PRT NINEWA:LENDING MARKET IS DRY BUT SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003675 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2017 TAGS: EAGR EAID EINV IZ PGOV PTER SUBJECT: PRT NINEWA:LENDING MARKET IS DRY BUT SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS AND BAGHDAD ACTION COULD GET FUNDS FLOWING AGAIN BAGHDAD 00003675 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ninewa PRT Leader Jason Hyland: for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). (U) 1. This is a Ninewa Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) message. Summary -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Ninewa banks have nearly ceased providing loans to the private sector, citing dual security-related constraints on the enforcement of loan terms and on general economic activity. State-owned banks complain that a lack of authority, funds and staff also restrict their operations. The little lending that does occur is in government lending institutions, like the Agriculture Bank, using government-linked collateral. While near-term solutions like non-bank microlending may improve Ninewa's credit environment, two systemic improvements would provide the framework to support provincial lending: increased support for loan collection and a lowering of the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) deposit rate. Fearful Bankers and Officials Avoid Confrontation -------------- ¶3. (C) In meetings over the last three months, private and state-owned bank managers in Mosul complained to the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) that criminal kidnappings and homicides of bank employees scare them away from trying to enforce loan repayment. When unpaid loans come due, the managers said they regularly issue the borrowers a new loan to roll over their debt to avoid the complications and hazards of trying to force repayment through the legal system. One manager cited 14 specific bad debts that he tried to resolve since 2003. Each debt was backed by buildings used as collateral, which he tried to seize by working through the local real estate office of the Director General of Municipalities. The manager said that office refused to support the seizure and auction of the borrowers' land, even though it had been staked as collateral, because of fear of criminal retribution as well as administrative delays in registering and assessing land. Restricted Bank Access, Economic Activity Down -------------- ¶4. (C) Bank managers throughout Ninewa, northern Iraq, lamented the negative affects of road closures and transportation insecurity on the economic activity that would normally drive lending. Checkpoints on a bridge near several Mosul banks have practically eliminated access for what two bankers estimate to be 500,000 daily commuters and potential customers. In the western Ninewa city of Tal Afar, a bank manager says his customers would normally be inter-city traders but that a lack of fuel and attacks on the main road to Mosul have severely limited their business, and correspondingly reduced their need for banking services. Street closures also impede the banks' own activities, as managers are forced to hand-carry deposits to the local CBI offices. Lack of Central Support for Banking Operations -------------- ¶5. (C) Rural Ninewans only have access to the state-owned Al Rafidein Bank and Agriculture Bank, our contacts tell us. While the Agriculture Bank is marginally active (see below), rural Al Rafidein managers in both eastern and western Ninewa complained that they are swamped with government salary and pension payment responsibilities and lack the authority and staffing to expand into lending. The Al Hamdaniya manager said he only has authority to make loans up to USD 5,000, while a Tal Afar manager said he must clear loans of all amounts through his bank's Baghdad headquarters. Tied Lending In Both Public and Private Banks -------------- ¶6. (C) In this financially and administratively restrictive environment, the few Ninewa banks that do lend are using insider loans. For a state-owned institution like the Agriculture Bank, this means that only government-owned BAGHDAD 00003675 002 OF 003 property or the guarantee of four government employees' salaries are acceptable collateral for a loan. (Note: The majority of Ninewa's farmland is actually owned by the government but worked by individual farmers under tribal or individual lease arrangements with the government.) While the state-owned Agriculture Bank looks for lenders who can stake government land and government salaries for their loans, private banks can not similarly garnish government salaries. Nonetheless, the PRT has heard suggestions of insider lending in the private banks. Middle East Bank Mosul Director Mohammed al-Makhion, for example, said his bank "prefers to give loans to shareholders," though his bank,s main office said Middle East Bank investors receive no preference. ¶7. (SBU) The Agricultural Bank appears to be Ninewa's most actively lending bank, with about loans to about 40 farm projects like olive farms, support