BAGHDAD'S SCENESETTER FOR THE ISTANBUL MINISTERIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003633

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: BAGHDAD'S SCENESETTER FOR THE ISTANBUL MINISTERIAL


Classified By: Classified by Acting Political Counselor Ellen Germain f
or Reasons 1.4d/b


1. (C) Secretary Rice: After Ambassador Crocker's
September testimony, the widespread feeling within the GOI
was that the Maliki government had shown just enough
political progress to ensure 3-6 additional months of United
States support. We are now close to the two-month
anniversary of the hearings, and, despite continued "hard
security gains won at a high price" the pace of political
reconciliation remains slow. You should use Istanbul to push
senior GOI leadership hard on reconciliation imperatives;
emphasize that the window of time our "security surge" has
bought is narrow and that the GOI must act now to follow on
with a "services surge." Encouraging local developments in
the provinces and in some parts of Baghdad must be matched by
national leadership initiatives that continue and broaden the
momentum. The Turkey/PKK situation on Iraq's border
threatens to take over the ministerial; the crisis prompted
the GOI to consider rescheduling and even now we are not sure
whether Prime Minister Maliki or President Talabani will
attend. There is a danger this issue will dominate much of
the discussion in Istanbul and a key part of your mission
will be to keep the conference focused on Iraq. However,
Istanbul also provides you the chance both to stress that
economic opportunity must follow security gains and to
encourage Iraqi and Neighbors leaders to commit to meeting
that challenge.

NORTHERN BORDER ISSUES
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2. (C) Despite an October 23 visit to Baghdad by Turkish
Foreign Minister Babacan, and an October 26 visit by a
high-level Iraqi delegation to Ankara, headed by Minister of
Defense Abdul Kader, the Iraqis have still not put in place
the type of concrete actions against the PKK that Turkey is
demanding, including capturing and extraditing PKK leaders
and closing PKK offices in Kurdistan. Eight Turkish soldiers
are still being held hostage by the PKK. Senior GOI
officials and KRG President Massud Barzani have made strong
statements condemning the PKK, but the Turks have made clear
that is not good enough.


3. (C) The high-level visits left the GOI convinced that a
major cross-border operation was imminent. In response,
instead of going after the PKK, the GOI has developed a
strategy that involves reaching out to both the Arab League
and the European Union for support. This strategy risks
internationalizing and polarizing what until now has been a
local problem that two neighbors are working together
(however fitfully) to address. With the exception of the
hostage issue, on which GOI and KRG leadership appear
intensely focused, the GOI has failed to grasp the need for
action against the PKK. You will want to avail yourself of
every opportunity to stress that GOI plans to persuade the
international community to "take sides" on the PKK issue risk
turning a local quarrel into an international crisis and are
simply not responsive to Turkish concerns.

TRILATERAL MINISTERIAL--REVIVING GOI-GOT DIALOGUE
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4. (C) The GOI delegation returned from Ankara feeling that
their delegation and the proposals it presented on October 26
were not taken seriously, and that Iraqi dignity had been
offended to the point they formally complained to the Turkish
Ambassador in Baghdad. You should use a trilateral
ministerial with FM Zebari and FM Babacan after the
conclusion of the Neighbors conference to put the diplomatic
process back on track, minimizing the likelihood of a Turkish
cross-border operation, or at least its scope. We will push
Zebari to come to the table with a number of concrete
measures which have already been implemented and others which
it will be willing to take in the mid- to long-term. The GOI
has moved considerably toward recognition that the presence
of the PKK is a problem for which it must take
responsibility. However, Zebari, himself a Kurd, is not
always able on an emotional level to put his role as a member
of the central government above his ethnic loyalties. He can
nonetheless be counted upon to welcome U.S. help in
facilitating diplomacy ) he recently hosted Babacan in
Baghdad ) and to work in a constructive way on the sensitive
issue of future KRG participation in trilateral fora.

SECURITY
--------------


5. (C) On October 21-22 Kuwait hosted meetings of technical
experts from participants in the Neighbors Border Security
Working Group. The experts, representing all of Iraq,s
neighbors including Saudi Arabia (which had been absent at
the first Border Security Working Group Meeting in Damascus),

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will present recommendations at the Ministerial that include:
the establishment of an information-sharing mechanism among
their border control entities; restrictions on visas for
military-aged males; and exchange of liaison officers at
Points of Entry. In an October 23 follow-on meeting, the
Interior Ministers of all of Iraq,s neighbors, plus those of
Egypt, Bahrain, and representatives of the Arab League, and
UNAMI, presented formal statements of their views on the
security situation in Iraq, and offered a range of assistance
including screening of military-age males at POEs, enhanced
information sharing and training for Iraqi border police. As
with other Neighbors Working Groups, you will want to push
them to transition from words to actions.

