MALIKI ON DIPLOMACY WITH TURKEY, STRATEGIC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003563 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2017 TAGS: MARR MCAP MOPS PGOV PINS PNAT PTER IZ SUBJECT: MALIKI ON DIPLOMACY WITH TURKEY, STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP DECLARATION, AND BASRAH SECURITY LEADERSHIP Classified By: Charges D'Affaires Patricia A. Butenis for reasons 1.4(b ) and (d) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Prime Minister Maliki told the Ambassador and General Petraeus that the door remains open to dialogue with Turkey concerning the recent attacks by the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) on Turkish Army units. He said it was important to include members of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) as part of his delegation to Ankara to give them a stake in any potential agreements. Maliki expressed pessimism about deterring Turkish cross border operations (CBO) because of the intense pressure by the Turkish military on the GOT. In a short discussion about the U.S.-Iraqi Strategic Partnership Declaration, the Ambassador reiterated the strong support for the declaration by President Bush. Maliki replied that the GOI had carefully studied the draft SPD, agreed with its principles, but did not want it to include specific details. Responding to the Ambassador,s question, PM Maliki expressed confidence that the Accountability and Justice Law (&De-Baathification Law8) would be passed very soon by the Council of Representatives (CoR). Regarding the Expanded Neighbors Ministerial in November, Ambassador Crocker convinced Maliki to accept an invitation by the Turkish PM to attend. The Ambassador, General Petraeus, and PM Maliki also discussed alternative employment opportunities for Concerned Local Citizens (CLC),and Maliki,s disappointment in Basrah security force leadership. END SUMMARY. Iraqi Delegation to Turkey on PKK Issues -------------- ¶2. (S) During the weekly security meeting on October 25 with Ambassador Crocker and MNF-I Commanding General Petraeus, Prime Minister Maliki said he had just given final instructions to his delegation prior to their departure to Ankara for talks precipitated by PKK attacks on Turkish forces. First and foremost, he said he wanted to keep dialogue open. He described the Turkish relationship with the GOI as one of mutual understanding and expressed his belief that the GOT recognized Maliki,s government had little or no power to control the actions of the PKK. Regarding the composition of his delegation to Ankara, he said it had been important to include members of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) so they could hear first-hand details of any �00A;agreements the GOI concluded with Turkey and their requirements for implementation. He said this would give them a stake in the process and their implementation of any agreements. Maliki Pessimistic on Deterring Turkish CBO -------------- ¶3. (S) Maliki said he was pessimistic about the GOT restraining their military from cross border operations (CBO). He described the GOT as under enormous pressure from the Turkish military to resolve the PKK issue by force because of two recent &humiliations8: the election last month of Prime Minister Erdogan--whom they opposed--and the kidnapping last week of their soldiers by the PKK. Maliki also expressed concern that in their anger, the Turkish Army would destroy badly-needed infrastructure in northern Iraq while hunting for PKK terrorists. He asked General Petraeus about USG intentions if actionable intelligence was developed against the PKK. ¶4. (S) General Petraeus answered that senior USG leadership would make the decision about any possible USG military operations against the PKK and he emphasized that no decision had yet been made. General Petraeus added that &MNF-I should not be engaged in any military action against the PKK.8 In order to deter a Turkish CBO, General Petraeus said he believed the PKK must immediately release its hostages, maintain a cease fire, and engage in negotiations. In any case, General Petraeus called it unlikely that a Turkish incursion would go very deep into Iraqi territory since the terrain in the far north is extremely poor for conducting military ground operations and the Turkish Army would need to keep their supply lines short. General Petraeus noted that Saddam Hussein had not been able to conquer the Kurds there even after three decades of fighting. General Petraeus noted there was over ten billion dollars of Turkish investment in the region which would mitigate any desire by the Turkish military to destroy infrastructure. ¶5. (S) Maliki responded that he knew northern Iraq well, first as a soldier in the Army and then as a Peshmerga fighter against Saddam, knowledge which made him aware of his limited options. Although he had ordered the KRG to cut off BAGHDAD 00003563 002 OF 003 supply routes to the PKK, he recalled that Saddam had tried to do the