AMBASSADOR'S JANUARY 5 MEETING WITH IRAQI PM

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000036 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS IZ SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S JANUARY 5 MEETING WITH IRAQI PM ADVISOR AL-ASKARI Classified By: Ambassador Khalilzad, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: In a January 5 meeting, Iraqi PM Maliki advisor (and Council of Representatives (CoR) member) Sami al-Askari, who is point on the team writing the speech, previewed PM Maliki's speech about the new Baghdad security plan, in which the PM would say he would need more coalition force (CF) assistance. The Ambassador urged that the new overall Baghdad commander have a good military reputation and competence, be broadly acceptable and able to work with the coalition. He pointed out that one candidate - Ground Force Commander General Ali -- already has an established headquarters in Baghdad and this would save time. With plans for a moderate front stalled, the Ambassador suggested al-Askari consider whether like-minded GOI leaders might form a de facto "virtual front" which would explicitly exclude no party but would be unfettered by the need for consensus by all parties. Al-Askari agreed the idea might work. Al-Askari raised the need for the USG and GOI to work together on the militia problem; the Ambassador told him that he and the PM had agreed to form a joint working group and asked al-Askari to encourage the PM to provide names for GOI members. End Summary. -------------- -- Getting Ready for the New Baghdad Security Plan -------------- -- ¶2. (S) The Ambassador emphasized the importance of PM Maliki's upcoming January 6 speech, which would prepare the Iraqi public for the new Baghdad security plan and set the stage for President Bush's speech. Al-Askari said the PM would say what he had previously told the Ambassador: he would need more coalition force (CF) assistance and that the details would be worked out between CF and Iraqi military commanders. In addition, the PM would stress that Iraqi forces will go after all those who break the law; that there will be no sanctuary; that political interference with Iraqi commanders would not be allowed; and Iraqi commanders would not have sectarian ties and would not make military decisions based on sectarian considerations. ¶3. (S) According to al-Askari the PM would also talk about the Iraqi army as an institution, contrasting it with Saddam's army. He would raise Saddam's execution, calling for reconciliation and for people to join in Iraq's political processes now that Saddam is gone. ¶4. (S) The Ambassador raised the issue of who would be the Iraqi commander in Baghdad for the new plan. The commander should have a good military reputation and competence, be broadly acceptable, and be able to work with CF. The U.S. has no particular candidate, but General Ali, the commander of ground forces, one candidate for the job, already has an established headquarters in Baghdad. For this reason, CF believes Ali would be preferable. The Ambassador pointed out that General Abbuod, another candidate, had little experience as commander of large land-unit forces and had only recently been promoted to general. -------------- Creating a GOI "Virtual Coalition" -------------- ¶5. (S) The Ambassador noted that plans for a moderate political front are stalled, but the GOI needs cooperation among like-minded leaders. The Ambassador suggested that al-Askari think about a core group of forces that could move important matters forward within the GOI. The GOI needs efficiency in decision-making, and cannot afford the delays inherent in gaining consensus from all parties. The Ambassador asked al-Askari to consider whether like-minded political leaders could form a de facto "virtual coalition" which would explicitly exclude no party. ¶6. (S) Al-Askari said the moderate front idea would not work because it would exclude "some people" and require breaking down the main Shiite and Sunni coalitions. Perceptions are important, al-Askari stressed, and "excluding people makes them unhappy." However, the virtual coalition concept among some larger parties might work, as long as it remains undeclared. Al-Askari suggested that CoR bloc leaders would be the best members for such a group, which would focus on supporting GOI initiatives in the CoR. ¶7. (S) The Ambassador agreed that the CoR is the GOI's main political bottle neck. He asked al-Askari to think carefully about how to structure and operationalize such an arrangement. The Ambassador noted that failure to agree on structure and operation was one reason the moderate front bogged down. -------------- Working Together on Militias -------------- ¶8. (S) Al-Askari raised the issue of militias, saying the USG and GOI need to work together on the problem. The Ambassador noted he and the PM had agreed on January 4 that the USG and GOI form a joint working group on militias, including two members from each government. The working group would be given a short time, perhaps two weeks, to formulate a workable program. The USG would be willing to invest people and resources into the program. The Ambassador asked al-Askari to think about the matter and to advise the PM to suggest two names from the GOI for the working group as soon as possible. KHALILZAD