FDI). Turkish businesses have invested over US$3 billion in the Kurdistan Region - by far the most of any country - and its annual exports to Iraq total over US$2.7 billion. FM Bakir added that most of the Kurdistan Region's foreign laborers are Turks. KRG: Shahristani "Key Obstacle" to Progress -------------- ¶9. (C) Turning to the stalled discussion of the national hydrocarbons law, the USG delegation emphasized the need to pass this legislation both to spur needed investment in the sector, and as a tangible sign of political reconciliation. KRG Minister of Natural Resources Hawrami stated that GOI Oil Minister Shahristani bears most of the blame for current delays in enactment of a national hydrocarbons law. While he described GOI PM al-Maliki and Deputy PM Salih as "helpful," he described Shahristani as "the key obstacle to progress." Hawrami claimed Shahristani invited anti-constitution, anti-rule of law people to initially draft the national law, and he described their efforts as "a disaster that caused long delays and has never been fixed." Hawrami and Barzani cited their frustration with Shahristani and the lack of progress on national hydrocarbons legislation as the driving forces behind the KRG,s enactment of its regional oil law and its award of production sharing agreements (PSAs) to international oil companies. Hawrami said, "our regional oil law, production sharing contract standards, and our negotiating experiences with international oil companies are a gift to Iraq. The (GOI) should tell Shahristani to learn something from his colleagues in Kurdistan." ¶10. (C) PM Barzani stated the KRG agreed "100 percent" with the February 2007 national hydrocarbons framework text, but stated that the Shura Council's reworking of that text omitted key elements of it. Hawrami said the KRG provided PM al-Maliki with a written description of five elements contained in the February document that were omitted from the Shura Council document. He said the KRG would require inclusion of these elements, which include a commitment to restructure the GOI's Oil Ministry, in any national oil law. He cautioned that the Iraqi National Oil Company should not automatically be granted 93 percent of the exploration blocks, but should compete on commercial terms.Hawrami and the PM agreed that a comprehensive national hydrocarbons law is in the KRG,s best interests, as the KRG will financially benefit from the development of oil fields in southern Iraq ¶11. (C) With regard to the over two dozen PSAs already signed by the KRG with international oil companies, Hawrami said the KRG would have "no problem putting them under review in Baghdad," but he said the reviewing body (likely the Oil and Gas Council to be established by the new national hydrocarbons law) must not have the power to cancel or otherwise unilaterally amend the PSAs. He said, "before such a review would commence, we would want standards agreed upon that will apply to all PSCs nationwide." Hawrami also said the KRG does not wish to publicly acknowledge that it would submit to a central government review of its existing PSAs, as such an announcement would "undermine efforts to negotiate additional PSAs and slow the speed of investment in the Kurdistan Regions hydrocarbons sector." Hawrami stated that all PSAs in the Kurdistan Region now generally correspond to the terms of the KRG,s model PSA, which is available on the KRG website. He said, "we don't want to be accused that we're hiding anything. If the Ministry of Oil in Baghdad achieves the terms I've negotiated with the international oil companies, I would be very proud of them." ¶12. (C) In a separate meeting on November 9, Hawrami indicated that he thinks an agreement is very close using a BAGHDAD 00003750 003 OF 003 July 14 version of the Shura Council text. He explained that the remaining differences textually revolve around the power of the federal government as opposed to regional government powers, but at heart they are based on a lack of trust. He remarked that PM Barzani had sent an amended text to PM Maliki in July, but had received no reply. Nevertheless, the KRG is willing to continue discussions. ¶13. (S) Comment: PM Barzani spoke strongly about the need to combat the PKK and his personal engagement in coordinating KRG efforts is a good sign. The USG will need to continue pressing the KRG to take actions that lead to visible progress. On hydrocarbons, both KRG Minister of Natural Resources Hawrami and PM Barzani defended the KRG,s decision to proceed with the regional law and sign PSAs. The poisoned relationship with Shahristani will make new discussions difficult, but they said the KRG would engage with the GOI on the issue. End Comment. CROCKER

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -