Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD3731
2007-11-13 09:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

TALABANI REITERATES STANCE ON STRATEGIC

Tags:  PGOV PREL IZ 
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VZCZCXRO4488
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3731/01 3170904
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 130904Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4324
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003731 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: TALABANI REITERATES STANCE ON STRATEGIC
PARTNERSHIP, DE-BAATH


Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003731

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: TALABANI REITERATES STANCE ON STRATEGIC
PARTNERSHIP, DE-BAATH


Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Iraqi President Jalal Talabani told
Ambassadors Crocker and Satterfield on November 9 that he
would agree to whatever changes the Embassy wanted to Vice
President Mahdi's draft of the strategic partnership paper.
He said the Presidency would send the leaders' draft of the
de-Baathification law to the Council of Representatives if
the Council of Ministers did not. He and Deputy PM Barham
Saleh were pessimistic that the Deputies meetings or the 3 1
would reconvene soon. He was also pessimistic on the future
of hydrocarbons legislation. Barham Saleh reported on the
status of budget discussions with the IMF.

Strategic Partnership
--------------


2. (C) Talabani told the Ambassador the Presidency preferred
Vice President Mahdi's "clearer" draft of the strategic
partnership paper to the Prime Minister's draft, which Deputy
PM Barham Saleh termed "full of fluff." Talabani said he had
spoken to National Security Advisor Rubaie on this topic at
the behest of the PM, but he complained that Rubaie had done
nothing and that all the work the Presidency had been doing
on this and other issues was eventually nullified by the
"dishdasha government" of Maliki's closest advisors. Told
the Embassy had some changes to Mahdi's draft, Talabani said
he would accept whatever changes we had and sign the document
before he left the next day for a 10 day trip to Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, and Kuwait. He told the Ambassador that he
would empower VP Mahdi to send forward the revised draft in
his absence.

Presidency will send de-Baathification Draft
--------------


3. (C) Talabani reiterated his commitment to send the
de-Baathification leaders' draft to the Council of
Representatives (CoR) if the Council of Ministers (CoM)
failed to do so at their regular November 13 meeting. Saleh
said the emergency session of the CoM called for November 12
would tackle GOI budget issues, not de-Baathification.
Talabani expressed concern that the PM be given the
opportunity to send the leaders' draft to the CoR via the
CoM, but he said the PM told him that not all the ministers
agree. Talabani promised to prepare the necessary documents
for sending the draft to the CoR in advance of his departure
and agreed to authorize Mahdi to submit it as appropriate.

Deputies, 3 1 Meetings Unlikely to be Soon
--------------


4. (C) The Ambassador called for the reactivation of the
so-called Deputies Preparatory Group meetings. He told
Talabani and Saleh that he had encouraged Rowsh Shaways, the
KDP designee to the Deputies meetings, to return to Baghdad.
Saleh said that they lacked the political will to hold
successful meetings, explaining that ISCI/Badr representative
Hadi Amiri had said he was not yet ready to come back to the
table until the PM began respecting the will of his
representatives. Talabani interjected that an appeal to
Saudi leaders is the only way to pressure Hashimi and Sunnis
like Khalaf Ulayan to negotiate.


5. (C) Talabani, himself still visibly agitated over the
issue, said the row over the dismissal of the Tawafuq
ministers had soured PM-Hashimi relations and would prevent a
successful 3 1 in the near future. The Ambassador urged
Talabani to use the Kurds' influence to force the PM to
listen. Talabani agreed, saying that they must alter their
language from that of support to that of threat to withdraw.

Hydrocarbons Going Nowhere
--------------


6. (C) Ambassador said his meetings with KRG PM Nechirvan
Barzani and KRG Oil Minster Ashti Hawrami was discouraging.
Talabani agreed, saying negotiating with Ashti is impossible.
He stated that disagreements remain between PUK and KDP on
hydrocarbons, and he feared that Ashti and the KDP were
"leading the Kurdish people to catastrophe." He thought the
only way to resolve hydrocarbons issues was to get KRG
President Masood Barzani and Nechirvan to visit Baghdad.

Saleh on the Budget, Investment
--------------


7. (C) Saleh said that the IMF was pressing the GOI to
include only a $5 billion deficit in the 2008 budget, whereas
he preferred $8 billion, saying "This is not the year for
being prudent." This would allow $12 billion of the budget
for investment, with a $4 billion rollover from 2007, for a

BAGHDAD 00003731 002 OF 002


total of $16 billion in investment for 2008, according to
Saleh.
CROCKER

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