KURDS: PKK IS PRETEXT FOR DEEPER TURKISH AIMS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003617

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2037
TAGS: PGOV PTER TU IZ
SUBJECT: KURDS: PKK IS PRETEXT FOR DEEPER TURKISH AIMS

Classified By: Classified By Jess Baily, Regional Coordinator for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).

This is an Erbil Regional Reconstruction Team message.

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) Conversations with senior Kurdish leaders indicate
that they view Turkey's recent public statements and military
action against the PKK as a pretext to forward Turkey's
"true" strategic goals of undermining the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG),delaying a referendum vote on Article 140,
and creating fissures between the Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). They point
to the disrespectful treatment of Kurdish delegates to recent
talks in Ankara, the KRG's continued willingness to engage in
talks, public statements labeling PKK actions "illegal,"
ceasefire pronouncements, and a new KRG-inter-ministerial
security committee as evidence that the Kurds are serious
about finding a solution to the PKK issue. KRG officials see
a critical role for the United States in any resolution
scenario, but fear the possibility the U.S. would "sacrifice
the Kurds" to broader regional interests. In order to get
the KRG to engage seriously in any resolution effort and to
build trust that Turkey has no inherent anti-Kurdish agenda,
a Turkish willingness to engage with the KRG as a
constitutionally-empowered entity and a statement indicating
Turkey's respect of Iraq's constitutional arrangements would
go a long way.


2. (C) The following report crystallizes recent
conversations RRT Erbil staff has had with KRG officials
listed below, together with official public statements and
public media commentary. Officials include: Falah Bakir,
KRG Director of Foreign Relations; Fuad Hussein, President
Barzani,s Chief of Staff; Kemal Kerkuki, Deputy Speaker of
the Kurdish National Assembly; Salahuddin Bahauddin,
Kurdistan Islamic Union General Secretary; KRG Minister of
State for Peshmerga, Jafar Mustafa Ali (PUK); and MG Aziz
Weysi, head of the Peshmerga Zervani (KDP Intelligence).


TURKISH FEAR AND LOATHING DRIVES PKK HUNT
--------------


3. (S) Public and private Kurdish reactions to the recent
increased tensions with Turkey over the PKK reveal broad
themes and concerns that focus on the manifest mistrust and
ill-will between the Kurds and Turkey. Seemingly no one in
the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and few average Kurds
believe that recent Turkish actions are fundamentally about
eliminating the PKK's ability to strike from northern Iraq.
Senior Kurdish political and security officials have
privately shared their belief that the PKK is simply a
convenient, high-profile pretext for Turkey's aim to
undermine and destabilize the KRG. Public commentary and
editorials have made similar claims. They point to
"unacceptable insults" leveled by the Turkish military via
the press against KRG President Massoud Barzani, the recent
talks in Ankara at which KRG leaders were treated
disrespectfully, and Turkey's purported "terrorist list,"
which includes senior Kurdish political figures including
President Barzani,s son and Iraqi Council of Representatives
member Mahmoud Othman. This is all evidence, Kurdish leaders
claim, that exposes Turkey's cynicism and lack of good faith
toward real resolution of the PKK problem and lays bare
Ankara's fear and mistrust of a prosperous, secure,
autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq.


DELAYING ARTICLE 140 POSSIBLE MOTIVE
--------------


4. (S) Kurds also liberally point to Article 140 as a
probable motive for Turkey's growing calls for military
action against the PKK. Many believe that the GOT's real
interest lies in delaying the scheduled referendum on the
status of Kirkuk until such time as a more favorable
advantage can be gained for Turkey's interests. The KRG, for
its part, has responded by working to shore up support among
Kirkuk's Arabs to counter any Turkish incursion.
Additionally, some in the Kurdish political class believe
that the Turkish government's potshots against President
Barzani in the Turkish press are an attempt to check the
power of Barzani,s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) vis a
vis Iraqi President Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK) -- possibly in an attempt to keep the KRG fractured,
off-balance, and ineffective.


USG KEY TO ANY RESOLUTION
--------------

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5. (S) Many in the Kurdish political and security leadership
class believe the United States is the only effective broker
to push a resolution. The KRG is concerned about perceived
USG impatience with its position, but still sees the United
States as critical in any resolution scenario. Some have
asked whether the United States would "sacrifice the Kurds"
to broader strategic interests as they feel was done in the
Algiers Accords of 1975.


WHAT THE KURDS BELIEVE THEY'RE DOING RIGHT
--------------


6. (S) Despite being stung by the recent slights in Ankara,
the Kurdish leadership has signaled that it is still prepared
to engage diplomatically on the PKK issue but argues that its
resources are limited. Kurdish leaders have stressed that
any Kurd-on-Kurd violence would not be part of any solution
-- dismissing any KRG military option against the PKK. Aside
from the inability (and unwillingness) of Peshmerga forces to
rout the PKK from their mountain redoubts, KRG officials are
also quick to remind people that the PKK continues to be
viewed by Kurds as the protector of millions of ethnic Kurds
in Turkey. While KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani and President
Barzani have publicly called PKK attacks on the Turkish
military and emplacements on the border "illegal," there is
little likelihood that any KRG leader will tag the PKK as
terrorists. Kurdish officials have distanced themselves by
insisting that the conflict is between the PKK and Turkey;
have called for a peaceful solution borne out of diplomacy
and negotiation; and have officially banned anti-Turkish
demonstrations, while allowing small neighborhood
demonstrations. Kurds keep pointing to ceasefire
announcements, overestimating the good faith derived from
such pronouncements, particularly when they fall short of a
call to the PKK to lay down its arms. When confronted with
press reports about the PKK's ability to operate and garner
support in northern Iraq, the KRG is hard-pressed to offer
specific actions it could take to counter the group and
quickly reverts to discussions about long-term solutions.
(Note: We understand a committee chaired by PM Barzani
including key several security officials met on October 31
and is developing specific measures to cut off the PKK's
ability to move and re-supply in northern Iraq.)


WHAT COULD HELP BRING THE KRG AROUND
--------------


7. (S) COMMENT: The KRG wants legitimacy and respect and
has repeatedly called for dialogue. The view among Kurds is
that if Turkey is serious about engaging Iraqi leaders on the
issue, it must be prepared to talk to the KRG as a
constitutionally-empowered entity. Expecting official and
public GOT recognition of the KRG as a regional Iraqi entity
would, of course, be a redline for Turkey -- but a statement
before any new negotiations indicating that the GOT respected
Iraq's constitution arrangements and accepting KRG
participation in Iraqi delegations would be helpful in
reassuring the KRG that Turkey's aim is to stop PKK attacks.

BUTENIS