SADR REPRESENTATIVES MODERATE RHETORIC AND POLICY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003667 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2017 TAGS: PGOV PINR PINS IZ SUBJECT: SADR REPRESENTATIVES MODERATE RHETORIC AND POLICY IN SADR CITY REF: BAGHDAD 3543 Classified By: ACTING POLCOUNS ELLEN GERMAIN FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d ). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Despite an immediate, angry response from Sadrists in the Council of Representatives to an October 21 raid in Sadr City by Coalition Forces, the raid did not trigger notable reactions anywhere in Baghdad, including Sadr City, according to post's local contacts, Baghdad PRT, and Baghdad EPRTs. Rather than calling on followers to conduct street protests or violent reprisals, Muqtadr Al-Sadr's spokesman responded to the raid by confirming Sadr's commitment to the "freeze" on hostilities declared in August, and even hinted that the freeze could be renewed after six months have elapsed. EPRT engagements in Sadr City, which resumed less than a week after the raid, took a significant step forward on October 27 when the EPRT met in Karada district with almost the entire Sadr City District Council for the first time in nine months. Shortly thereafer, Sadr reportedly issued specific injunctions for Jaysh Al-Mahdi (JAM) in Sadr City not to resist future raids by Coalition Forces, and not to plant improvised explosive devices. If true, these instructions may indicate that Sadr has moderated his oppposition to engagement with the USG by his followers in Sadr City, the Baghdad stronghold of the Sadrist movement. Sadr's actions may also form part of a larger Sadr strategy to consolidate his control over JAM by punishing rogue factions that disobey his freeze order. In response to these developments, the EPRT intends to expand its engagements with leaders in Sadr City, and the Brigade (2/82) plans to continue "driving a wedge between mainstream JAM and special groups." END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- QUIET INSTEAD OF VIOLENCE FOLLOWS RAID IN SADR CITY -------------- -------------- ¶2. (S) Less than 24 hours after an October 21 raid in Sadr City by Coalition Forces (CF) precipitated widespread media coverage alleging the death of approximately 50 locals, Sadrist members of the Council of Representatives (CoR) issued a call to limit the Coalition's mandate in Iraq. Local residents of Sector 71 in Sadr City, where the raid took place, expressed anger and dismay. These residents included Sadr City District Council Chairman Abdul Hasan Jbara al Ka-abi, who lives in the area. He cancelled a planned meeting with the EPRT responsible for Sadr City. ¶3. (S) These early responses, however, proved isolated and short-lived. The raid did not trigger notable reactions anywhere else in Baghdad, including Sadr City, according to post's local contacts, Baghdad PRT, and Baghdad EPRTs. In the days following the raid, local leaders in Shia-dominated Kadhamiya district and the mixed-sect districts of Mansour and Karkh did not react to or comment about the incident during meetings with EPRT leaders. Nor did EPRTs observe any reaction in the outlying districts (qadas) of Baghdad. In the mixed-sect qada of Taji, leading Shia tribal sheikhs did not mention the raid during their October 24 meeting with the EPRT. On the same day, Sadrist-affiliated Deputy Mayor Naeem Al-Aboub made no mention of the raid during his meeting with Baghdad PRToffs. Even in Sadr City itself, the atmosphere remained quiet outside the sector in which the attack occurred, according to the Brigade and local contacts. On October 26, when PRToff and poloff asked Sadr City Qa'im Makam Mohammed Taly Chalab al-Maliki why he did not attend the funerals of those killed in the raid, he replied, "These funerals are common in Sadr City." (Note: Baghdad Governor Hussein Al-Tahan (ISCI/Badr) and Dr. Ahmed Chalabi did attend the funerals. Governor Tahan told PRT Baghdad on October 24 that he, unlike Prime Minister Maliki and other politicians, is welcome in Sadr City. End note.) -------------- SADR SPOKESMAN RE-STATES COMMITMENT TO FREEZE -------------- ¶4. (C) Rather than focus his public statements on condemning the Sadr City raid, Muqtadr Al-Sadr confirmed October 28 - through his spokesman, Salah Al-Ubaydi - his commitment to the "freeze" announced in August, and even hinted that the freeze could be renewed after six months. Al-Ubaydi said that Sadr may choose to extend the cessation of hostilities if "some Iraqi parties stopped fishing in murky waters and using their official positions to settle accounts with Al-Sadr elements on the pretext they were breaking the law." Even before this public statement, locals in Sadr City reported October 26 that word had spread in the district about Sadr's renewed statement of commitment to the ceasefire. BAGHDAD 00003667 002 OF 003 -------------- SADR DIRECTIVE TO JAM: BACK DOWN IN SADR CITY -------------- ¶5. (S) Three days after the public statement by Sadr's spokesman, Sadrist-affiliated Sheikh Shia Al-Faraji told the EPRT that Sadr issued precise instructions to Jaysh Al-Mahdi (JAM) in Sadr