SADR REPRESENTATIVES MODERATE RHETORIC AND POLICY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003667

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR PINS IZ
SUBJECT: SADR REPRESENTATIVES MODERATE RHETORIC AND POLICY
IN SADR CITY

REF: BAGHDAD 3543

Classified By: ACTING POLCOUNS ELLEN GERMAIN FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d
).


1. (S) SUMMARY: Despite an immediate, angry response from
Sadrists in the Council of Representatives to an October 21
raid in Sadr City by Coalition Forces, the raid did not
trigger notable reactions anywhere in Baghdad, including Sadr
City, according to post's local contacts, Baghdad PRT, and
Baghdad EPRTs. Rather than calling on followers to conduct
street protests or violent reprisals, Muqtadr Al-Sadr's
spokesman responded to the raid by confirming Sadr's
commitment to the "freeze" on hostilities declared in August,
and even hinted that the freeze could be renewed after six
months have elapsed. EPRT engagements in Sadr City, which
resumed less than a week after the raid, took a significant
step forward on October 27 when the EPRT met in Karada
district with almost the entire Sadr City District Council
for the first time in nine months. Shortly thereafer, Sadr
reportedly issued specific injunctions for Jaysh Al-Mahdi
(JAM) in Sadr City not to resist future raids by Coalition
Forces, and not to plant improvised explosive devices. If
true, these instructions may indicate that Sadr has moderated
his oppposition to engagement with the USG by his followers
in Sadr City, the Baghdad stronghold of the Sadrist movement.
Sadr's actions may also form part of a larger Sadr strategy
to consolidate his control over JAM by punishing rogue
factions that disobey his freeze order. In response to these
developments, the EPRT intends to expand its engagements with
leaders in Sadr City, and the Brigade (2/82) plans to
continue "driving a wedge between mainstream JAM and special
groups." END SUMMARY.

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QUIET INSTEAD OF VIOLENCE FOLLOWS RAID IN SADR CITY
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2. (S) Less than 24 hours after an October 21 raid in Sadr
City by Coalition Forces (CF) precipitated widespread media
coverage alleging the death of approximately 50 locals,
Sadrist members of the Council of Representatives (CoR)
issued a call to limit the Coalition's mandate in Iraq.
Local residents of Sector 71 in Sadr City, where the raid
took place, expressed anger and dismay. These residents
included Sadr City District Council Chairman Abdul Hasan
Jbara al Ka-abi, who lives in the area. He cancelled a
planned meeting with the EPRT responsible for Sadr City.


3. (S) These early responses, however, proved isolated and
short-lived. The raid did not trigger notable reactions
anywhere else in Baghdad, including Sadr City, according to
post's local contacts, Baghdad PRT, and Baghdad EPRTs. In
the days following the raid, local leaders in Shia-dominated
Kadhamiya district and the mixed-sect districts of Mansour
and Karkh did not react to or comment about the incident
during meetings with EPRT leaders. Nor did EPRTs observe any
reaction in the outlying districts (qadas) of Baghdad. In
the mixed-sect qada of Taji, leading Shia tribal sheikhs did
not mention the raid during their October 24 meeting with the
EPRT. On the same day, Sadrist-affiliated Deputy Mayor Naeem
Al-Aboub made no mention of the raid during his meeting with
Baghdad PRToffs. Even in Sadr City itself, the atmosphere
remained quiet outside the sector in which the attack
occurred, according to the Brigade and local contacts. On
October 26, when PRToff and poloff asked Sadr City Qa'im
Makam Mohammed Taly Chalab al-Maliki why he did not attend
the funerals of those killed in the raid, he replied, "These
funerals are common in Sadr City." (Note: Baghdad Governor
Hussein Al-Tahan (ISCI/Badr) and Dr. Ahmed Chalabi did attend
the funerals. Governor Tahan told PRT Baghdad on October 24
that he, unlike Prime Minister Maliki and other politicians,
is welcome in Sadr City. End note.)

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SADR SPOKESMAN RE-STATES COMMITMENT TO FREEZE
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4. (C) Rather than focus his public statements on condemning
the Sadr City raid, Muqtadr Al-Sadr confirmed October 28 -
through his spokesman, Salah Al-Ubaydi - his commitment to
the "freeze" announced in August, and even hinted that the
freeze could be renewed after six months. Al-Ubaydi said
that Sadr may choose to extend the cessation of hostilities
if "some Iraqi parties stopped fishing in murky waters and
using their official positions to settle accounts with
Al-Sadr elements on the pretext they were breaking the law."
Even before this public statement, locals in Sadr City
reported October 26 that word had spread in the district
about Sadr's renewed statement of commitment to the
ceasefire.


