IRAQI DFM VIEWS ON TURKEY/PKK

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003608

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER IR IZ SY
SUBJECT: IRAQI DFM VIEWS ON TURKEY/PKK

REF: BAGHDAD 3498

BAGHDAD 00003608 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: POL-MIL MINISTER-COUNSELOR MARCIE B. RIES, REASONS 1.4 (
B) AND (D)


1. (S) SUMMARY: At an October 30 meeting with
Political-Military Minister-Counselor, Deputy Foreign
Minister Labeed Abbawi related his concerns regarding the
current PKK crisis and addressed items including Syria, Iran,
and the Neighbors Process. He suspected that the Turkish
military intended to mount an extensive cross-border
operation reaching beyond the area used by the PKK. The GOI
had signaled to Turkey its assent to a limited operation
targeting the PKK to Turkey, but could not accept Turkish
military action beyond this. Further actions against the PKK
would be possible if Turkey would provide more information to
the GOI and engage with the KRG. President Talabani had
passed a peace feeler from the PKK to FM Babacan on October

23. Abbawi predicted that the Turkish hostages would be
freed in one or two days through the efforts of the KRG.
Pol-Mil M/C emphasized the need to continue GOI-GOT dialogue
and for concrete action from the KRG. Abbawi agreed to raise
the topic of scheduling another trilateral with Iran during
FM Mottaki?s visit and to invite Syrian participation in the
November 15 reopening of the Al Qaim border crossing. The
Neighbors Ministerial Communique? needed work, but a concept
for a support mechanism for the Neighbors Process had been
agreed by the GOI and the UN. END SUMMARY

ANGST ABOUT ANKARA
--------------


2. (S) Deputy Foreign Minister Labeed Abbawi began his
October 30 meeting with Pol-Mil Minister-Counselor by
relating his impressions from his October 26 visit to Ankara
as part of an Iraqi delegation sent to discuss the PKK with
the GOT. Abbawi opined that authority to make decisions
regarding the PKK crisis had now passed from the Turkish
government to the Turkish military, which was using the
situation in order to regain domestic political standing.
Abbawi expressed his belief that the Turks intend to mount a
cross-border operation which would go far beyond the
mountainous areas used by the PKK, moving through Kurdish
towns as far south as Irbil using mechanized forces. They
would use the pretext of attacking PKK logistical bases to
justify this extensive cross-border operation.

DRAWING THE LINE, BUT READY FOR DIALOGUE
--------------


3. (S) Abbawi confided that the GOI had signaled its assent
to Turkish action against PKK camps in northern Iraq to FM
Babacan when he visited Baghdad October 23. Strikes against
such bases would be &no problem.8 It was unacceptable,
however, for Turkish forces to move beyond those areas.
Pol-Mil M/C expressed concern that the GOI,s initial
approach, treating the PKK as a mutual problem for Iraq and
Turkey to solve, was now veering in the direction of
confrontation. Bringing in outsiders as the GOI was seeking
to do would only accelerate this trend. Pol-Mil M/C
emphasized that, in order to head off a confrontation, both
the GOI and GOT should maintain a diplomatic dialogue.
Abbawi indicated that the GOI was ready to renew a direct
dialogue if the GOT agreed to treat the Iraqi delegation with
respect and if the GOT was willing to engage in a dialogue
rather than merely present its views without allowing the
Iraqis the dignity of a reply.

GOI WILLING TO ACT, HOSTAGES TO BE FREE SOON
--------------


4. (S) Abbawi outlined actions which the GOI was prepared to
implement against the PKK: its camps could be closed pursuant
to the Iraq-Turkey Counterterrorism Agreement when the legal
process had been followed, and PKK members could be
extradited if the GOI were presented with proof and had the
leaders in its custody, which it did not. On a more
optimistic note, Abbawi seemed confident that the eight
Turkish hostages would be released in one or two days through
the efforts of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).

PKK PEACE FEELER
--------------


BAGHDAD 00003608 002.2 OF 002



5. (S) He related that President Talabani had passed a letter
from the PKK to FM Babacan October 23 that contained an offer
by the PKK to surrender their arms to the United States in
exchange for an amnesty by the GOT; PKK leaders would be
allowed to leave while rank and file would return to Turkey.
Abbawi indicated that this was not the first such letter
which the PKK had relayed to Turkey through GOI officials.

MESSAGE TO TURKEY: TALK TO THE KRG
--------------


6. (S) KRG President Barzani was prepared to establish
checkpoints to prevent PKK movements, to institute joint
patrols with Turkish forces, and to send Peshmerga to secure
the border against PKK incursions, if Turkey would negotiate
with him, related Abbawi. Turkey could not stay on their
high horse, insisting on action without committing itself to
political engagement with the Kurds. Abbawi concluded his
discussion of the PKK by pleading for President Bush to
convey a clear message not to interfere in Iraq to PM Erdogan
during his November 5 White House visit. Pol-Mil M/C made
clear that Barzani needed to deliver on something tangible
and visible, such as actually setting up checkpoints, and not
just talk about taking action. Pol-Mil M/C explained to
Abbawi that the real beneficiary of the current crisis
atmosphere was the PKK itself, which could use anxiety among
Kurds to rally support for its cause.

IRAN: TRILATERAL, CONSULATES
--------------


7. (S/NF) Pol-Mil M/C requested that Abbawi arrange a
follow-up meeting of the U.S.-Iraq-Iran Trilateral Security
Subcommittee in two weeks. Abbawi promised to raise this
with Iranian FM Mottaki when he visits Baghdad on October 31.
When asked about the status of the planned opening of the
Iranian consulates in Irbil and Sulaymaniyah, Abbawi
indicated that the Irbil consulate had already opened and
that its consul general had been accredited to the GOI and
was already in residence. The Sulaymaniyah consulate,s
prospective consul general was already in Iraq, although it
had yet to open. Pol-Mil M/C reminded Abbawi of FM Zebari,s
promise (reftel) to share the names of Iranian staff at these
consulates to identify IRGC officers using diplomatic cover.

NEIGHBORS PROCESS: COMMUNIQUE, SUPPORT MECHANISM
-------------- ---


8. (S) Abbawi explained that the GOI desired numerous changes
to the Neighbors Ministerial communique which he wanted to
iron out on November 1 with S/I Satterfield or Ambassador
Crocker before the senior officials meeting. He indicated
that the communique should establish dates for the next round
of working group meetings, but that locations might be agreed
on later. He reported that the GOI and the UN had agreed on
a concept for a support mechanism to facilitate the Neighbors
Process. The GOI had made only two changes to the
UN-proposed draft: one requiring that the mechanism reside
inside the Iraqi MFA with an Iraqi and a UN official
co-leading, and another expanding the remit of the border
security working group to include security writ large. The
proposal for a support mechanism would be included in the
Istanbul documents.

AL QAIM, UNSCR
--------------


9. (C) Pol-Mil M/C asked whether the GOI had contacted Syria
regarding the planned November 15 reopening of the border
crossing at Al Qaim. Abbawi promised to speak to the Syrians
about this in Istanbul and to invite a Syrian delegation to
attend the reopening. Pol-Mil M/C notified Abbawi that the
U.S. was beginning the process of renewing UNSCR 1723.
BUTENIS