UK DEFENSE SECRETARY SAYS HMG WILL DRAWDOWN, AND

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000360

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2017
TAGS: PINS PNAT PINR PREL MOPS MARR IZ
SUBJECT: UK DEFENSE SECRETARY SAYS HMG WILL DRAWDOWN, AND
IRAN IS A MENACE

REF: A. BAGHDAD 0328

B. BAGHDAD 0257

C. BAGHDAD 0229

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: On January 29, UK Secretary of State for
Defense, Des Browne told the Ambassador that HMG remains
committed to the mission in Iraq, but would need to drawdown
its force strength in the coming months. He promised that
London would coordinate this downsizing with us. The
Ambassador emphasized the importance of British forces
maintaining a strong presence in central Basra. Browne
expressed concern with Iranian interference in Iraq, agreeing
that the time was right to ratchet up the pressure on Tehran.
At the same time, he supported a dialogue with Iran, if
Tehran undertook some confidence building steps first. END
SUMMARY.

UK to Drawdown Forces
--------------


2. (S) On January 29, UK Secretary of State for Defense Des
Browne told the Ambassador that HMG is planning to withdraw a
significant number of its troops in the coming months.
Browne explained the entire UK force is no larger than the US
Marine Corps and that it is stressed by service in Iraq and
Afghanistan. It can no longer sustain the current tempo.
Furthermore, he said, the UK is increasing its force size in
Afghanistan because they believe there is a real opportunity
to defeat the Taliban and stabilize the south in the next
several months. He said that the increase in Afghanistan
would need to be counterbalanced by a reduction of troops in
Iraq. Browne added that the growing dissatisfaction with the
war among the British population was also putting pressure on
the government to drawdown.


3. (S) Browne said the MND-SE commander would coordinate
closely with the Coalition to ensure the transition goes
smoothly and Basra remains stable. He assured the Ambassador
that the UK would maintain its presence in Basra, but noted
that London had yet to finalize its plan. The Ambassador
said Washington was eager to receive the details of the plan,
noting that the change will affect the U.S. presence in the
area. The Ambassador said he needed to consider the British
plans as we determine how best to protect U.S. civilians
working in the Basra Palace.


4. (S) Browne said the US should not focus on the British
reduction in terms of troop numbers. While the downsizing
would result in the closure of forward operating bases and
other facilities around Basra, Browne argued that remaining
British forces would still conduct critical missions in the
center of Basra, such as training and supporting the ISF and
having quick reaction forces stationed for emergencies. The
Ambassador stressed the importance of the UK maintaining a
solid presence in the center of Basra, noting that the
Coalition does not want the enemy to think we have given up.
He said that Prime Minister Maliki also wants to have the UK
remain in Basra, the second most important city in Iraq.
Browne committed to take this message back to London.

Near Term Steps to Change Iranian Behavior
--------------


5. (S) Browne told the Ambassador that HMG is gravely
concerned with malign Iranian-sponsored activities in Iraq,
adding that steps must be taken to disrupt and diminish them.
He said Iran was targeting UK soldiers, providing training
to militias, and smuggling weapons into Iraq. The Ambassador
agreed, outlining his ideas for a near term way forward to
change Iranian behavior.


6. (S) When the Ambassador said that MNF-I spokesman Major
General Caldwell intended to hold a press conference offering
evidence of Iranian activity in Iraq, Browne suggested
bolstering the presentation's effect by simultaneously
mounting an I/O campaign. He said this could be done by
leaking some of President Talabani's conversations in Tehran
and Syria with Iranian officials (Reftel C). For example,
IRGC's Quds Force Commander Qassem Suleimeni reportedly told
Talabani that Tehran supports the killing of British forces.
Browne also said we could leak reports that Tehran is working
with Sadr to provide JAM leaders with safe havens in Iran.


7. (S) The Ambassador said that he is working with Iraqi
Foreign Minister Zebari to ensure Iranian diplomats
accredited to Iraq are actually diplomats (Reftel B). Zebari
recently provided the Embassy with a list of Iranian

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diplomats serving in Iran and has committed to removing
anyone identified as a member of Pastran, Quds Force, or
MOIS. Those proven to be involved in illegal activities will
also be removed. The Ambassador said that he had warned
Zebari that Iraqi accreditation of Quds Force personnel would
significantly increase the risks of conflict between Vienna
Convention and U.S. force protection responsibilities.


8. (S) The Ambassador said he was exploring with Washington
how to respond to Soleimani's message brought by Talabani.
Browne said London could serve as a messenger to Iran, if
needed. He recommended that we precondition any talks,
asking Iran to take a few concrete steps to demonstrate it is
serious about changing its activities in Iraq. Browne
suggested demanding that the Iranian Government: publicly
state it will stop targeting/attacking Coalition forces;
assist the Coalition in identifying nefarious actors; and
provide assistance to the GOI for development along the Shatt
al Arab waterway. Browne said the waterway commitment would
be extremely useful, noting that reconstruction of the ports
is virtually impossible at this time because it would require
Iraqi "transgression" into Iranian waters.

The Right Time to Pressure Iran
--------------


9. (S) Browne agreed with the Ambassador's assessment that
the timing is right to increase the pressure on Iranian EFP
networks. Browne said Iran is increasingly on the defense,
noting the recent uptake in domestic and international
condemnation of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's strident,
belligerent messages; the increased criticism by regional
players of Iran's actions that fuel sectarian violence; and
the US's recent successful military operations against
Iranians linked to EFP networks.


10. (S) Browne asked whether the Ambassador was concerned
this added pressure might push Iran to escalate its
activities in Iraq. While acknowledging that we cannot
precisely calibrate the Iranian reaction to our operations,
the Ambassador argued that doing nothing seemed more risky.
Browne agreed, but cautioned that Iran is an unpredictable
and inconsistent actor. The Ambassador concurred, but said
that Iran seemed to want to avoid a direct military
engagement with the US.
KHALILZAD