KRG RAMPS UP CHECK POINTS AROUND QANDIL; IMPACT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003663

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2037
TAGS: PGOV PTER IZ
SUBJECT: KRG RAMPS UP CHECK POINTS AROUND QANDIL; IMPACT
UNCLEAR

Classified By: Classified By Jess Baily, Regional Coordinator for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).

This is an Erbil Regional Reconstruction Team message.


1. (C) Summary: On November 4, RRT Erbil DTL visited five
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) checkpoints leading
toward known PKK areas in the Qandil Mountains. Local
security officials have reinforced efforts to control the
flow of goods and people to the PKK by adding new checkpoints
and increasing personnel at existing checkpoints. Officials
said they took such steps beginning November 3 on the orders
of their superiors. Other actions, such as blocking unpaved
trails, would follow. Expressing no sympathy for the PKK,
local Asayish (internal security) director stressed that the
PKK was hurting the region's interests. What is less clear
is the impact of such measures. Asayish director noted that
the PKK has links in Iran and may just turn toward Iran to
replace any supplies no longer moving north from KRG
territory. Declining to pass judgment on the effectiveness
of such efforts, RRT DTL stressed the importance of
sustaining these efforts in order to isolate the PKK and show
the public (and Turkey) what they are doing. End Summary.


2. (C) KRG Minister of Interior Karim Sinjari organized a
visit on November 4 to allow RRT staff (RRT DTL, ARSO and RSO
LES) to see the new measures to isolate the PKK. A committee
chaired by PM Nechirvan Barzani decided November 1 to take
steps to disrupt the movement of people and goods to the PKK;
implementation reportedly began November 3. Sinjari chose the
site of the RRT's visit: the areas north of Lake Dukan
leading to the Qandil Mountains in the north, where the PKK
has its main bases. The high mountains and rough terrain
make the area difficult for any law enforcement authority to
control. The director of Ranya Asayish Haider Hajji Tany led
RRT group along the road north of Lake Dukan from the town of
Ranya toward the east. The first check point, at a narrow
passage between the mountains east of Ranya and Lake Dukan,
had the most vehicular traffic in the area. Officials said
that they had doubled the number of Asayish forces at the
check point from 6 to 15 and increased the questioning of
drivers, particularly truckers carrying food and other
staples. LES noted that the quality of personnel was higher
than at normal checkpoints in the region.


3. (C) Proceeding and then turning on a road leading north
toward the mountains, RRT staff stopped at a checkpoint on a
road that led directly to known PKK camps and about 30
villages in high, mountainous terrain. According to
officials, a small PKK outpost (manned by two or three
people) stood about five kilometers away. The checkpoint,
staffed with 20 Asayish personnel, is one that journalists
often used to visit PKK. Haider said the journalists were
now being turned away. He added that they were paying close
attention to foodstuff deliveries and were checking amounts
against the rations delivered to the estimated 6,000
villagers. (Note: it is unclear how this vetting process
worked.) Haider said that, if necessary, they could add
personnel to the site. He also emphasized that the villagers
were cooperating in giving the Asayish information about the
PKK.


4. (C) The third checkpoint had just been established on the
morning of November 3. Lying on a road leading north toward
the Iranian border, it consisted of several barriers with
tents for the security personnel; an Iraqi Department of
Border Enforcement post lay two kilometers further up the
road. Haider said the idea was to build a more permanent
check point in the near future. The visit continued north of
the town of Qalat Dizah on a road lined with vendors selling
smuggled Iranian fuel. Haider explained that this was not a
known PKK supply route, but the Asayish had established a new
checkpoint next to a local Peshmerga post in case the PKK
began to use it as an alternative. The final check point was
another newly established one, northwest of the town of Ranya.


5. (C) The local security officials noted repeatedly that
they were working on a new set of orders from above, and
expressed no sympathy for the PKK. "They are working against
our national interests," Haider said, "and we want them to
leave." RRT DTL declined a request to pass judgment on the
effectiveness of the new measures, noting that the local
Asayish were the experts. He did stress, however, the
importance of keeping up the pressure over time. It is not
just a matter of adding new sites or personnel; they need to
block the flow of goods and people to the PKK and show the
public in Iraq and Turkey the results of their efforts.


6. (C) Comment: Local security officials in Ranya were
clearly marching to a new set of orders to block PKK supply
routes. Two of the check points had been established in the
past two days, and all checkpoints had increased personnel.

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Without a baseline, however, it is impossible for RRT
personnel to judge the extent and effectiveness of such
measures. The proof will come over time. In the meantime,
the USG needs to maintain pressure on regional authorities to
isolate PKK, disrupt their supply routes and arrest their
leaders. It is also crucial to encourage them to let the
public in Iraq, Turkey and beyond see proof of their
determination to take concrete steps against the PKK. We
recognize that these checkpoints near the Iranian border may
not be the ones about which Turkey is most concerned, such as
the Zap camp near the Turkish border. As security permits,
we will also endeavour to verify checkpoint activity in that
area. End Comment.
CROCKER