PM MALIKI MEETING WITH CDA AND GEN PETRAEUS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003638 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER BA IR IZ SUBJECT: PM MALIKI MEETING WITH CDA AND GEN PETRAEUS Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Patricia A. Butenis, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: MNF-I Commanding General Petraeus and CDA held their weekly meeting with Prime Minister Maliki November ¶1. They urged Maliki to attend the Istanbul Neighbors Ministerial and discussed Kurdish actions taken against the PKK and the possibility of a Turkish strike against the PKK. Maliki indicated that the Iranians were ready for another trilateral meeting with the U.S. There was an exchange of views on the legal procedure for carrying out the death sentences of Chemical Ali and two others convicted in the Anfal case. CDA and General Petraeus urged that proposed legislation to strip the immunity from PSDs be stopped or delayed. They briefly discussed Iraqi-Bahraini RELATIONS and Foreign Military Sales. END SUMMARY. TURKEY/PKK -------------- ¶2. (S) General Petraeus urged Maliki to attend the November 2-3 Neighbors Ministerial in Istanbul. Maliki related his opinion that it would not be good for President Talabani to attend the Ministerial, although he had not given an opinion directly to President Talabani when they had spoken earlier in the day. Talabani had expressed concern regarding how he would be treated if he went to Istanbul. Maliki related that he would be talking to Turkish PM Erdogan later in the day. ¶3. (S) General Petraeus emphasized that the focus of Turkey's anger is the PKK, not Iraq. If Turkey attacks at all, they will attack the PKK, not Iraq. General Petraeus listed the measures that needed to be taken to forestall an attack, including: getting the hostages released, establishing and announcing checkpoints on PKK supply routes, joint Turkey/Peshmerga checkpoints/patrols, public declaration of a ceasefire by the PKK, the closure of PKK offices, monitoring of Irbil Airport for PKK passengers, and freezing of PKK assets. ¶4. (S) Maliki understood the Turkish need to defend their people and related that the GOT had assured him that they respected Iraq's government and democracy. Maliki talked with Kurdish leaders yesterday and they are eager for a peaceful solution. They are worried that Turkey will hit Kurdish institutions and target KRG President Barzani himself. General Petraeus was skeptical, given that Turkey had over $10 billion invested in Kurdish areas, and reiterated his opinion that Turkey would not go beyond PKK targets. ¶5. (S) Maliki stated that he had put significant pressure on Kurdish leaders to do something about the PKK, and had told them that they must publicly state that the PKK is a terrorist group. He received a list of the things that they are already doing, including improving airport security and closing media/cultural offices of the PKK. They had also said that the Peshmerga were ready to work together with Turkish forces. Maliki expressed his understanding that Turkey must do something, but its action must not go beyond PKK areas and into the cities. General Petraeus and Maliki discussed the difficulty the Turks would face with the terrain and with PKK attacks on their logistics if they tried a major ground operation, agreeing that this would be unlikely. General Petraeus emphasized that Turkish air strikes against the PKK, while likely ineffective, would make a statement. The key was to help Turkey feel that it did not need to take other more serious actions. GOI/KRG actions against the PKK would move the Turks in this direction. IRAN: EFPs, TRILATERAL, DETAINEE RELEASE -------------- ¶6. (S) General Petraeus told Maliki that MNF-I had uncovered the largest cache of explosively-formed projectiles (EFPs) found to date and that they believed these had been smuggled into Iraq several months ago, before Iranian promises were made to Maliki to stop sending such weapons into Iraq. The cache find would be announced in a press conference in the next week or so. MNF-I would announce that the EFPs were believed to have been sent by Iran before its commitments to Maliki. We would also announce that we had requested further trilateral talks at the sub-Ambassadorial level. General Petraeus related his desire to release several Iranian detainees, including possibly two but not all of the Irbil Five, if the situation remained calm. ¶7. (S) Maliki indicated that if some detainees could be released, this would be a strong weapon to push the Iranians. Maliki indicated that the visit of Iranian FM Mottaki had gone well. Mottaki had confirmed that the policy of not sending weapons to Iraq was at the level of a religious BAGHDAD 00003638 002 OF 003 fatwa. The Iranians said they are ready for another trilateral, and expected to receive a note through the Swiss Embassy in Tehran as in the previous round. Maliki related that Iran was putting pressure on the JAM Special Groups, and Moqtada al-Sadr had indicated that this was decreasing their attacks. Maliki referred to reports that some EFPs were now being made in Iraq, but General Petraeus explained that these were of low quality and were readily distinguished from Iranian-made EFPs. ANFAL DEATH PENALTY CASES -------------- ¶8. (S) General Petraeus urged that the case of Chemical Ali be separated from the other two prisoners sentenced to