same thing but the Kurds always managed to get food to him and his fellow fighters. Making a Concrete Offer to Turkey -------------- ¶6. (S) Despite the limited options available, Ambassador Crocker urged Maliki to give his delegation in Ankara something concrete to offer the GOT. As a start, they should make the GOT aware of his orders to shut down PKK supply routes. The Ambassador added that other measures--even if symbolic--would relay Maliki,s seriousness of intent; for example, he could clamp down on Irbil airport to greatly restrict the flow of PKK fighters into the region. (Note: Irbil airport has direct links to Europe. End note.) PM Maliki agreed and added that he would be willing to surrender PKK terrorists directly to the GOT without going through intermediaries like Interpol as another good-faith gesture. Strategic Partnership Declaration -------------- ¶7. (S) The Ambassador told PM Maliki that President Bush considered the Strategic Partnership Declaration (SPD) a very important step forward in the US-Iraq relationship and would be willing to host a signing ceremony. Maliki responded that the GOI had studied the draft SPD closely, and while they accepted its principles, they had made some modifications. He said it would be transmitted to the USG in a few days. In particular, Maliki noted that the U.S. draft of the SPD called for a &Declaration of Principles8--which the GOI accepted--but that it also included many additional details that the GOI preferred to exclude from the SPD itself, and to reserve for future agreements and negotiations. De-Baathification Law Progress -------------- ¶8. (S) Concerning the Accountability and Justice Law (Note: also known as the &De-Baathification law8 End Note),the Ambassador noted that while PM Maliki had agreed to specific language on August 26, the issue was not yet under Council of Representatives (CoR) consideration. He strongly urged the Prime Minister to use all his efforts with the CoR to push it through, saying the that US Embassy would vigorously assist in the effort. He emphasized that the purpose of the legislation was to advance national reconciliation and should be a top priority. ¶9. (S) PM Maliki replied that he had already discussed the issue with Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq (ISCI) party representatives and would talk with the Kurdish parties later in the day. He said they all agreed to the August 26 language with one modification. He said he expected to get a clear majority on the vote during the coming week. He remarked that the delay was his fault which came as a result of his efforts to get complete consensus. He lamented that it had not happened, but still expected to get some Sunni votes for the measure. Employment Alternatives for Concerned Local Citizens -------------- -------------- ¶10. (S) Responding to concerns by PM Maliki that too many Concerned Local Citizens (CLC) were going into the police forces rather than other employment alternatives, Ambassador Crocker agreed on the need for vigorous jobs creation programs. He told Maliki that program managers at the U.S. embassy were searching extensively throughout Baghdad to find new employment opportunities and would work closely with the central government to expand the program. Maliki said he fully supported those efforts and asked for USG assistance at state-owned industries especially with product marketing. Maliki said that his Government now has a clear vision and that jobs are important but equally important is the need to be cautious about security force growth through CLCs. Maliki to Attend Expanded Neighbors Ministerial -------------- -- ¶11. (S) Turning to the Expanded Neighbors Ministerial in Istanbul on November 2, PM Maliki reported that the Turkish Prime Minister had personally invited him to attend, but that he had not made up his mind as yet. Ambassador Crocker described the invitation as a very good sign and urged Maliki to accept. He added that it would set the stage for more fruitful discussions with the attending foreign ministers; BAGHDAD 00003563 003 OF 003 further, it would have a good effect on Turkish-Iraqi relations. Maliki said he would attend. Maliki Disappointed in Basrah Security Force Leadership -------------- -------------- ¶12. (S) PM Maliki voiced serious concerns about the outbreak of violence in Basrah during the past week. He said he was particularly disappointed in the leadership of Generals Mohan and Jalil, the Basrah military commander and the Provincial Chief of Police. Maliki said he could not understand why over 30 policemen had so quickly surrendered to Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) forces; he called them cowards and vowed to arrest them himself, if JAM ever released them. Maliki said that Mohan and Jalil were sent to Basrah not to be diplomats, but to crack down hard on the militias there; clearly exasperated, Maliki threatened to arrest them as well if they remained derelict in their duties. BUTENIS