PM MALIKI MEETING WITH CDA AND GEN PETRAEUS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003638

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER BA IR IZ
SUBJECT: PM MALIKI MEETING WITH CDA AND GEN PETRAEUS

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Patricia A. Butenis, Reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)


1. (S) SUMMARY: MNF-I Commanding General Petraeus and CDA
held their weekly meeting with Prime Minister Maliki November

1. They urged Maliki to attend the Istanbul Neighbors
Ministerial and discussed Kurdish actions taken against the
PKK and the possibility of a Turkish strike against the PKK.
Maliki indicated that the Iranians were ready for another
trilateral meeting with the U.S. There was an exchange of
views on the legal procedure for carrying out the death
sentences of Chemical Ali and two others convicted in the
Anfal case. CDA and General Petraeus urged that proposed
legislation to strip the immunity from PSDs be stopped or
delayed. They briefly discussed Iraqi-Bahraini relations and
Foreign Military Sales. END SUMMARY.

TURKEY/PKK
--------------


2. (S) General Petraeus urged Maliki to attend the November
2-3 Neighbors Ministerial in Istanbul. Maliki related his
opinion that it would not be good for President Talabani to
attend the Ministerial, although he had not given an opinion
directly to President Talabani when they had spoken earlier
in the day. Talabani had expressed concern regarding how he
would be treated if he went to Istanbul. Maliki related that
he would be talking to Turkish PM Erdogan later in the day.


3. (S) General Petraeus emphasized that the focus of Turkey's
anger is the PKK, not Iraq. If Turkey attacks at all, they
will attack the PKK, not Iraq. General Petraeus listed the
measures that needed to be taken to forestall an attack,
including: getting the hostages released, establishing and
announcing checkpoints on PKK supply routes, joint
Turkey/Peshmerga checkpoints/patrols, public declaration of a
ceasefire by the PKK, the closure of PKK offices, monitoring
of Irbil Airport for PKK passengers, and freezing of PKK
assets.


4. (S) Maliki understood the Turkish need to defend their
people and related that the GOT had assured him that they
respected Iraq's government and democracy. Maliki talked
with Kurdish leaders yesterday and they are eager for a
peaceful solution. They are worried that Turkey will hit
Kurdish institutions and target KRG President Barzani
himself. General Petraeus was skeptical, given that Turkey
had over $10 billion invested in Kurdish areas, and
reiterated his opinion that Turkey would not go beyond PKK
targets.


5. (S) Maliki stated that he had put significant pressure on
Kurdish leaders to do something about the PKK, and had told
them that they must publicly state that the PKK is a
terrorist group. He received a list of the things that they
are already doing, including improving airport security and
closing media/cultural offices of the PKK. They had also
said that the Peshmerga were ready to work together with
Turkish forces. Maliki expressed his understanding that
Turkey must do something, but its action must not go beyond
PKK areas and into the cities. General Petraeus and Maliki
discussed the difficulty the Turks would face with the
terrain and with PKK attacks on their logistics if they tried
a major ground operation, agreeing that this would be
unlikely. General Petraeus emphasized that Turkish air
strikes against the PKK, while likely ineffective, would make
a statement. The key was to help Turkey feel that it did not
need to take other more serious actions. GOI/KRG actions
against the PKK would move the Turks in this direction.

IRAN: EFPs, TRILATERAL, DETAINEE RELEASE
--------------


6. (S) General Petraeus told Maliki that MNF-I had uncovered
the largest cache of explosively-formed projectiles (EFPs)
found to date and that they believed these had been smuggled
into Iraq several months ago, before Iranian promises were
made to Maliki to stop sending such weapons into Iraq. The
cache find would be announced in a press conference in the
next week or so. MNF-I would announce that the EFPs were
believed to have been sent by Iran before its commitments to
Maliki. We would also announce that we had requested further
trilateral talks at the sub-Ambassadorial level. General
Petraeus related his desire to release several Iranian
detainees, including possibly two but not all of the Irbil
Five, if the situation remained calm.


7. (S) Maliki indicated that if some detainees could be
released, this would be a strong weapon to push the Iranians.
Maliki indicated that the visit of Iranian FM Mottaki had
gone well. Mottaki had confirmed that the policy of not
sending weapons to Iraq was at the level of a religious

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fatwa. The Iranians said they are ready for another
trilateral, and expected to receive a note through the Swiss
Embassy in Tehran as in the previous round. Maliki related
that Iran was putting pressure on the JAM Special Groups, and
Moqtada al-Sadr had indicated that this was decreasing their
attacks. Maliki referred to reports that some EFPs were now
being made in Iraq, but General Petraeus explained that these
were of low quality and were readily distinguished from
Iranian-made EFPs.

