BARZANI'S CHIEF OF STAFF: BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003630

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2037
TAGS: PGOV PTER TU IZ
SUBJECT: BARZANI'S CHIEF OF STAFF: BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE

REF: BAGHDAD 3617

Classified By: Classified By Jess Baily, Erbil Regional Coordinator for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

This is an Erbil Regional Reconstruction Team message.

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In an October 30 meeting with RRT officers, Kurdistan
Regional Government (KRG) President Barzani's Chief of Staff
Fuad Hussein emphasized "dialogue, dialogue, dialogue" to
solve the crisis over the PKK. He asserted that Turkey's
refusal to negotiate with the Iraqi delegation in Ankara on
October 26 made resolution difficult and underscored the need
for Turkey to come to terms with the reality of an autonomous
Kurdish region in Iraq to deal with the situation. Hussein
offered no specifics when asked how the KRG might isolate PKK
but said it would be unacceptable for Kurdish forces to
attack other Kurds; and said that only the U.S. can peaceably
solve the crisis through its relationship with the Turkish
military. (However, KRG Minister of Interior reported that
KRG PM Nechirvan is holding two days of meetings Oct 31 and
Nov 1 with top security officials to develop measures to
isolate PKK.) Hussein certainly had not given up hope about
resolving the crisis diplomatically, but emphasized that
Turkey must show a willingness to meet with and listen to
Iraqi officials, including KRG representatives.
Unfortunately, he had less to say about the KRG's own need to
build credibility with Turkey by taking concrete steps to
crack down on PKK activities in Kurdish-controlled territory.


Solution to the Crisis: Dialogue
--------------


2. (C) Regional Reconstruction Deputy Team (RRT) Leader and
Erbil Iraq Provincial Action Officer (IPAO) met October 30
with Fuad Hussein, KRG President Barzani,s Chief of Staff.
Hussein started the meeting by pointing out the disastrous
results of the Iraqi delegation's meetings in Ankara on
October 26. He said Turkey's behavior is precluding
negotiation. He said that the KRG had called PKK attacks
illegal and asked them to lay down arms. He complained at
length about the lack of respect shown to the Iraqi
delegation and Turkey's exclusion of Kurdish officials from
some meetings. The delegation came ready for discussion, but
Turkey just presented a "list of demands." He echoed what
RRT members regularly hear in discussions on the crisis: a
peaceful solution is the only option, military interventions
will solve nothing, and the KRG will not act on Turkey's
orders. When asked about the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU)
initiative to lead a delegation of political parties to
Turkey, Hussein said he advised the KIU not to go unless
Turkey guarantees the delegation would be treated with
respect and would be met by appropriate officials. The KIU
efforts to capitalize on its relationship with the Justice
and Development Party (AKP) were admirable, he noted, but the
Turkish military is causing the problem. (Note: RRT
understands that delegation will not go until after the
November 5 meeting between President Bush and PM Erdogan.)


PKK Crisis Masks Turkey's Real Goal
--------------


3. (C) Hussein fell back on the oft-cited reason for Turkish
aggression: fear of the successful, autonomous Iraqi
Kurdistan Region. Hussein said that the KRG-led territory
has become to Kurds what Israel is the Jewish diaspora, and
what Iraqi Kurds have achieved cannot be threatened by
Turkey. He said the personal attacks on Barzani in the
military backed Turkish press are causing further
deterioration in relations. He and other advisors have urged
Barzani to remain restrained and not respond to the attacks.
(Note: He made no mention of Barzani,s use of heated
rhetoric earlier this year.) Hussein observed that the
AKP's success in attracting voters in recent elections has
increased pressure on the PKK to act to maintain support
among Turkey's Kurdish citizens. He said the military was
also using the PKK against the AKP and hinted at possible
collusion between the TGS and PKK since they were the only
beneficiaries of the crisis.


KRG Unable to Halt PKK Operations
--------------


4. (S) Deputy RRT TL pointed out the recent New York Times article, one of many news reports, on the ease with which the PKK operates in northern Iraq, undermining KRG claims that nothing can be done. Hussein responded that the peshmerga had helped the Turkish army fight the PKK in the 1990s but had not been successful. He said Turkish CHOD General Yasar Buyukanit knew the reality well as he was stationed in Amadi during this time. Kurdish attacks on fellow Kurds are anathema to the Kurdish population, and peshmerga could not participate in military operations. He noted Kurdish contributions to the fight against terrorists in Iraq, but dealing with the PKK is a complex issue.


5. (C) Pressed about the KRG cordoning off the PKK-controlled
territory or taking other actions to isolate the PKK, he
offered no specifics. He countered that if the U.S. and
Europe are unable or unwilling to end PKK operations, how
could the KRG be successful? He faulted the Europeans for
harboring and allowing PKK financier Ali Riza Altun to travel
freely in France and Austria. If the Europeans could not
stop Altun, how could the KRG be expected to? Altun's name
did not appear on any flight manifests, and the KRG was
unaware of his travel. Hussein pointed out that over 10,000
PKK members live freely in Germany. (Note: KRG Minister of
Interior reported that KRG PM Nechirvan is holding two days
of meetings Oct 31 and Nov 1 with top security officials to
develop measures to isolate PKK.)


6. (C) When asked whether KRG would name the PKK a terrorist
organization, as the government of Iraq had done, he brought
up our double standards, such as alleged U.S. support for the
PKK-affiliated Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK),and the
Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK's) unhindered travel between Camp
Ashraf and Baghdad. He concluded the discussion by noting
only the U.S. and Israel can peaceably resolve the crisis.


KNA Closed Session on Crisis Reportedly Tense
--------------


7. (C) Hussein arrived an hour late for the meeting, coming
directly from President Barzani,s three hour Kurdistan
National Assembly (KNA) closed session on the crisis.
Hussein said the KNA discussion focused on KRG defenses if
Turkey invades, and the make-up of the KRG political party
delegation traveling to Baghdad to meet with President
Talabani and Prime Minister Maliki. Two delegations are
expected, a KDP/PUK joint delegation, and a Supreme Council
of Political Parties delegation made up of KNA
parliamentarians.


8. (C) RRT LES reported October 31 a KNA member said Masud
Barzani seemed tired during the session, and very concerned
about the situation. He repeated several times that "if the
Turks won't receive us, how can a peaceful solution be
found?" The KNA atmosphere was tense, with corridor
discussions focusing on U.S. actions, and speculation about a
repeat of the 1975 "betrayal." (Note: Iranian support for
Barzani,s resistance to Saddam Hussein ended when Iraq and
Iran signed the Algiers Agreement in 1975, delivering a
devastating blow to the Kurdish resistance movement. End
Note).


Comment
--------------


9. (S) Hussein's focus on the "disrespect" shown toward
Iraqi and Kurdish officials reveals a high level of mistrust
about Turkish motives, particularly those of the Turkish
military. Hussein, like many other Kurds, believes that
Kurdish autonomy in Iraq is the real target of potential
Turkish military action; that only a long term political
solution including amnesty will solve the PKK issue; and thus
there is little the KRG can do to appease Turkey. He
certainly had not given up hope on resolving the crisis
through dialogue but stressed that Turkey must show a
willingness to meet with and listen to Iraqi officials,
including KRG representatives. Unfortunately, he had much
less to say about the KRG's own need to build credibility
with Turkey by taking concrete steps to crack down on PKK
activities in Kurdish-controlled territory. End Comment.
BUTENIS