IRAQ EXECUTIVE STEERING COMMITTEE, OCTOBER 26

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003573

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2017
TAGS: PGOV ECON MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ EXECUTIVE STEERING COMMITTEE, OCTOBER 26

Classified By: Charles P. Ries for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

CONFIDENTIAL

SIPDIS


1. (C) Summary. On 26 October, in the absence of Prime
Minister Nouri Al Maliki, National Security Advisor Dr.
Muwfak Rubai chaired the Baghdad Security Plan (Fardh al
Qanoon ) FAQ) Executive Steering Committee (I-ESC) of the
Government of Iraq (GoI). The Meeting featured a reading of
the proposed draft Executive Order to empower the new Ahmed
Chalabi Services Committee and a wide ranging discussion of
Baghdad's fuel situation which highlighted the challenges of
transporting refined products to the city. NSA Rubaie's
staff, with the cooperation of Baghdad Commander General
Aboud and Minister of Oil Shahristani, announced a plan to
station Baghdad Operations Command Officers at oil depots and
filling stations to keep an audit trail of kerosene loadings
and deliveries. This should improve availability of all oil
products in neighborhoods (gasoline availability is already
noticeably better).

Chalabi Service Committee Draft Executive Order Discussed
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2. (C) NSA Rubaie briefed the Executive Order that he has
prepared for PM Maliki that, if signed, would give new FaQ
Service Committee Chair Ahmed Chalabi significant authority.
It is unknown when the Order will be presented to PM Maliki
for signature. NSA Rubaie highlighted the following aspects
of the Order:

-The Services Committee would consist of the Deputy NSA, the
Amanat, the Baghdad Operations Command and appointed and
empowered deputy representatives of, respectively, the
Ministries of Defense, Interior, Finance, Oil, Health,
Electricity, Trade, and Transportation. (Note: After a
comment by Baghdad Provincial Chair Mueen, Rubaie amended the
Order to also include a representative from the Baghdad
Governor's Office. End Note.)

-The Services Committee will work in coordination with
Baghdad Province.

-The Services Committee will be authorized to: 1) Coordinate
between various entities of the GoI, 2) Instruct them to do
their job, 3) Issue solutions to any problems that are
preventing service delivery; 4) Field complaints from
citizens; 5) Set priorities for service improvements; 6) Keep
internally displaced people in mind when addressing service
improvements.

-All ministries must cooperate with the Service Committee
with regard to needed financial support to improve services.
(Comment: Rubaie stated at the I-ESC pre-meeting that the
Services Committee would not be given its own budget, as this
"was not necessary." End Comment).

Improving Fuel Delivery in Baghdad
--------------


3. (C) I-ESC Secretary Saeed Ng, a member of NSA Rubaie's
staff, presented a study and tracking slides of private and
government fuel stations in Baghdad that highlighted that
storage depots have excess capacity because insufficient
supplies of refined products are making their way to Baghdad.
(Comment. Typically only MNF-I creates and distributes this
sort of tracking slide at the I-ESC. Albeit created with
Embassy encouragement, this is the first known such slide
study created and distributed in this forum by a member of
the GoI. Notable praise was given by Rubaie and CG Petraeus.
End Comment.)


4. (C) Commander of Baghdad, General Aboud, discussed a new
Baghdad Operations Command (BOC) plan to reduce militia
involvement in black market kerosene sales. The plan,
stemming from meeting in early October with DPM Salih and
Minister of Oil Sharistani, will track wholesale fuel
delivery trucks by having 2 BOC officers present at each of
the Krakh and Rusafa fuel depots and distributions yards to
monitor outgoing and incoming trucks. (Comment. This effort
should help reduce the number of trucks going missing.
However, at a meeting in early October, Minister Sharistani
told Embassy officers that militants are far more involved in
sales to end point customers than they are in theft of trucks
from depot to yard. End Comment.)