City: -- No resistance to American Forces. -- Do not shoot at the Americans and do not place improvised explosive devices (IEDs). -- Do not resist raids because you will endanger families and children. -- Sheikhs should help educate the population about these instructions. (NOTE: Sheikh Shia Al-Faraji has played a central role since July in facilitating EPRT communication with Sadrists in Sadr City. His report seemed credible in light of the significant decrease since August in violence emanating from Sadr City, such as rocket and mortar strikes; improvised explosive devices (IEDs); and marauding attacks into adjacent areas. END NOTE.) ¶6. (S) On October 31, two prominent Sadrist-affiliated Sheikhs in Sadr City independently confirmed Al-Faraji's report of Sadr's injunction: Sheikh Mazen al Araby, whom other local Sheikhs commonly refer to as the leading Sheikh in Sadr City; and Sheikh Abbas Hanoon Ali al Shamoos, a regular EPRT contact. Sheikh Abbas added that Sadr initially issued this order during his Salat Al-Juma sermon in the Kufa Mosque in Najaf on Friday, October 26, and then subsequently reinforced it more publicly following the October 30 kidnapping in Baghdad of 12 sheikhs from Diyala. According to Skeikh Abbas, Sadr seeks to distance himself from rogue JAM elements that kidnapped the sheikhs. Sheikh Abbas said that Sadr has stated that the kidnappers do not belong to his movement - they belong to an Iranian-influenced "special group." -------------- -------------- SADR CITY DAC MEETS USG FOR FIRST TIME IN 9 MONTHS -------------- -------------- ¶7. (S) In another significant development that took place in the wake of the CF raid into Sadr City, the EPRT met October 27 with almost the entire Sadr City District Council (DAC) for the first time in nine months. The meeting took place outside of Sadr City in the Karada district, and included 36 of 40 Sadr City DAC members. DAC Members Dr. Heyder Al-Musawi and Kuder Jabar told poloff November 1 that DAC members last came together as a group to meet USG officials in February. While ten DAC members have met secretly with State Department officials and Coalition Forces during the past nine months, the vast majority of the DAC has refused to maintain any contact with the USG. Deputy Chairman Kareem Mutashar Shindi, who also reportedly maintains very strong ties to JAM, led the unusual meeting. (NOTE: The Sadrist DAC Chairman, Abdul Hasan Jbara al Ka-abi, approved the meeting but could not attend; he was absent due to a prior engagement scheduled at the Provincial Council, according to Al-Musawi. END NOTE.) After spending the majority of the 90-minute engagement complaining about CF raids, DAC members agreed to establish a working group to meet regularly with the EPRT. The next scheduled engagement will take place in Karada again on November 10. -------------- - DRIVING A WEDGE BETWEEN JAM AND SPECIAL GROUPS -------------- - ¶8. (S) COMMENT: This meeting and the DAC's commitment to regular interaction with USG officials marks a significant step forward in EPRT attempts to engage with Sadr City's leaders (reftel),especially since it followed closely upon a widely publicized CF raid in Sadr City. At least on the surface, the meeting appears to send a clear signal that the Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS) has moderated its prior opposition to engagement with the USG. Willingness among the overwhelming majority of Sadr City DAC members to meet American officials indicates that they likely received prior approval from JAM commanders and OMS. The meeting reflects a diminution among DAC members of their fear that violent reprisal will follow any meeting with U.S. representatives. Since extremist JAM members have in the past conducted these reprisal attacks, the meeting's high attendance suggests that mainstream JAM leaders may have even provided implicit assurance to DAC members that they will protect them from attack by rogue JAM elements or special groups. ¶9. (S) COMMENT CONTINUED: Analysts at the Brigade covering BAGHDAD 00003667 003 OF 003 Sadr City believe that Sadr's effort to identify and isolate rogue JAM groups provides the key to understanding these recent developments in Sadr City. By clarifying and reiterating his freeze order, Sadr has set the stage for disloyal groups to identify themselves by disobeying his instructions. After they have revealed their disobedience, Sadr appears to withdraw rhetorical and militia support from them. Without the support of mainstream JAM, Brigade analysts argue, these groups must stand alone against CF raids - which helps Sadr to weaken or eliminate them. Thus Sadr's directive not to resist CF assaults and the increasing willingness among local leaders to meet USG officials may form part of a larger Sadr strategy to consolidate his control over JAM. Whatever Sadr's actual long-term strategy, the practical results ) more moderate rhetoric and policy in Sadr City ) are encouraging. Hence the Brigade plans to continue, in the words of a Brigade Major, "driving a wedge between mainstream JAM and special groups," and the EPRT intends to expand its engagements with leaders in Sadr City. END COMMENT. CROCKER