VP ABDEL MEHDI ON SPD, TURKEY, ISTANBUL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003634 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SUBJECT: VP ABDEL MEHDI ON SPD, TURKEY, ISTANBUL CONFERENCE, ANFAL, AND LEGISLATION Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Patricia Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Vice President Adel Abdel Mehdi told the Charge on November 1 that Prime Minister Maliki had yet to complete his review of a draft Strategic Partnership Declaration (SPD) and predicted that Maliki's proposed revisions would not differ significantly from the original text. On the PKK-Turkey issue, Adel said he heard that the Turkish hostages had been moved to Irbil, a development that shows "contact" between the PKK, the Kurdish Regional Government, and the Kurdish Democratic Party. He opined the USG must "do something strong" to avert an imminent Turkish incursion into Iraq. He said GOI President Talabani had told him Kurdish forces would fight back against any such incursion, and Adel warned that Kurdish resistance could give Ankara a pretext to drive deep into Kurdistan. Adel said Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki expressed support for Iraq's position on Turkey during his October 31 visit to Baghdad. Regarding Maliki's formal request that we hand over Chemical Ali and other convicted Anfal detainees for execution, Adel said he agreed with our understanding that a prior Presidential decree was required and that he would send a letter on this matter to Maliki. In reply to the CDA's repeated urging of GOI action to ensure enactment of key pending legislation, Adel acknowledged the importance of the draft bills and complained that agreement among Iraqi leaders has not translated into speedy parliamentary action. End Summary. No News on Strategic Partnership Declaration -------------- ¶2. (C) In reply to the CDA's point that we hoped for a timely GOI review with minimal substantive revisions of the draft declaration so as to prepare for a signing ceremony later this month, Adel said that Prime Minister Maliki was working on the draft and Adel was unaware of specific revisions. Noting that the text he and the Embassy had prepared in August was "not an official paper," he said he believed Maliki's revisions would not differ greatly from the August text. Turkey Tension Likely to Overshadow Istanbul Conference -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) The CDA expressed hope that the Istanbul Neighbors Conference would not focus solely on the PKK-Turkey issue, noting that the release of Turkish soldiers held hostage by the PKK is a major issue for Ankara. Adel said he had heard "unofficially" that the Turkish hostages had been moved to Irbil: "this is good news and bad news," he said, "good news because it shows they might be freed but bad news because it shows contact between the PKK, the Kurdish Regional Government, and the Kurdish Democratic Party." After the CDA informed him that we had told Massoud Barzani that the Turkish Government was under a great deal of internal pressure to take action in Iraqi Kurdistan, the Vice President sighed that Barzani made a helpful statement recently but that it should have been made three months ago: in the meantime, the PKK exploited the situation and complicated Turkey's internal political dynamic, thus putting great pressure on Turkey to act. Adel opined that Turkey was waiting for a signal from Washington. If the USG wants to avoid a Turkish military incursion into Iraq, it "must do something strong." He said the Turkish Ambassador to Iraq told him Turkish troops would enter Iraq, and Adel speculated that this will happen unless the Istanbul Conference produced "real measures." He surmised that Turkish concerns go beyond the PKK and include "the whole Kurdistan Regional Government project," noting that the Turkish Ambassador had complained bitterly about Kurdish violence against Iraq's Turkomen community. Adel said he found it hard to imagine that Turkey would let this crisis pass without "doing something" against the PKK in Iraq. ¶4. (C) If Turkish forces enter Iraq, Adel prognosticated, they would likely avoid mountainous areas and concentrate instead on the region around Makmur and Faider. When asked how the GOI would respond, he noted GOI President Talabani told him that Kurdish Peshmerga forces would fight back. Adel said he warned Talabani that the Kurds might fall into a Turkish trap by giving Turkey a pretext to drive deeper inside Kurdistan. Adel said that Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki had visited Baghdad October 31 for talks with FM Zebari, Maliki and others (Adel said he had a lunch meeting with Mottaki) primarily to discuss the Turkey issue and the Istanbul Conference. When pressed for a readout, he said simply that Iran supports the GOI position. In reply to a CDA question, Adel said the issue of Iranian support to Iraqi militias was not discussed. BAGHDAD 00003634 002 OF 002 ¶5. (C) The CDA noted we had expressed concern to the Turks about their cold treatment of the GOI delegation last week, and that we urged Turkey to provide a more respectful welcome to GOI representatives at the upcoming Istanbul Conference. Adel confirmed that neither Talabani nor Maliki had agreed to attend the conference and asked for USG advice on who should attend. After the CDA stated that both had been invited, in spite of our advice to the contrary, and that Maliki should attend, Adel said the Iranians want Maliki to attend. Regarding possible conference deliverables, CDA noted that the Ambassador was visiting many of the Arab capitals that Adel had recently visited in order to discuss Iraq issues with neighboring leaders. Adel mentioned that Egypt will soon open its Embassy in Baghdad, and that Kuwait was looking for a suitable building in which to open an embassy. Anfal Executions -------------- ¶6. (C) The CDA informed Adel that we had received a formal request from PM Maliki that "Chemical Ali" and the other two convicted Anfal detainees be handed over to GOI custody for execution, adding that this approach was contrary to our understanding regarding the need for a prior Presidential Decree on the matter. Adel said he agreed that such a decree was required and that he was in the process of sending a letter on this matter to Maliki. Adel observed that an execution of Anfal defendant Sultan Hashim would be "politically damaging to Iraq" and that Sultan should be imprisoned for life instead. He said that he was talking to GOI lawyers about the proper mechanism to prepare a decree that would permit the execution of Chemical Ali. The CDA emphasized that that while we have no position on the judgment of the Iraqi court, we require GOI consensus before we hand over the convicted detainees. Pending Legislation -------------- ¶7. (C) The CDA pressed for concerted GOI action to ensure speedy passage of key benchmark legislation. Adel threw up his hands and blurted that when Iraq's top leaders talk about such legislation "we have agreement and it all seems so easy, but then the government and the parliament get involved and suddenly everybody wants to discuss every detail and it all becomes so difficult." After the CDA again asked him to push the process forward, he said the pending legislation was important not just for the USG but also for Iraq and Maliki: however, he added, the USG should not lose focus on other important Iraqi progress such as the recently-enacted pensions law, the confirmation of "two good people" as replacement ministers, and an improved security climate. BUTENIS