Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD3631
2007-11-01 22:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

SNAPSHOTS OF IRAQI ARAB REACTION TO TENSIONS WITH

Tags:  PGOV PREL IZ 
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OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3631/01 3052227
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 012227Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4167
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003631 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: SNAPSHOTS OF IRAQI ARAB REACTION TO TENSIONS WITH
TURKEY

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Ellen Germain for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

Summary
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003631 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SUBJECT: SNAPSHOTS OF IRAQI ARAB REACTION TO TENSIONS WITH TURKEY Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Ellen Germain for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Anecdotal soundings taken among Iraqi Arabs of various walks of life reveal Iraqi Arab suspicion of Kurdish nationalist intentions and a feeling that Kurdish arrogance and aggression toward Turkey have landed the Kurds -- and Iraq -- in the current predicament; with a Shia CoR member even using the Arabic word for "schadenfreude" to capture his feelings about the current situation. Despite the anger and resentment evinced towards Iraqi Kurds, there was widespread feeling that they are nevertheless Iraqis, and the Kurdistan region must be defended as part of Iraq. Some went further and expressed a view (or hope) that the crisis with Turkey will increase national solidarity and unity as the Kurds now better understand their vulnerability to Turkey and their need for GOI support and protection. End Summary. Iraqi Arabs Shed Few Tears for Kurds -------------- ¶2. (C) If the PKK was trying to highlight divisions between Iraqi Kurds and Arabs by provoking a crisis with Turkey, it appears to have been at least partially successful. Ordinary non-Kurdish Baghdadis we talked to were unsparing in their criticism of perceived Kurdish arrogance and aloofness. Firas, a resident of the 9 Nissan District, told us "I couldn,t care less about what is happening in the north. Most Iraqis don,t really like Kurds . . . It wouldn,t be so bad if they took a beating." Maha, a media NGO worker from Baghdad, was equally blunt in stating that "ordinary Shia and Sunni Arabs share the view that the Turkey-PKK crisis is positive. Barzani is like Saddam and needs a kick, so he can give up his dreams of separatism. Arabs are treated like foreigners when they go to Kurdistan. The Kurds only want to be part of Iraq when it suits their interests." A resident of Rusafa District confided that "we talk about this in our neighborhood almost every night. Everyone except for one Fayli Kurd thinks the Turks are right to fight PKK. I would say 80 percent of Arabs support the invasion. The Kurds are only members of Iraq when they need us in crisis. They say, Kurdistan is mine, but I,m your partner in Iraq., An NGO worker from Karkh District echoed this, saying, "on the one side, the Kurds say they,re part of Iraq; on
the other, they want their own country and to divide ours. They deserve what,s happening to them. Most Iraqis think this." (Note: One Baghdadi was perceptive enough to comment that while he was suspicious of Kurdish nationalist aims, he also envied Kurdish success, saying "A lot of Arabs feel jealousy because Kurdistan is so peaceful and stable compared to the rest of Iraq." End Note.) ¶3. (C) While Iraqi Arab mistrust of of Kurdish nationalist intentions was summarized by a Sadr City physician's comment that "we all know that the Kurds have a goal to make a big Kurdistan, to unite all the Kurds in one country," there was also some thought that the current crisis could serve to bind Iraqi Kurds more closely to the Iraqi nation. Bassim Sherif, Deputy CoR Bloc leader of the Shia Fadhila Party, expressed a view that we understand is common among non-Kurdish CoR members that Turkish threats have made or at least should have made the Kurds realize they need the protection of being part of a united Iraq. He said some Iraqis feel a sense of "shamata" (the Arabic word for schadenfreude) in seeing the Kurds, who have been "selfish" and quick to assert autonomy, now asking Baghdad to stand up to Turkey on their behalf. But Rallying Around the Flag -------------- ¶4. (C) Whatever their feelings towards the Kurds, numerous Sunni and Shia Iraqis alike expressed anger toward Turkey and solidarity with their fellow Iraqi citizens. Seven mid and low level staffers of the Independent High Electoral Commission all agreed that the Kurdistan region must be defended if it was invaded by Turkish forces, despite the way (in their perception) Iraqi Kurds treat Iraqi Arabs. "They (the Iraqi Kurds) are our brothers and we have to help them," said one. Sunni and Shia staff members agreed that they would defend the Kurdistan region since it represents part of Iraq, and pointed out that "(Iraqi) Kurds have the same identity card we have, the same passport as we, although they discriminate against us." Haitham Husseini, senior advisor to Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim at the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI),told us his organization wants a peaceful resolution to the crisis but is ready to defend Iraqi sovereignty. Two Iraqiyya Party CoR members, Maysoon al-Damluji and Sheikh Ayad Jamal al-Din, told us they "reject any aggression from Turkey against the sovereignty of Iraq." And Sunni Awakening leader Sheikh Ahmad Abu Risha stated that the time had come BAGHDAD 00003631 002 OF 002 for Iraqis to stop thinking along sectarian lines and start thinking like Iraqis, and that Turkish military actions against northern Iraq should be seen as military actions against Iraq. Saad Yousif Al Muttalibi (protect),Deputy Minister of Dialogue and Reconciliation, described the Turkish-PKK crisis as a "tsunami waiting to happen;" but suggested that such a "tsunami" could nonetheless actually have "good results" akin to the positive developments in Aceh, Indonesia following the natural disaster and rebuilding there. While Criticizing Both KRG and GOI -------------- ¶5. (C) Iraqi Arabs do not believe the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) has done much to address the PKK problem -- for example, ISCI advisor Haitham Husseini said that the topic frequently comes up when ISCI leaders meet their Kurdish counterparts and that "we'd like to believe them when they tell us they are doing all they can." However, the crisis with Turkey has highlighted dissatisfactions with the GOI as well. When asked to assess Kurdish efforts to rein in the PKK, one Baghdadi lamented the weakness of the Maliki government, saying that "During Saddam,s time, Turkish forces couldn,t do what they,re doing now. This government is too weak to put pressure on the PKK, and too weak to keep out the Turks." Dr. Riyadh al-Ani, an Iraqi-American who works with NGOs, said that the Kurds are intentionally trying to take advantage of a weak Iraqi government, and indicated that he believes they are still working towards a greater Kurdistan which contains portions of surrounding countries. Dr. Mukdad, a Baghdad University Professor from the Adhamiya District, told us "This is bad for Iraq. This could destroy northern Iraq, and the government here in Baghdad can do nothing to stop it." Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) The crisis with Turkey has highlighted both divisions and unities within Iraq's multi-ethnic society. While there is a good deal of resentment and envy of the Kurds among the Iraqi Arab population, there is also a feeling that the Kurds are part of the Iraqi nation. Whether the crisis ultimately strengthens Iraqi ethnic unity or widens the divide between Iraqi Arab and Kurd remains to be seen. BUTENIS

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