AMBASSADOR'S JANUARY 5 MEETING WITH IRAQI PM

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000036

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S JANUARY 5 MEETING WITH IRAQI PM
ADVISOR AL-ASKARI

Classified By: Ambassador Khalilzad, reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (S) Summary: In a January 5 meeting, Iraqi PM Maliki
advisor (and Council of Representatives (CoR) member) Sami
al-Askari, who is point on the team writing the speech,
previewed PM Maliki's speech about the new Baghdad security
plan, in which the PM would say he would need more coalition
force (CF) assistance. The Ambassador urged that the new
overall Baghdad commander have a good military reputation and
competence, be broadly acceptable and able to work with the
coalition. He pointed out that one candidate - Ground Force
Commander General Ali -- already has an established
headquarters in Baghdad and this would save time. With plans
for a moderate front stalled, the Ambassador suggested
al-Askari consider whether like-minded GOI leaders might form
a de facto "virtual front" which would explicitly exclude no
party but would be unfettered by the need for consensus by
all parties. Al-Askari agreed the idea might work.
Al-Askari raised the need for the USG and GOI to work
together on the militia problem; the Ambassador told him that
he and the PM had agreed to form a joint working group and
asked al-Askari to encourage the PM to provide names for GOI
members. End Summary.

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Getting Ready for the New Baghdad Security Plan
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2. (S) The Ambassador emphasized the importance of PM
Maliki's upcoming January 6 speech, which would prepare the
Iraqi public for the new Baghdad security plan and set the
stage for President Bush's speech. Al-Askari said the PM
would say what he had previously told the Ambassador: he
would need more coalition force (CF) assistance and that the
details would be worked out between CF and Iraqi military
commanders. In addition, the PM would stress that Iraqi
forces will go after all those who break the law; that there
will be no sanctuary; that political interference with Iraqi
commanders would not be allowed; and Iraqi commanders would
not have sectarian ties and would not make military decisions
based on sectarian considerations.


3. (S) According to al-Askari the PM would also talk about
the Iraqi army as an institution, contrasting it with
Saddam's army. He would raise Saddam's execution, calling
for reconciliation and for people to join in Iraq's political
processes now that Saddam is gone.


4. (S) The Ambassador raised the issue of who would be the
Iraqi commander in Baghdad for the new plan. The commander
should have a good military reputation and competence, be
broadly acceptable, and be able to work with CF. The U.S.
has no particular candidate, but General Ali, the commander
of ground forces, one candidate for the job, already has an
established headquarters in Baghdad. For this reason, CF
believes Ali would be preferable. The Ambassador pointed out
that General Abbuod, another candidate, had little experience
as commander of large land-unit forces and had only recently
been promoted to general.

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Creating a GOI "Virtual Coalition"
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5. (S) The Ambassador noted that plans for a moderate
political front are stalled, but the GOI needs cooperation
among like-minded leaders. The Ambassador suggested that
al-Askari think about a core group of forces that could move
important matters forward within the GOI. The GOI needs
efficiency in decision-making, and cannot afford the delays
inherent in gaining consensus from all parties. The
Ambassador asked al-Askari to consider whether like-minded
political leaders could form a de facto "virtual coalition"
which would explicitly exclude no party.


6. (S) Al-Askari said the moderate front idea would not work
because it would exclude "some people" and require breaking
down the main Shiite and Sunni coalitions. Perceptions are
important, al-Askari stressed, and "excluding people makes
them unhappy." However, the virtual coalition concept among
some larger parties might work, as long as it remains
undeclared. Al-Askari suggested that CoR bloc leaders would
be the best members for such a group, which would focus on
supporting GOI initiatives in the CoR.


7. (S) The Ambassador agreed that the CoR is the GOI's main
political bottle neck. He asked al-Askari to think carefully
about how to structure and operationalize such an
arrangement. The Ambassador noted that failure to agree on
structure and operation was one reason the moderate front

bogged down.

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Working Together on Militias
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8. (S) Al-Askari raised the issue of militias, saying the
USG and GOI need to work together on the problem. The
Ambassador noted he and the PM had agreed on January 4 that
the USG and GOI form a joint working group on militias,
including two members from each government. The working
group would be given a short time, perhaps two weeks, to
formulate a workable program. The USG would be willing to
invest people and resources into the program. The Ambassador
asked al-Askari to think about the matter and to advise the
PM to suggest two names from the GOI for the working group as
soon as possible.
KHALILZAD