ANFAL DEATH PENALTY CASES
--------------


8. (S) General Petraeus urged that the case of Chemical Ali
be separated from the other two prisoners sentenced to death
in the Anfal case and sent to the Presidency Council, since
no party was objecting to his execution. The U.S. understood
that Iraqi law required the Presidency Council to ratify
executions. Maliki said that his understanding of the law
was that the Presidency Council had 30 days from the
sentencing to sign off on the sentence. After that period,
the Government was obliged to carry out the sentence even in
the absence of affirmative action by the Presidency Council.
General Petraeus stated that this interpretation did not
comport with the U.S. understanding of Iraqi legal
requirements, although the Supreme Court ruling was not
entirely clear, and that the MNF-I Legal Counsel believes
that affirmative action by the Presidency Council is
required. If Maliki sent Chemical Ali's case forward, it
would help resolve the current impasse, and the other two
Anfal cases could then follow. Maliki replied that his legal
advisors opined that death sentences must be carried out
within 30 days and that there was no way to lift the death
penalty on those already sentenced, even with action by the
Council of Representatives (COR). If sentences were not
carried out, the criminal court judges said they will stop
working, he complained. Maliki mused that it would be
unfortunate if the public got the impression that MNF-I was
protecting those sentenced to death. General Petraeus
emphasized that the U.S. interpretation is shared by
Ambassador Crocker and is based on our legal, not political,
opinion.

PSD LEGISLATION
--------------


9. (S) CDA Butenis related USG concern regarding the
legislation recently passed by the Council of Ministers
regarding PSD immunity, a copy of which we had yet to
receive. She stressed two points: removal of immunity would
create serious difficulties for the many organizations,
embassies, and NGOs using personal security details (PSDs) as
it would for the U.S. Embassy; and a discussion of immunities
would be a part of the Long Term Strategic Partnership
negotiations we were undertaking with the GOI. In addition,
we are working with the Iraqi Minister of Defense on PSD
issues through the U.S.-Iraq joint commission at this time.


10. (S) CDA asked Maliki to intervene to prevent the PSD
legislation from being introduced or passed by the COR at
this time, emphasizing that it would be problematic to
implement such a change immediately. Maliki agreed that
implementation should be gradual, but urged the U.S. not to
publicly defend those who had killed Iraqis. The CDA stated
that we were not publicly defending them and that we were
doing what we could to ensure they faced justice in the U.S.
General Petraeus reinforced that a rapid introduction of the
law would even affect the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and
many other organizations involved with the reconstruction of
Iraq. In fact, the law likely would cause the invalidation
of contracts with PSD providers. Maliki indicated that he
would work with the Embassy and MNF-I on this issue.


11. (S) General Petraeus conveyed that he was going to talk
to Secretary Gates today and that all U.S.-contracted PSDs
would come under U.S. military authority pursuant to an
understanding between Secretary Gates and Secretary Rice
earlier this week. General Petraeus explained that recent
U.S. legislation gave field commanders court-martial
authority over U.S. PSDs working for the Department of
Defense and that this might be extended to other U.S. PSDs
working for U.S. government entities, regardless of
constitutional protections for civilians from court martials.
NSA Rubaie asked what sort of transition period the U.S.
needed for implementation of the PSD legislation, and whether
action before Christmas would be possible. General Petraeus
indicated that some things would certainly be in place by
then while efforts would continue on implementation of other.

BAHRAIN
--------------


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12. (C) General Petraeus noted that he had just returned from
the Coalition Conference in Bahrain. He and Ambassador
Crocker had met with the Bahraini Crown Prince, who saw Iraq
as the key to regional security. The Crown Prince was very
concerned by Iran. Bahrain wanted to improve relations with
Iraq and said that they had received no reply to an earlier
invitation to PM to visit. Maliki replied that he had not
received such an invitation. General Petraeus urged Maliki
to make a visit to the Gulf countries that reached out to him.

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES
--------------


13. (C) General Petraeus asked Maliki to pressure his
ministers to transfer the funds necessary for the MoI to
equip its forces. National Security Advisor Rubaie explained
that, after his meeting with Deputy Secretary England in
Washington, he had concluded that the U.S. Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) program needed to be updated and streamlined.
General Petraeus responded that it was moving faster, but
that it couldn,t provide equipment in Iraq until it received
an order, built the equipment, and sent it, all of which took
time. He recommended that the Ministry of Interior transfer
money needed to allow its FMS order to go forward. General
Petraeus added that MNF-I was planning to give 8,500
up-armored HMMWVs to the Iraqi Security Forces over the next
two years as MNF-I received MRAPs, noting that the
refurbishment would create jobs for Iraqis at their depot in
Taji.
BUTENIS