SADRISTS PLOT OUSTER OF KEY MUTHANNA COMMANDER

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003737 SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D C O P Y TO CHANGE CLASSIFICATION SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2017 TAGS: PINS PGOV IZ PREL SUBJECT: SADRISTS PLOT OUSTER OF KEY MUTHANNA COMMANDER REF: A. A. BAGHDAD 2511 ¶B. B. BAGHDAD 3330 BAGHDAD 00003737 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Muthanna Provincial Reconstruction Team Leader Paul O,Fr iel for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is a PRT Muthanna reporting cable. This is an action request. Please see paragraph 6. ¶2. (S/REL MNF-I) SUMMARY: Sadrists and Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) leaders in Baghdad have nearly succeeded in pressuring Prime Minister Maliki and Interior Minister Bolani to fire Colonel Ali Najm Mutasher al-Khawam, commander of Muthanna,s elite Criminal Intelligence Unit (CIU). Colonel Ali is the most professional, effective, and anti-JAM security official in Muthanna. His CIU unit, a 400-man force of whom only 30 conduct strike operations, is the only force in Muthanna willing and able to execute operations against JAM. With his small cadre of hand-picked and dedicated men, Colonel Ali has clamped down on JAM repeatedly since the ISF-JAM clashes of November 2006 and succeeded in bringing the militia,s power and influence in Muthanna to an all-time low. His ouster would lead to a serious deterioration in security in Muthanna, allowing JAM to reassert itself and opening the door to spillover violence from Diwaniya and Basra. The corrosive effect this would have on governmental institutions and performance and on Coalition efforts to encourage the rule of law and stimulate reconstruction would be dire. Urgent MNF-I and Embassy intervention is required to forestall this outcome. END SUMMARY. JAM,s Enemy # 1: Col. Ali's Precarious Position -------------- -- ¶3. (S/REL MNF-I) Since late 2006, JAM local and national leaders have realized that Colonel Ali is their most powerful opponent in Muthanna. Several assassination attempts, including an EFP strike, have failed. Additionally, four previous attempts to pressure Maliki and the MOI to sack or transfer Colonel Ali failed because of the intervention of Muthanna,s late governor, Muhammad Ali al-Hassani. Hassani, a longtime Badr officer with excellent Baghdad connections, appealed twice to Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, once to Ammar al-Hakim, and then finally to Maliki himself. Each time he successfully forestalled the Sadrists' removal of Colonel Ali. ¶4. (S/REL MNF-I) The man who succeeded Hassani as governor after the latter,s assassination, Ahmed Marzook al-Salal, is much weaker than his predecessor and lacks clout in Baghdad. This has stripped Colonel Ali of political protection from JAM's leaders and enablers. Leading Sadrists immediately capitalized by pressuring General Adnan Zurfi and the Interior Minister to activate a letter they had previously sought to enact in early 2007 sacking Colonel Ali for his Ba,th Party past. (Comment: Adnan al-Zurfi is a close friend of Maliki picked by the latter to be in charge of intelligence matters in the MOI. End Comment.) This tactic, of eliminating the most senior and competent commanders for their past political affiliation, is a common method by which Sadrist and JAM leaders eliminate their opponents (ref A). The late Governor Hassani,s efforts had kept this letter dormant in MOI until his assassination in August 2007. (Comment: Under the former regime, Colonel Ali was a major in the internal security division. He had responsibility for the Ghamas district of Najaf and was a firqa or shuuba level Ba,th party member. It is a testament to his professionalism that even having served in such a provocative position he is widely respected by the officials and citizens of Muthanna, and believed to be the only man capable of keeping Muthanna secure. End Comment.) Desperate Measures: Only Days Remain -------------- ¶5. (S/REL MNF-I) For the last three months, Zurfi has blocked Colonel Ali from receiving his MOI salary and withheld from the CIU the operating funds it needs to maintain its equipment or pay informants. In desperation, Colonel Ali,s men pooled contributions from their own wages to keep the department running, and the Muthanna Police Directorate performed some accounting sleight-of-hand to covertly pay Colonel Ali a salary. On October 4, a letter from the MOI arrived in Muthanna announcing Colonel Ali,s imminent replacement by a Brigadier General named Majeed Zeboon. BG Zeboon has not yet arrived, however, because local officials in Muthanna have been making last ditch efforts to prevent Colonel Ali,s ouster. The consensus on all sides is that these efforts will fail and that it is only a matter of days before Colonel Ali is forced out. ¶6. (S/REL MNF-I) COMMENT: The ouster of Colonel Ali would have grave consequences for Muthanna and the broader southern BAGHDAD 00003737 002.2 OF 002 region. It is unlikely that anything short of intervention by Ambassador Crocker and/or General Petraeus with the PM would prevent this. Over the long run, it is aggressive and anti-militia commanders of special units like Colonel Ali who will maintain security in Shi'ite southern Iraq, particularly in PIC provinces (ref B). But security will be fragile and fleeting until these commanders are protected from political manipulation by militias' supporters in Baghdad. END COMMENT. CROCKER