MALIKI CALLS FOR IMMEDIATE STEPS TO DEFUSE TURKISH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003597

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2017
TAGS: MOPS MARR PREL PGOV PHUM PTER PREF TU IZ
SUBJECT: MALIKI CALLS FOR IMMEDIATE STEPS TO DEFUSE TURKISH
CRISIS, HOSTAGE RELEASE CRITICAL; BASRAH TO PIC IN
DECEMBER; APPROVES REFUGEE FUNDS


Classified By: Charge Patricia Butenis. Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) At the October 28 Ministerial Council on National
Security (MCNS),Prime Minister Maliki called for immediate
and practical steps to defuse the border crisis with Turkey,
asking his ministers to focus on steps leading to the return
of Turkish military hostages captured by the Kurdish Workers
Party (PKK) and the need for a media campaign to forestall
cross border operations. MinDef Qadr said that at last week's
negotiations in Ankara, Turkey took the position that Iraqi
proposals were inadequate. Iraq's interpretation of Turkey's
failure to engage was that a decision had already been taken
to carry out military action but to defer until after
Erdogan's November 5 visit to Washington. The MCNS agreed to
convene the Crisis Action Cell to consider options to defuse
the immediate crisis as well as propose options should Turkey
cross any Iraqi "red lines" during military operations. The
MCNS also gave tentative approval to return Basrah to
Provincial Iraqi Control on December 17 and discussed refugee
assistance funding. END SUMMARY.

Report on Iraqi Delegation to Ankara
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2. (S). The October 28 Ministerial Council on National
Security (MCNS) focused on the GOI response to threats by
Turkey to initiate cross border operations (CBO) in
retaliation for attacks by the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK)
and the PKK's capture of eight Turkish soldiers. DefMin Abdul
Qadr, who led an Iraqi delegation to Ankara last week,
briefed the MCNS about results of the talks. He told them his
primary objective was prevention of a Turkish CBO, which he
called a violation of Iraqi sovereignty. He recalled that
during his opening remarks to the Turkish ForMin, he had
declared the PKK a terrorist organization whose presence
within Iraq was illegal. He said he emphasized that the GOI
had prohibited all government interaction with the PKK and
had closed all their offices; he noted that this prohibition
on contact with the PKK applied to the Kurdish Regional
Government (KRG) as well. Further, the GOI intended to honor
all Interpol arrest warrants for PKK terrorists issued by the
Turkish government. Additionally, Qadr said he outlined the
following concrete steps the GOI would undertake to defuse
the crisis:

-- Establish a combined technical-military liaison mission
composed of Turkish, Iraqi, and MNF-I elements to develop
combined operations against the PKK

-- Establish combined Turkish and Iraqi border patrols

-- Rebuild a series of border posts in Northern Iraq using
Turkish contractors

-- Renew tri-lateral (TU/IZ/USA) political discussions

-- Initiate a GOI request to MNF-I to share all intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance information (ISR) about PKK
movements in Iraq

-- Order available KRG forces into action against the PKK

Turkish ForMin Says Iraqi Measures Not Enough
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3. (S) DefMin Qadr reported that the Turkish ForMin stated
these measures were simply not enough and voiced doubts about
ability of the GOI to implement them. As an example, the
Turkish ForMin brought up the issue of Camp Makmour--and its
thousands of Turkish refugees*whom he accused of maintaining
contact with PKK terrorist units. Qadr replied to each
concern in turn. He noted MNF-I has the overall
responsibility for Iraqi security including issues regarding
the PKK. He cited briefings by the KRG to the Turkish
representatives on actions already taken to isolate the PKK.
Concerning Makmour, Qadr said he told the ForMin if the GOT
granted amnesty to its residents, they could return home
without fear of reprisals, and the camp would close.

Immediate Action Urged on Turkish Hostages
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4. (S) MNF-I Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Operations,
Major General Barbero--a U.S. advisor to the Iraqi
delegation--concurred that the Turkish Government made it
very clear the steps outlined by DefMin Qadr did not meet
their expectations. The GOT expected physical action by the
GOI against the PKK and time was of the essence.

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5. (S) Another U.S. advisor to the Iraqi delegation,
Ambassador MQie Ries, said it was obvious the Turkish
government was under enormous pressure to take military
action. She emphasized that the primary issue for the GOT was
the safe return of their eight military hostages held by the
PKK. She reiterated General Barbero's assessment that the GOT
wanted to see the Iraqis take immediate, direct, and very
public physical action against the PKK, something which could
defuse the anger of the Turkish populace. She Qed that the
Turkish representatives repeatedly cited timing as a critical
factor.

Iraqi ForMin Assesses Turkey Ready for War
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6. (S) Foreign Minister Zebari, another senior Iraqi
representative at the talks, took a harder line against the
Turkish government, describing the atmosphere in Ankara as
ready for war. He was convinced, he said, that the decision
to invade Iraq had already been made before the Iraqi
delegation arrived in Ankara. He expressed doubt that the GOT
had any intention of engaging in dialogue. ForMin Zebari
warned that Turkish forces massing along the northern border
were far greater than necessary to destroy small groups of
PKK terrorists. He expressed his opinion that the Turkish
Prime Minister's visit to Washington would not be a
discussion; rather, it would be a notification of impending
military action by the GOT.

National Security Advisor Calls for Focused Action
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7. (S) Attempting to calm this sentiment, National Security
Advisor Rubaie said it was necessary to "take the fuse out of
the bomb"; that is, it was absolutely essential that the GOI
remained focused on efforts to release the Turkish military
hostages by using all available means. He added that it was
also important to work with the KRG at locating the people
indicted under valid Turkish arrest warrants.


