UK DEFENSE SECRETARY SAYS HMG WILL DRAWDOWN, AND

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000360 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2017 TAGS: PINS PNAT PINR PREL MOPS MARR IZ SUBJECT: UK DEFENSE SECRETARY SAYS HMG WILL DRAWDOWN, AND IRAN IS A MENACE REF: A. BAGHDAD 0328 ¶B. BAGHDAD 0257 ¶C. BAGHDAD 0229 Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: On January 29, UK Secretary of State for Defense, Des Browne told the Ambassador that HMG remains committed to the mission in Iraq, but would need to drawdown its force strength in the coming months. He promised that London would coordinate this downsizing with us. The Ambassador emphasized the importance of British forces maintaining a strong presence in central Basra. Browne expressed concern with Iranian interference in Iraq, agreeing that the time was right to ratchet up the pressure on Tehran. At the same time, he supported a dialogue with Iran, if Tehran undertook some confidence building steps first. END SUMMARY. UK to Drawdown Forces -------------- ¶2. (S) On January 29, UK Secretary of State for Defense Des Browne told the Ambassador that HMG is planning to withdraw a significant number of its troops in the coming months. Browne explained the entire UK force is no larger than the US Marine Corps and that it is stressed by service in Iraq and Afghanistan. It can no longer sustain the current tempo. Furthermore, he said, the UK is increasing its force size in Afghanistan because they believe there is a real opportunity to defeat the Taliban and stabilize the south in the next several months. He said that the increase in Afghanistan would need to be counterbalanced by a reduction of troops in Iraq. Browne added that the growing dissatisfaction with the war among the British population was also putting pressure on the government to drawdown. ¶3. (S) Browne said the MND-SE commander would coordinate closely with the Coalition to ensure the transition goes smoothly and Basra remains stable. He assured the Ambassador that the UK would maintain its presence in Basra, but noted that London had yet to finalize its plan. The Ambassador said Washington was eager to receive the details of the plan, noting that the change will affect the U.S. presence in the area. The Ambassador said he needed to consider the British plans as we determine how best to protect U.S. civilians working in the Basra Palace. ¶4. (S) Browne said the US should not focus on the British reduction in terms of troop numbers. While the downsizing ;would result in the closure of forward operating bases and other facilities around Basra, Browne argued that remaining British forces would still conduct critical missions in the center of Basra, such as training and supporting the ISF and having quick reaction forces stationed for emergencies. The Ambassador stressed the importance of the UK maintaining a solid presence in the center of Basra, noting that the Coalition does not want the enemy to think we have given up. He said that Prime Minister Maliki also wants to have the UK remain in Basra, the second most important city in Iraq. Browne committed to take this message back to London. Near Term Steps to Change Iranian Behavior -------------- ¶5. (S) Browne told the Ambassador that HMG is gravely concerned with malign Iranian-sponsored activities in Iraq, adding that steps must be taken to disrupt and diminish them. He said Iran was targeting UK soldiers, providing training to militias, and smuggling weapons into Iraq. The Ambassador agreed, outlining his ideas for a near term way forward to change Iranian behavior. ¶6. (S) When the Ambassador said that MNF-I spokesman Major General Caldwell intended to hold a press conference offering evidence of Iranian activity in Iraq, Browne suggested bolstering the presentation's effect by simultaneously mounting an I/O campaign. He said this could be done by leaking some of President Talabani's conversations in Tehran and Syria with Iranian officials (Reftel C). For example, IRGC's Quds Force Commander Qassem Suleimeni reportedly told Talabani that Tehran supports the killing of British forces. Browne also said we could leak reports that Tehran is working with Sadr to provide JAM leaders with safe havens in Iran. ¶7. (S) The Ambassador said that he is working with Iraqi Foreign Minister Zebari to ensure Iranian diplomats accredited to Iraq are actually diplomats (Reftel B). Zebari recently provided the Embassy with a list of Iranian BAGHDAD 00000360 002 OF 002 diplomats serving in Iran and has committed to removing anyone identified as a member of Pastran, Quds Force, or MOIS. Those proven to be involved in illegal activities will also be removed. The Ambassador said that he had warned Zebari that Iraqi accreditation of Quds Force personnel would significantly increase the risks of conflict between Vienna Convention and U.S. force protection responsibilities. ¶8. (S) The Ambassador said he was exploring with Washington how to respond to Soleimani's message brought by Talabani. Browne said London could serve as a messenger to Iran, if needed. He recommended that we precondition any talks, asking Iran to take a few concrete steps to demonstrate it is serious about changing its activities in Iraq. Browne suggested demanding that the Iranian Government: publicly state it will stop targeting/attacking Coalition forces; assist the Coalition in identifying nefarious actors; and provide assistance to the GOI for development along the Shatt al Arab waterway. Browne said the waterway commitment would be extremely useful, noting that reconstruction of the ports is virtually impossible at this time because it would require Iraqi "transgression" into Iranian waters. The Right Time to Pressure Iran -------------- ¶9. (S) Browne agreed with the Ambassador's assessment that the timing is right to increase the pressure on Iranian EFP networks. Browne said Iran is increasingly on the defense, noting the recent uptake in domestic and international condemnation of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's strident, belligerent messages; the increased criticism by regional players of Iran's actions that fuel sectarian violence; and the US's recent successful military operations against Iranians linked to EFP networks. ¶10. (S) Browne asked whether the Ambassador was concerned this added pressure might push Iran to escalate its activities in Iraq. While acknowledging that we cannot precisely calibrate the Iranian reaction to our operations, the Ambassador argued that doing nothing seemed more risky. Browne agreed, but cautioned that Iran is an unpredictable and inconsistent actor. The Ambassador concurred, but said that Iran seemed to want to avoid a direct military engagement with the US. KHALILZAD