UNHCR PLEDGE/REFUGEES
--------------


6. (C) GOI senior leadership is sending mixed messages
about paying out its USD 25 million pledge for refugee
assistance, and the issue highlights deep divisions within
the GOI. Finance Minister Bayan Jabr told Deputy Secretary
Negroponte last week that the GOI would release the money
"soon," but Foreign Minister Zebari told Senior Coordinator
for Iraqi Refugee Affairs Ambassador James Foley on October
26 that releasing the money was "out of the question" because
Prime Minister Maliki considers the refugees to be (mainly)
Sunni Ba'athists insurgents who should receive no support
from the GOI. Maliki needs to hear a strong message from you
that GOI equivocation has negative consequences for Iraq,s
image that outweigh the modest sum involved.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
--------------


7. (C) Prime Minister Maliki is expected to announce a
cabinet reshuffle involving as many as 10 ministry
portfolios. He has just named two new ministers to fill the
Health and Agriculture positions vacated by Sadrists who
resigned several months ago; but another 15 positions vacated
by Tawafuq Coalition, Iraqiya and the Sadrists remain empty.
The new head of the Anbar Awakening Council (SAI),Ahmed
Beyzia al-Rishawi, has sent a letter to Prime Minister Maliki
offering up names of 11 SAI candidates for the vacant cabinet
seats. Ahmed, who succeeded his murdered brother, SAI
founder Sheik Sattar Abu Risha, has spearheaded a movement to
transform SAI into a national political actor and has opened
SAI offices in Ninewah province and begun coordinating with
tribal leaders in Diyala province. These developments may
threaten the Sunni mainstream, sunder Sunni political
cohesion (such as it is) and ultimately benefit Iran. You
should press the Prime Minister for his views on this matter.

EXPANDED UNAMI ROLE
--------------


8. (C) United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon is now
attending the conference, which will be Staffan de Mistura's
first official appearance as the Secretary General,s Special
Representative for Iraq. UNAMI has already done constructive
work in Iraq on elections support and constitutional review,
and the expanded mandate provided to it by UNSCR 1770 gives
it plenty of room for growth. You may have an opportunity
for a pull-aside during which it would be useful to press de
Mistura for specifics on how he intends to implement that
expanded mandate, suggesting special attention to national
dialogue and humanitarian relief measures. Another key issue
to raise with de Mistura is UN Baghdad representation: while
de Mistura and UNAMI have headquarters in Baghdad, other
agencies on the UN country team like UNDP and WHO are all
based in Amman (UNHCR recently opened an office in Baghdad.)
We would like to encourage them to set up offices in Baghdad
and this is a good opportunity to emphasize this point to de
Mistura, who is open to the idea.

RECONCILIATION
--------------


9. (C) The GOI took a step forward in reconciliation
efforts when the Council of Representatives recently passed a
universal pension law making all Iraqis eligible for a
pension regardless of past membership or level in the Ba'ath
Party. Iraqi leaders agreed in August on the language for
the flagship law on Accountability and Justice
(de-Baathification Law),and it is now moving, albeit slowly,
through the Council of Representatives. The bill still
limits access to public sector jobs for former high-ranking
members of the Baath party, but does not bar them from other
types of employment. You should press the GOI leaders to do
all they can to ensure the de-Ba'athification law passes as
quickly as possible.


10. (C) You should also encourage Prime Minister Maliki to
publicize his reconciliation efforts. He fears losing party

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support by publicly speaking about his reconciliation record,
but he needs to be told that the benefit to Iraqi unity
outweighs the risks. You might also want to urge him to
continue reaching out to minority groups such as Iraqi
Christians to ensure they remain a viable part of Iraq's
diverse, multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society

KEY ECONOMIC ISSUES
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11. (C) The military surge has produced security gains that
must be followed up by increased economic opportunities for
the Iraqi people. Senior GOI leadership must now summon the
political will to pass a comprehensive hydrocarbons package,
implement investment legislation passed a year ago, and stand
up a fully-staffed Secretariat to support implementation of
the International Compact with Iraq (ICI). Decision-makers
are still quibbling about details on the hydrocarbons
package; you should stress that they need to stop quarreling
and make the (small) required compromises and generally live
up to their agreements. Emphasize that Iraqi ownership and
leadership in a fully functional ICI Secretariat and sectoral
working groups is critical because they provides key
mechanisms to direct donor funds toward projects the GOI has
identified as priorities.

COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) The circumstances (both positive and negative)
surrounding the Istanbul Ministerial will test the usefulness
of the Neighbors format, but ultimately the success of the
conference may hinge on our ability to keep business focused
squarely on Iraq.
BUTENIS