KURDS IN BAGHDAD ON THE CRISIS WITH TURKEY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003615 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL TU IR IZ SUBJECT: KURDS IN BAGHDAD ON THE CRISIS WITH TURKEY Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Ellen Germain for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Kurdish view in Baghdad on the conflict with Turkey over the PKK has largely been unified and concentrated on several main themes. In multiple conversations with Poloff since the October 20-21 PKK attack on Turkish soldiers, the Kurdistan Democratic Party in particular has asserted that the U.S. bears responsibility for the security of Iraq and should ensure that Turkey remains on its side of the border. Many Kurds are still reluctant to label the PKK a terrorist organization and claim that the PKK issue is merely an excuse for Turkey to hinder Kurdish autonomy and prosperity. Kurdish contacts also warned of the consequences of a Turkish Cross-Border Operation (CBO). Some more liberal-minded Kurds opined that Barzani would only be convinced to act after a reality-check from the U.S. END SUMMARY. U.S. Bears Responsibility, Only Peaceful Solution -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Baghdad-based Kurds, in particular the KDP, have during the past ten days tried to portray the Turkey-PKK-KRG issue as one for which the USG bears the primary responsibility. They assert that the U.S. is responsible for the security of the entire country so any violation of Iraqi sovereignty by the Turks should be rebuffed by U.S. force. They continue to say that the only way to solve the PKK issue is through peaceful political means. They see the only solution as a scenario in which the GOT issues an amnesty for all PKK and their sympathizers/relatives, such as those in the Makhmour refugee camp. Many Kurds refuse to label the PKK terrorists, instead viewing them as freedom fighters and sympathizing with their fight against what they view as Turkish oppression of the Kurds in Turkey. Kurdistan Alliance List deputy leader Saadi Barzinji in particular bristled at the suggestion the KRG officially designate the PKK as a terrorist organization. One or two POL contacts even revealed their previous associations with the PKK and claimed that, were they younger they might join the PKK in the mountains. PKK Only an Excuse -------------- ¶3. (C) Most Kurds view Turkey's obsession with the PKK as only peripheral to the "real issue" that they feel Turkey is reacting to, namely Kurdish autonomy and the potential for an independent Kurdish state, as well as the fate of Kirkuk. Local KDP leaders and CoR members warned Poloff on October 30 that Turkey would not stop with the PKK, but rather would occupy Iraqi Kurdistan and move as far south as Kirkuk. They said the Turkish generals could not be placated no matter what actions were taken by the KRG. They also warned that any operation in the mountains was doomed to failure. (Note: most Kurds present were former peshmerga. All offered their firsthand accounts of how difficult operations in the mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan are. End Note). ¶4. (C) The Kurds also view the PKK issue as a power struggle between Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's AKP party and the Turkish General Staff (TGS). Many have said the TGS is enriching itself through military contracts and keeping itself powerful and relevant through the continued conflict with the PKK. The Kurdish Deputy Director of the INIS even told Poloff on October 30 that the TGS has infiltrated the PKK and encourages them to fight in order to keep the conflict going. Consequences of a Turkish CBO -------------- ¶5. (C) Kurds on all sides have offered many dire predictions should the U.S. not find a way to solve this crisis. Independent Kurdish CoR member Mahmoud Othman and his son, Hiwa, who is media advisor to President Talabani, warned that Iran would take advantage of a Turkish CBO. The Kurds will have nowhere else to turn but Iran, which has already told the Kurds that it would welcome them with open arms and open borders, the Othmans said ) a line reiterated by many Baghdad-based KDP and PUK members, including Talabani advisor Aram Yarweissi. Should the PKK be forced out of the mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan, the &real terrorist groups8 such as Ansar al-Islam and Al Qaeda would move in, several Kurdish CoR members and local KDP leaders claimed. ¶6. (C) Finally, the Othmans, along with many KDP members, have emphasized over the past two weeks that "the Kurds are the U.S.,s only friend in the Middle East," and warned that the Kurdish public would blame the U.S. should Turkey conduct a CBO. BAGHDAD 00003615 002 OF 002 Taking a Tougher Line with Barzani -------------- ¶7. (C) A few non-KDP Kurds, including the Othmans, have told us that they understand that the U.S. is unlikely to fight Turkey on behalf of the KRG, but that many Kurds, including KRG President Massoud Barzani, believe the U.S. will defend Iraqi Kurdistan in the event of a Turkish Cross Border Operation (CBO). They argued that the U.S. must be forceful with Barzani and explain to him that this is not going to happen. Then, they said, Barzani might reevaluate the way he is addressing the current crisis. ¶8. (C) The Othmans said U.S. efforts to convey the seriousness of the situation to Barzani have thus far failed. Hiwa suggested it was time to stop using &diplomatic language8 and be more forceful. According to Mahmoud, Barzani himself had told him that the U.S. would protect the Kurds from Turkey. He also claimed that Deputy Kurdistan Alliance List leader Saadi Barzinji (KDP) told him October 30 that MNF-I troops in Mosul and Kirkuk had been warned to prepare to move north to defend the Kurds in the event of a CBO. ¶9. (C) Comment: The intensity of the KDP message suggests a deep, legitimate belief in their views, namely that the Turks are really going after the Kurds and successful Kurdish autonomy, not just the PKK; and that the U.S. will defend the Kurdistan region. The PUK, in particular President Talabani, have taken a somewhat softer line, but generally appear to be on the same track as the KDP. The KIU has also fallen in line behind the KDP points. Most Kurds have been reluctant to discuss what the KRG's (military) reaction would be should Turkey come across the border, preferring to return to the argument that the U.S. should prevent it. BUTENIS