death in the Anfal case and sent to the Presidency Council, since no party was objecting to his execution. The U.S. understood that Iraqi law required the Presidency Council to ratify executions. Maliki said that his understanding of the law was that the Presidency Council had 30 days from the sentencing to sign off on the sentence. After that period, the Government was obliged to carry out the sentence even in the absence of affirmative action by the Presidency Council. General Petraeus stated that this interpretation did not comport with the U.S. understanding of Iraqi legal requirements, although the Supreme Court ruling was not entirely clear, and that the MNF-I Legal Counsel believes that affirmative action by the Presidency Council is required. If Maliki sent Chemical Ali's case forward, it would help resolve the current impasse, and the other two Anfal cases could then follow. Maliki replied that his legal advisors opined that death sentences must be carried out within 30 days and that there was no way to lift the death penalty on those already sentenced, even with action by the Council of Representatives (COR). If sentences were not carried out, the criminal court judges said they will stop working, he complained. Maliki mused that it would be unfortunate if the public got the impression that MNF-I was protecting those sentenced to death. General Petraeus emphasized that the U.S. interpretation is shared by Ambassador Crocker and is based on our legal, not political, opinion. PSD LEGISLATION -------------- ¶9. (S) CDA Butenis related USG concern regarding the legislation recently passed by the Council of Ministers regarding PSD immunity, a copy of which we had yet to receive. She stressed two points: removal of immunity would create serious difficulties for the many organizations, embassies, and NGOs using personal security details (PSDs) as it would for the U.S. Embassy; and a discussion of immunities would be a part of the Long Term Strategic Partnership negotiations we were undertaking with the GOI. In addition, we are working with the Iraqi Minister of Defense on PSD issues through the U.S.-Iraq joint commission at this time. ¶10. (S) CDA asked Maliki to intervene to prevent the PSD legislation from being introduced or passed by the COR at this time, emphasizing that it would be problematic to implement such a change immediately. Maliki agreed that implementation should be gradual, but urged the U.S. not to publicly defend those who had killed Iraqis. The CDA stated that we were not publicly defending them and that we were doing what we could to ensure they faced justice in the U.S. General Petraeus reinforced that a rapid introduction of the law would even affect the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and many other organizations involved with the reconstruction of Iraq. In fact, the law likely would cause the invalidation of contracts with PSD providers. Maliki indicated that he would work with the Embassy and MNF-I on this issue. ¶11. (S) General Petraeus conveyed that he was going to talk to Secretary Gates today and that all U.S.-contracted PSDs would come under U.S. military authority pursuant to an understanding between Secretary Gates and Secretary Rice earlier this week. General Petraeus explained that recent U.S. legislation gave field commanders court-martial authority over U.S. PSDs working for the Department of Defense and that this might be extended to other U.S. PSDs working for U.S. government entities, regardless of constitutional protections for civilians from court martials. NSA Rubaie asked what sort of transition period the U.S. needed for implementation of the PSD legislation, and whether action before Christmas would be possible. General Petraeus indicated that some things would certainly be in place by then while efforts would continue on implementation of other. BAHRAIN -------------- BAGHDAD 00003638 003 OF 003 ¶12. (C) General Petraeus noted that he had just returned from the Coalition Conference in Bahrain. He and Ambassador Crocker had met with the Bahraini Crown Prince, who saw Iraq as the key to regional security. The Crown Prince was very concerned by Iran. Bahrain wanted to improve RELATIONS with Iraq and said that they had received no reply to an earlier invitation to PM to visit. Maliki replied that he had not received such an invitation. General Petraeus urged Maliki to make a visit to the Gulf countries that reached out to him. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES -------------- ¶13. (C) General Petraeus asked Maliki to pressure his ministers to transfer the funds necessary for the MoI to equip its forces. National Security Advisor Rubaie explained that, after his meeting with Deputy Secretary England in Washington, he had concluded that the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program needed to be updated and streamlined. General Petraeus responded that it was moving faster, but that it couldn,t provide equipment in Iraq until it received an order, built the equipment, and sent it, all of which took time. He recommended that the Ministry of Interior transfer money needed to allow its FMS order to go forward. General Petraeus added that MNF-I was planning to give 8,500 up-armored HMMWVs to the Iraqi Security Forces over the next two years as MNF-I received MRAPs, noting that the refurbishment would create jobs for Iraqis at their depot in Taji. BUTENIS