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SADR DIRECTIVE TO JAM: BACK DOWN IN SADR CITY
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5. (S) Three days after the public statement by Sadr's
spokesman, Sadrist-affiliated Sheikh Shia Al-Faraji told the
EPRT that Sadr issued precise instructions to Jaysh Al-Mahdi
(JAM) in Sadr City:

-- No resistance to American Forces.
-- Do not shoot at the Americans and do not place improvised
explosive devices (IEDs).
-- Do not resist raids because you will endanger families and
children.
-- Sheikhs should help educate the population about these
instructions.

(NOTE: Sheikh Shia Al-Faraji has played a central role since
July in facilitating EPRT communication with Sadrists in Sadr
City. His report seemed credible in light of the significant
decrease since August in violence emanating from Sadr City,
such as rocket and mortar strikes; improvised explosive
devices (IEDs); and marauding attacks into adjacent areas.
END NOTE.)


6. (S) On October 31, two prominent Sadrist-affiliated
Sheikhs in Sadr City independently confirmed Al-Faraji's
report of Sadr's injunction: Sheikh Mazen al Araby, whom
other local Sheikhs commonly refer to as the leading Sheikh
in Sadr City; and Sheikh Abbas Hanoon Ali al Shamoos, a
regular EPRT contact. Sheikh Abbas added that Sadr initially
issued this order during his Salat Al-Juma sermon in the Kufa
Mosque in Najaf on Friday, October 26, and then subsequently
reinforced it more publicly following the October 30
kidnapping in Baghdad of 12 sheikhs from Diyala. According
to Skeikh Abbas, Sadr seeks to distance himself from rogue
JAM elements that kidnapped the sheikhs. Sheikh Abbas said
that Sadr has stated that the kidnappers do not belong to his
movement - they belong to an Iranian-influenced "special
group."

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SADR CITY DAC MEETS USG FOR FIRST TIME IN 9 MONTHS
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7. (S) In another significant development that took place in
the wake of the CF raid into Sadr City, the EPRT met October
27 with almost the entire Sadr City District Council (DAC)
for the first time in nine months. The meeting took place
outside of Sadr City in the Karada district, and included 36
of 40 Sadr City DAC members. DAC Members Dr. Heyder
Al-Musawi and Kuder Jabar told poloff November 1 that DAC
members last came together as a group to meet USG officials
in February. While ten DAC members have met secretly with
State Department officials and Coalition Forces during the
past nine months, the vast majority of the DAC has refused to
maintain any contact with the USG. Deputy Chairman Kareem
Mutashar Shindi, who also reportedly maintains very strong
ties to JAM, led the unusual meeting. (NOTE: The Sadrist DAC
Chairman, Abdul Hasan Jbara al Ka-abi, approved the meeting
but could not attend; he was absent due to a prior engagement
scheduled at the Provincial Council, according to Al-Musawi.
END NOTE.) After spending the majority of the 90-minute
engagement complaining about CF raids, DAC members agreed to
establish a working group to meet regularly with the EPRT.
The next scheduled engagement will take place in Karada again
on November 10.

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DRIVING A WEDGE BETWEEN JAM AND SPECIAL GROUPS
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8. (S) COMMENT: This meeting and the DAC's commitment to
regular interaction with USG officials marks a significant
step forward in EPRT attempts to engage with Sadr City's
leaders (reftel),especially since it followed closely upon a
widely publicized CF raid in Sadr City. At least on the
surface, the meeting appears to send a clear signal that the
Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS) has moderated its prior
opposition to engagement with the USG. Willingness among the
overwhelming majority of Sadr City DAC members to meet
American officials indicates that they likely received prior
approval from JAM commanders and OMS. The meeting reflects a
diminution among DAC members of their fear that violent
reprisal will follow any meeting with U.S. representatives.
Since extremist JAM members have in the past conducted these
reprisal attacks, the meeting's high attendance suggests that
mainstream JAM leaders may have even provided implicit
assurance to DAC members that they will protect them from
attack by rogue JAM elements or special groups.


9. (S) COMMENT CONTINUED: Analysts at the Brigade covering

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Sadr City believe that Sadr's effort to identify and isolate
rogue JAM groups provides the key to understanding these
recent developments in Sadr City. By clarifying and
reiterating his freeze order, Sadr has set the stage for
disloyal groups to identify themselves by disobeying his
instructions. After they have revealed their disobedience,
Sadr appears to withdraw rhetorical and militia support from
them. Without the support of mainstream JAM, Brigade
analysts argue, these groups must stand alone against CF
raids - which helps Sadr to weaken or eliminate them. Thus
Sadr's directive not to resist CF assaults and the increasing
willingness among local leaders to meet USG officials may
form part of a larger Sadr strategy to consolidate his
control over JAM. Whatever Sadr's actual long-term strategy,
the practical results ) more moderate rhetoric and policy in
Sadr City ) are encouraging. Hence the Brigade plans to
continue, in the words of a Brigade Major, "driving a wedge
between mainstream JAM and special groups," and the EPRT
intends to expand its engagements with leaders in Sadr City.
END COMMENT.
CROCKER