for wheat and barley farming, and water wells. The bank's five provincial branches make loans up to 25 million Iraqi dinars (about USD 20,000) at as low as 7 percent, well below the private bank interest rates of between 12 and 23 percent. (Note: Bankers say they rarely find a borrower who will pay more than 17 percent interest.) The bank also makes standard of living loans to government employees for up to 3 million Iraqi dinars (about USD 2400) at a rate of 8 percent. Security Demands High Collateral Requirements -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Amid security fears, a lack of authority and cautious management, Ninewa bankers described the few types of collateral they would accept to make one of their rare loans outside the circle of connected borrowers described above. Managers from both private and state-owned banks in both Mosul and rural areas agree on their preferred collateral: commercial buildings assessed at two to three times the value of the loan. In addition, private Mosul bankers said they would accept gold, CBI bonds and bank shares valued at about 40 percent of the loan and set aside with the lender. The banks said they do not take undeveloped land as collateral, a policy they said was generally true before 2003 as well. Bare land lacks any structures with auction value, the bankers said. In addition, Ninewa bankers said that most rural land in the province is actually owned by the government and could not be used as collateral until a national property rights law puts tribal and government leased land under the ownership of local residents. No Local Organization, No Desire for USG Help -------------- ¶9. (C) Ninewa bankers uniformly rejected offers of USG assistance and training, explaining that they understand how to conduct profitable local banking operations if only the security situation were improved. The bankers said they never meet as a group, nor are they interested in joint advocacy directed at the GOI. Even the CBI northern region interim director, whose office is in Mosul, said he conducts little training, oversight or advocacy efforts for the banks under his purview. (Note: The last head of the CBI northern region, a close USG contact, was assassinated in May 2007.) Non-bank Lending Can Help but ... -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Microlending of less than USD 5,000 through non-bank organizations and institutions could meet a small portion of Ninewa's credit needs. The PRT is supporting an expansion of microlending to more rural towns and Mosul neighborhoods through increased capacity at the Ninewa Business Center, which has a microcredit portfolio size of more than USD 2 million through 400 loans, the Tal Afar Economic Development Center, which has about USD 100,000 out in 50 microloans, and new rural institutions. ... Insecurity Plagues Disorganized MOLSA Loans -------------- -- ¶11. (C) Ninewa's Employment Service Center, an institution of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, is also working to provide microloans through Deputy Prime Minister Barhem Saleh's national microloan program. However, the Ninewa portion of the program may never get off the ground because of security and organizational problems. The center's director said she has received numerous threats from individuals who say the program's stipulation of a 2 percent BAGHDAD 00003675 003 OF 003 interest charge is against Islam. As a result, some of her already thinly stretched staff have stopped coming to work. Those who remain lack the lending experience, training and accounting background to properly administer the loans and ensure that the funds go to legitimate borrowers, rather than criminals, the director said. For comparison, a PRT-supported microgrant program used a staff of 20 to distribute 200 grants over four months, while the center's director has three staff to distribute and collect repayments on 3,000 loans of USD 2,400 each over the next year. Comment: Support Collections, Reduce CBI Rate -------------- ¶12. (C) Comment: The work of Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security Forces to improve security should help lessen the impact of criminal activity on the banking system. Simultaneously, GOI institutions could boost lending by assisting banks with efficient court decisions that support loan terms and with an energized local real estate office that enforces collateral seizures, reducing the amount of collateral that wary banks feel they must demand. Finally, the CBI could help make lending more attractive to local bankers by reducing its deposit rate. While the currently high rate may have been emplaced to fight inflation, it leaves bankers no incentive to push credit out to Ninewa's natural traders and entrepreneurs who drive economic growth. With a Ninewa business paying 17 percent on a loan in the best of times, bankers would clearly choose the risk-free CBI deposits of 20 percent or more. Even a reduction in the CBI's deposit rate of a few percentage points would help make local private lending more attractive to local bankers. CROCKER