MALIKI'S ADVISORS PRESSED ON DE-BA'ATH, EXPRESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003736

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2017
TAGS: IZ PGOV
SUBJECT: MALIKI'S ADVISORS PRESSED ON DE-BA'ATH, EXPRESS
DOUBT ABOUT HASHIMI

Classified By: Pol Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Sadiq Rikabi and Gorges Bakous, both advisors to PM
Maliki, met with Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State and
Coordinator for Iraq Ambassador David Satterfield, Special
Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Iraq and
Afghanistan Brett McGurk, and Political Counselor Matthew
Tueller on November 12th. In the meeting Satterfield
emphasized the importance of seeing progress on
De-Ba'athification reform legislation and warned that POTUS
expected prompt action. Rikabi asked for U.S. advice on how
to move the legislation and expressed doubts over the
intentions of VP Hashimi. He confirmed Maliki's support for
a U.S.-Iraq partnership declaration but worried about a
possible public backlash. Both sides agreed that the Anbar
model needed to be replicated elsewhere in Iraq and that a
key to its success was transitioning members of Concerned
Local Citizens (CLCs) groups to other employment
opportunities.

Must See Progress on De-Ba'athification
--------------


2. (C) Satterfield opened the meeting by emphasizing the
importance of seeing progress on De-Ba'athification reform
legislation by November 14th. He explained that the U.S.
does not understand why 10 weeks had passed since the August
26 "Leaders' Declaration" and no concrete action had been
taken on any of the legislative issues - including De-Ba'ath
reform - upon which ostensible formal agreement had been
reached. The Prime Minister's constantly shifting
explanation of why the "Leader's Draft" of the De-Ba'ath
reform had not yet moved to the Council of Representatives
(COR) and questions about the support of other participants
in the August 26 Declaration did not build USG confidence.
Action to move the correct "Leaders' draft" to the COR needed
to take place immediately - whether through the Council of
Ministers or, as now appeared most expeditious and practical,
from the Presidency Council. Waiting for the COR to act to
vote down the present De-Ba'ath draft now before it (draft A)
was not a viable option. If the new draft does not reach the
COR "we will not accept the excuse that the COR didn't cancel
the law," regardless of draft A's status, noted Satterfield.
Rikabi promised to speak to the PM on the issue and asked for
U.S. guidance on how best to move the legislation to the COR.
Both parties ultimately agreed the best solution is for the
leader's draft to come from the Presidency Council.

Concerns about Hashimi
--------------


3. (C) Rikabi was eager to talk about VP Tariq al-Hashimi
and repeatedly expressed doubt over Hashimi's intentions
towards the Iraqi government. "We don't understand his
position," he said, "is he in the government or would he like
to stop everything?" He complained about Hashimi's vetoes of
COR legislation, including the Japanese loan package, and
compared Hashimi's use of vetoes to the actions of the Soviet
Union on the UN Security Council during the Cold War. Bakous
said most of the failure attributed to the government was
actually the fault of Hashimi and worried that Hashimi was
planning to withdraw from government entirely. Satterfield
said he was meeting Hashimi that evening and promised to call
Rikabi to give his impressions afterwards. (Note: Al-Hasimi
told Ambassadors Crocker and Satterfield that he "strongly
supported" the Presidency Council taking immediate action to
send the "Leaders' Draft" of De-Ba'ath reform to the COR.
End Note.)

Strategic Partnership Declaration
--------------


4. (C) Rikabi said the PM's office and the U.S. were
"identical" on the draft U.S.-Iraq partnership declaration.
However, he warned that the PM would face condemnation from
the public for signing the document. "He will be crucified,"
added Bakous. Both advisors said to guard against backlash
the document needed the support of the Presidency Council.
Satterfield asked about the technical details of the signing
ceremony and recommended it occur during the November 20th
DVC with POTUS.

Baqubah failures and Anbar successes
--------------


5. (C) Satterfield said the Anbar model needs to be
replicated elsewhere in Iraq, adding that "it is an important
example of success but we need to see successes in more
difficult areas". What worked for Anbar appears to be
failing in Diyalah. Discussing his recent visit to Baqubah,
he said the Provincial Council is ineffective, its Concerned
Local Citizens groups face infiltration by militants, and the

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role of the Diyala Support Committee is unhelpful. Rikabi
said he agreed "100%" the Anbar model needed to be replicated
but emphasized the differences between Anbar and Diyala. He
said the Anbar tribes want to participate in the political
process and urge their sons to join the Iraqi Army, while the
tribes in Diyala do not respect the central government and
have not disbanded their militias. Rikabi explained that
Maliki wants to ask local people to nominate individuals for
the CLC and stop dealing with armed groups that do not
recognize the national government. Satterfield mentioned the
existence of a prohibition against locally hiring police
officers in Diyala, saying new police officers were all Shi'a
and brought in from outside the governorate. Rikabi
expressed surprise over the prohibition and agreed the
sectarian composition of the police force should match the
local population. Satterfield emphasized the importance of
transitioning from the CLCs through integrating members into
the Iraqi forces and providing government assistance for job
creation. Rikabi responded that the PM agrees and the only
remaining question is how to implement the transition.

Confusion over ministers, amnesty
--------------


6. (C) Asked about whether Tawafuq's ministers would be
replaced, Rikabi said it was illegal for the ministers to
abandon their ministries and complained the PM kept receiving
contradictory messages over whether they would return.
Satterfield also asked Rikabi about any plans to offer a
general amnesty, saying it was an important initiative that
the U.S. would support. Rikabi said he had no specific
information on any draft amnesty law but promised to
follow-up on the issue.
CROCKER