DFM ABBAWI DISCUSSES ISTANBUL, PKK, AND IRAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003697

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER IR IZ SA
SUBJECT: DFM ABBAWI DISCUSSES ISTANBUL, PKK, AND IRAN

Classified By: POL-MIL MINISTER-COUNSELOR MARCIE B. RIES, REASONS 1.4(B
) AND (D)


1. (S) SUMMARY: Pol-Mil M/C called on Deputy Foreign Minister
Abbawi November 6 to discuss his impressions of the Istanbul
Neighbors Ministerial, progress on dealing with the PKK, and
setting up trilateral talks with Iran. Abbawi was pleased
with Istanbul and praised Turkish cooperation at the
ministerial. He assessed that tensions with Turkey regarding
the PKK had been lowered and that the next step was
regularizing Kurdish participation in dialogue with Turkey.
Abbawi agreed to propose a second round of trilateral talks
with Iran at the sub-ambassadorial level for late November.
Syrian officials told him that they were ready to open their
side of the border at Al Qaim but were not likely to
participate in the ceremony. Abbawi concluded by raising the
Saudi failure to participate in the Border Security Working
Group Technical Experts meeting in Kuwait. END SUMMARY.

ISTANBUL: ATMOSPHERE, TURKISH ATTITUDE POSITIVE
-------------- --


2. (S) Pol-Mil Minister Counselor called on Deputy Foreign
Minister Labeed Abbawi November 6. Abbawi was very positive
regarding the atmosphere at the Neighbors Ministerial in
Istanbul, regarding it as a step forward from the first
ministerial at Sharm el Sheikh. He regarded the final
communiqu? as a good document and appreciated the &very
good8 cooperation from the Turks in accepting the many
changes requested by the GOI. By contrast, he regarded the
Syrian interventions (&the same old rhetoric8) as
problematic. Abbawi described the Iranian &plan8 for Iraq
as &very provocative8, like a big brother telling Iraq what
to do.

PKK ISSUE ON THE RIGHT TRACK
--------------


3. (S) Abbawi assessed that discussions at Istanbul had
defused tensions with Turkey regarding the PKK to some degree
and that the GOI had managed to send a message to the Turkish
public that Iraq was cooperating with Turkey regarding the
PKK, countering the negative press Iraq had been getting.
While Turkey might yet &do something8 up north in the
mountains, Abbawi thought that more extensive Turkish
military action might have been averted. The GOI agreed with
Secretary Rice,s view expressed at the trilateral that the

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three governments needed to think strategically about how to
tackle the problem. Maintaining the positive atmosphere
generated at Istanbul would allow dialogue on the PKK to
continue. Getting Turkey to routinely accept Kurdish
representation within GOI delegations would be a key next
step. The Kurds must understand that they cannot ease up on
the PKK, but ultimately a solution will require the PKK to
lay down their arms in exchange for amnesty from Turkey.
There is significant sympathy for the PKK throughout
Kurdistan, although it is not always expressed around
outsiders, noted Abbawi. He related an anecdote about a shop
clerk selling a PKK flag literally under the table when
Abbawi was in Kurdistan with a visiting with a group of
foreign dignitaries.


4. (S) Pol-Mil M/C praised the GOI for taking an assertive
role, pursuing diplomacy, and encouraging concrete actions by
the KRG. This was likely a fundamental advance from a
Turkish perspective, as was KRG willingness to take specific
measures. Continued visible actions against the PKK will be
necessary to enable the Turks to continue on the path of
diplomacy. Pol-Mil M/C notified Abbawi that approximately
200 Interpol red notices had been issued for PKK operatives,
and that we would be passing these to the GOI. It would be
very important for the Turks to see arrests of PKK officials.
While we did not yet have a lengthy readout from PM
Erdogan,s meeting with the President, Turkey seemed to be
pleased that the U.S. had declared the PKK to be our problem,
not just theirs. Though Turkey has been bringing up the
perceived failure of the previous trilateral process
regarding the PKK, we will need to move forward with
trilateral efforts to reach a solution, concluded Pol-Mil M/C.

TRILATERAL WITH IRAN
--------------


5. (S) Abbawi explained that Iranian Ambassador Ghomi,s
statement that Iran was waiting for a note from the U.S.
through the Swiss channel conflicted with public statements
that Iran was ready for further trilateral talks whenever the
Iraqis set a date. Abbawi agreed that the talks should take
place between November 20-30 and indicated that he would

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follow up with the Iranians. Pol-Mil M/C explained that the
next round would be at the sub-ambassadorial level and that
she would lead the U.S. delegation as at the first round of
the trilateral security subcommittee on August 6. She
predicted that the parties would be able to engage in a more
substantive way than in the first round since the format had
now been established.


6. (S) Pol-Mil M/C told Abbawi that there were some
indications the Iranians were abiding by their commitment to
PM Maliki to cease provision of weapons and support to
illegal militias in Iraq. The U.S. had found large caches of
explosively-formed penetrators (EFPs) in recent weeks, and
would publicize these finds, but we would also state our
belief that they had been sent to Iraq prior to Iran,s
commitment to a cessation of weapons-smuggling. Our most
serious concern was Iranian lethal aid which was still
killing our soldiers. If these shipments stopped, this would
be a major advance. Abbawi confided that he had spoken to PM
Maliki about this matter, and they assessed that the Iranians
now realized they couldn,t use the militias or the Sadrists
to control Iraq. Sadr is not Nasrallah and JAM is not
Lebanese Hezbollah, concluded Abbawi.

AL QAIM REOPENING
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7. (C) Abbawi explained that he had raised the November 15
reopening of the Al Qaim border crossing with the Syrians at
Istanbul. They said they were ready to reopen their side,
but they did not respond substantively to his invitation to
take part in the reopening ceremony. He said he would follow
up with the SARG regarding the invitation, but he was not
hopeful.

SAUDI NONPARTICIPATION IN BSWG
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8. (C) Abbawi raised Saudi nonparticipation in the October
21-22 Border Security Technical Experts meeting in Kuwait as
an indicator of their continued cold attitude towards this
working group. Saudi Arabia did attend the Neighbors
Interior Ministers meeting in Kuwait October 23, but refused
to allow the results of the technical experts meeting to be
placed on the agenda. Abbawi seeks U.S. help in convincing
the Saudis to participate in the Border Security Working
Group. NOTE: Saudi Arabia also failed to participate in the
initial Border Security Working Group meeting in Damascus
August 8-9. END NOTE.


9. (C) COMMENT: Post requests that the USG seek assurances
from the Saudi government that they will attend the next
Border Security Working Group meeting expected to be hosted
in Damascus. END COMMENT.


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