5. (C) Noting that "people are very content at gas stations,"
that militia involvement with fuel has decreased in Karkh and
that the black market price of propane has dropped sharply in
the city, Minister Sharistani gave a long summary of the fuel
situation in Baghdad in which he stated that it has improved
some in recent months, but that the overall fuel situation
will continue to be hampered until more refined products can

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be brought to Baghdad. Once again Sharistani singled out the
off-line pipeline from Iraq's largest refinery in Bayji as
essential to solving Baghdad's fuel woes. (Comment: Bayji is
approximately 250 KM from Baghdad. The pipeline, which runs
through predominantly Sunni areas, is said to have more than
4000 holes. End Comment.) Sharistani also complained that
neither Iraq's other governmental ministries nor Baghdad's
citizens are doing their part to come and pick up fuel from
the Ministry of Oil's (MoO) refineries and storage depots.
(Comment. Sharistani has long held a "we make it, you come
pick it up" view of responsibilities for the Ministry of Oil.
End Comment.)


6. (C) In response to Sharistani comments that the MNF-I was
preventing the MoO from repairing a 10" pipeline to the South
of Baghdad, CG Petraeus pointed out that the pipeline had
already been repaired and pressurized two days ago and that
facilitating repair of key infrastructure is always a
priority for the MNF-I.


7. (C) Ahmed Chalabi noted that terrorists continue to try
and isolate Baghdad through the provision of fuel and urged
that increases use of trucks, rail and pipelines be made to
deliver refined products to Baghdad. In response, Sharistani
stated that he welcomed all efforts to deliver more product
to Baghdad, noting that the Ministry of Transport had
informed him that the Basra to Baghdad railroad is NOW
operations an that the Ministry of Oil would soon be
receiving shipment of 300 more fuel trucks.


8. (C) In response to Sharistani comments of corruption and
collusion with militias by neighborhood councils, the
Governor of Baghdad challenged Sharistani to provide him an
official letter with names of those involved so that he could
investigate and take action. The Governor also urged that
Baghdad's allocation of fuel be separated out from the other
central provinces and stated that fuel canisters received of
late have been 15% lighter than normal. The Governor also
noted that his office was in the midst of creating a new fuel
card, to be ready in 6 weeks, that would help cut down on
corruption.


9. (C) Baghdad Provincial Chair Mueen complained that despite
Sharistani's statements that fully 60% of the first of two100
L allotments (per familiy) of winter kerosene has been
delivered to Baghdad families, he himself has received no
kerosene and that in any event the promised 200 L is
insufficient for the winter. In response, Sharistani stated
that despite an intensive media campaign, including
announcements on television, Baghdad's residents have been
slow in coming to pick up their kerosene. He asked Mueen if
the Province was really "serious" in its stated desire to
assume responsibility for Kerosene delivery, as the Province
had not picked up any part of its first allotment of 10
million L from the Ministry of Oil.

Tigris River Bridge Repair Dispute
--------------


10. (C) The I-ESC discussed the issue of a dispute between
the Ministry of Water Resources and the Baghdad Amanat over
delays in the rebuilding of the Hwy 1 (Mosul Road) bridge
that crosses the Grand Canal north of Baghdad. Insurgents
have dropped or damaged many of the bridges heading north out
of Baghdad making this particular bridge rebuild of strategic
significance. The bridge is near Taji and therefore outside
of the normal areas of responsibility for the Baghdad Amanat,
but the Amanat agreed to rebuild the bridge at the request of
PM Maliki. The Ministry of Water provided the Amanat with a
suggested design plan for the bridge, using a series of
culverts, which included a cost of 18 million Iraqi dinars.
The Amanat had its own design team look at the plan and came
up with their own design which would cost 9 million Iraqi
dinars and which they are NOW in the final stages of
constructing. In order to begin construction on the bridge,
the Ministry of Water had to reduce the flow on that portion
of the river, causing a reduction in water levels at a dam
that provides electricity to Samarra.


11. (C) During the I-ESC meeting, the representative of the
Ministry of Water complained that the Amanat had not shared
the designs for the re-designed bridge under construction,
and therefore the Ministry of Water remained unsure of its
structural integrity and whether it would allow a sufficient
amount of water to pass underneath it. The representative
also noted that the continued burden of having to limit flow
on that portion of the river could cause a significant drop
in electricity to Samarra if continued much longer.


12. In an occasionally heated series of exchanges, the Mayor
first tried to deny his responsibility for completing the
project and then guaranteed that the construction process
would allow the sufficient amount of water to pass through,

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concluding by stating that the project would be "completed
soon."


13. (C) Discussion closed on the issue by NSA Rubaie
instructing the Amanat to share the new design and by
insisting that the Minister of Water and the Amanat meet to
coordinate and increase progress on the bridge. He said that
the issue will be revisited next week.
BUTENIS