8. (S) Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih was not as
conciliatory, voicing his belief that the Turkish
representatives at the talks in Ankara had behaved badly. He
agreed with ForMin Zebari that Turkey was ready for war and
Iraq needed to move quickly to avoid further escalation.
Salih said the GOI should immediately activate the measures
outlined by DefMin Qadr at Ankara whether or not the GOT
believed them enough. He called for the Crisis Action Cell
(CAC) to convene and develop options to prevent escalation of
the crisis.

DefMin Qadr Wants Red Line at National Border
-------------- -


9. (S) DefMin Qadr concurred with immediate activation of the
CAC but said it should develop contingency plans and define
the "red lines" beyond which the GOI would have to take
defensive actions. He insisted that one of those red lines
was the national border and--like ForMin Zebari--also
assessed the GOI would have to defend it shortly after the
November 6 meetQ between President Bush and PM Erdogan.


10. (S) Upon hearing this assessment, the Deputy Minister of
Justice called on the MNF-I to protect Iraq from an invading
Turkish military force under provisions of the UNSCR and
asQ for a United Nations decision. He urged that all
political measures must be taken to resolve the crisis.

Maliki Rejects Red Line, Calls for Action on Hostages
-------------- --------------


11. (S) Prime Minister Maliki dismissed the idea of a red
line and stated he did not want the situation to escalate
that far. In any case, he said, the GOI had no forces in
place with which to defend the northern border. Maliki cQed
instead for immediate and practical steps to avoid a Turkish
CBO, particularly any action which would secure release of
the Turkish hostages. Additionally, he urged mobilization of
a full-scale media campaign which would highlight these
positive actions by the GOI, including the arrest and
expulsion of persons under valid Turkish warrants. These
public actions, he said, would help defuse Turkish anger.

MNF-I CG Petraeus Urges Immediate, Practical Measures
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12. (S) MNF-I Commanding General Petraeus said the Iraqi
delegation to Ankara should be congratulated for their
important and constructive work in trying to find a solution
to this crisis. He assessed it unlikely that the Turkish

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military would invade before the Turkish PM's visit to
Washington, and noted, if they did eventually take action
that they would not go very deep into Iraqi territory. He
added that Turkey and its citizens had a vested interest in
Northern Iraq where Turkey has invested some ten billion
dollars and conducts an enormous amount of business. General
Petraeus also expressed his belief that Turkey could make a
good case--at the UN or anywhere else--for initiating cross
border operations against the PKK. Reacting to Prime Minister
Maliki's call for immediate and practical measures to defuse
the crisis, he urged the GOI to once again denounce the PKK,
declare their actions illegal, and make every effort to
secure release of the Turkish military hostages. General
Petraeus offered to participate in any CAC discussions and
recommended the GOI consider further actions like cracking
down on PKK funding and personnel resources flowing through
Irbil and Sulaymaniyah airports. General Petraeus also
offered to engage the GOI in discussions about combined
US-Iraqi operations against the PKK.

Next Step: Crisis Action Cell
--------------


13. (S) A discussion ensued between PM Maliki and DPM Salih
about options available to the GOI regarding the Turkish
hostages. Both had heard reports that the PKK would exchange
the hostages in return for full amnesty by the GOT. In the
end, the matter was deferred to immediate consideration by
the CAC for development of options.

Basrah PIC Gets Tentative Approval
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14. (S) Turning to Basrah, NSA Rubaie requested a required
MCNS decision on transfer of security responsibilities to
Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) on December 17. IntMin Bolani
raised an immediate objection, saying only about 15 percent
of the MOI forces were ready, citing issues with the
border/coast guards and failure of FinMin Jabr to release
funds for the purchase of equipment. DefMin Qadr said the
Army was ready-to-go with most of its units near full
readiness by December 17 and all expected to be at 100
percent readiness by February 2008. Bolani said this did not
match the facts on the ground, citing severe clashes in
Basrah last week, he said MOD forces had performed very
poorly against coordinated Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) assaults. MOD
Qadr rejected that assessment, calling the engagements a
success story, even if not perfectly executed. PM Maliki
repeated his oft-stated concerns about General Mohan's
leadership and asked for a full report on the major violence
which occurred last week. DefMin Qadr offered to go to Basrah
himself and investigate.


15. (S) General Petraeus agreed with MinDef Qadr, assessing
the Army's response to JAM as generally adequate and slowly
improving. He suggested that in future engagements in Basrah,
the military and police commanders consider the use of the
Iraqi special operations forces located at the airport and
available to GEN Mohan. Deputy NSA Safa pointed out that the
PIC process would not immediately change the number of
security forces within a province; rather, it would change
the relationship between MNF-I and the provincial government.
Before PIC, the MNF-I had the lead (although, MND-SE has
already, at Iraqi request, essentially moved into an
over-watch situation); after PIC, the provincial government
would take the lead in security operations but always had the
option of calling on MNF-I forces if necessary. The MCNS
gave a tentative approval to continue planning for a Basrah
PIC date of December 17.

Refugee Funding
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16 (C) ForMin Zebari urged the Prime Minister to release the
$25 million it had pledged for Iraqi refugees in neighboring
countries. Deputy PM Saleh endorsed the request, noting that
the money should be provided to the Syrian Red Cross. CDA
Butenis advised Maliki that this matter had been pending for
quite a while and it would be good to announce this funding
for Iraqi refugees at the Istanbul Extended Neighbors
Ministerial. PM Maliki said it had already been decided to
release the funs and the Minister of Finance had been
instructed to do so. Amb. Ries met next day (Monday, October
29) with Zebari, who clearly stated that, regardless of
Maliki's instructions the previous night, that more work
needs to be done with the PM to ensure the funds are released.
BUTENIS