KURDS IN BAGHDAD ON THE CRISIS WITH TURKEY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003615

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU IR IZ
SUBJECT: KURDS IN BAGHDAD ON THE CRISIS WITH TURKEY

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Ellen Germain for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Kurdish view in Baghdad on the conflict
with Turkey over the PKK has largely been unified and
concentrated on several main themes. In multiple
conversations with Poloff since the October 20-21 PKK attack
on Turkish soldiers, the Kurdistan Democratic Party in
particular has asserted that the U.S. bears responsibility
for the security of Iraq and should ensure that Turkey
remains on its side of the border. Many Kurds are still
reluctant to label the PKK a terrorist organization and claim
that the PKK issue is merely an excuse for Turkey to hinder
Kurdish autonomy and prosperity. Kurdish contacts also
warned of the consequences of a Turkish Cross-Border
Operation (CBO). Some more liberal-minded Kurds opined that
Barzani would only be convinced to act after a reality-check
from the U.S. END SUMMARY.

U.S. Bears Responsibility, Only Peaceful Solution
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Baghdad-based Kurds, in particular the KDP, have
during the past ten days tried to portray the Turkey-PKK-KRG
issue as one for which the USG bears the primary
responsibility. They assert that the U.S. is responsible for
the security of the entire country so any violation of Iraqi
sovereignty by the Turks should be rebuffed by U.S. force.
They continue to say that the only way to solve the PKK issue
is through peaceful political means. They see the only
solution as a scenario in which the GOT issues an amnesty for
all PKK and their sympathizers/relatives, such as those in
the Makhmour refugee camp. Many Kurds refuse to label the
PKK terrorists, instead viewing them as freedom fighters and
sympathizing with their fight against what they view as
Turkish oppression of the Kurds in Turkey. Kurdistan
Alliance List deputy leader Saadi Barzinji in particular
bristled at the suggestion the KRG officially designate the
PKK as a terrorist organization. One or two POL contacts
even revealed their previous associations with the PKK and
claimed that, were they younger they might join the PKK in
the mountains.

PKK Only an Excuse
--------------


3. (C) Most Kurds view Turkey's obsession with the PKK as
only peripheral to the "real issue" that they feel Turkey is
reacting to, namely Kurdish autonomy and the potential for an
independent Kurdish state, as well as the fate of Kirkuk.
Local KDP leaders and CoR members warned Poloff on October 30
that Turkey would not stop with the PKK, but rather would
occupy Iraqi Kurdistan and move as far south as Kirkuk. They
said the Turkish generals could not be placated no matter
what actions were taken by the KRG. They also warned that
any operation in the mountains was doomed to failure. (Note:
most Kurds present were former peshmerga. All offered their
firsthand accounts of how difficult operations in the
mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan are. End Note).


4. (C) The Kurds also view the PKK issue as a power struggle
between Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's AKP party and the
Turkish General Staff (TGS). Many have said the TGS is
enriching itself through military contracts and keeping
itself powerful and relevant through the continued conflict
with the PKK. The Kurdish Deputy Director of the INIS even
told Poloff on October 30 that the TGS has infiltrated the
PKK and encourages them to fight in order to keep the
conflict going.

Consequences of a Turkish CBO
--------------


5. (C) Kurds on all sides have offered many dire predictions
should the U.S. not find a way to solve this crisis.
Independent Kurdish CoR member Mahmoud Othman and his son,
Hiwa, who is media advisor to President Talabani, warned that
Iran would take advantage of a Turkish CBO. The Kurds will
have nowhere else to turn but Iran, which has already told
the Kurds that it would welcome them with open arms and open
borders, the Othmans said ) a line reiterated by many
Baghdad-based KDP and PUK members, including Talabani advisor
Aram Yarweissi. Should the PKK be forced out of the
mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan, the &real terrorist groups8
such as Ansar al-Islam and Al Qaeda would move in, several
Kurdish CoR members and local KDP leaders claimed.


6. (C) Finally, the Othmans, along with many KDP members,
have emphasized over the past two weeks that "the Kurds are
the U.S.,s only friend in the Middle East," and warned that
the Kurdish public would blame the U.S. should Turkey conduct
a CBO.


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Taking a Tougher Line with Barzani
--------------


7. (C) A few non-KDP Kurds, including the Othmans, have told
us that they understand that the U.S. is unlikely to fight
Turkey on behalf of the KRG, but that many Kurds, including
KRG President Massoud Barzani, believe the U.S. will defend
Iraqi Kurdistan in the event of a Turkish Cross Border
Operation (CBO). They argued that the U.S. must be forceful
with Barzani and explain to him that this is not going to
happen. Then, they said, Barzani might reevaluate the way he
is addressing the current crisis.


8. (C) The Othmans said U.S. efforts to convey the
seriousness of the situation to Barzani have thus far failed.
Hiwa suggested it was time to stop using &diplomatic
language8 and be more forceful. According to Mahmoud,
Barzani himself had told him that the U.S. would protect the
Kurds from Turkey. He also claimed that Deputy Kurdistan
Alliance List leader Saadi Barzinji (KDP) told him October 30
that MNF-I troops in Mosul and Kirkuk had been warned to
prepare to move north to defend the Kurds in the event of a
CBO.


9. (C) Comment: The intensity of the KDP message suggests a
deep, legitimate belief in their views, namely that the Turks
are really going after the Kurds and successful Kurdish
autonomy, not just the PKK; and that the U.S. will defend the
Kurdistan region. The PUK, in particular President Talabani,
have taken a somewhat softer line, but generally appear to be
on the same track as the KDP. The KIU has also fallen in
line behind the KDP points. Most Kurds have been reluctant
to discuss what the KRG's (military) reaction would be should
Turkey come across the border, preferring to return to the
argument that the U.S. should prevent it.
BUTENIS