BAGHDAD: BUILDING GOI CAPACITY TO DELIVER SERVICES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003545

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2017
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PINR PINS IZ
SUBJECT: BAGHDAD: BUILDING GOI CAPACITY TO DELIVER SERVICES

Classified By: Baghdad PRT Team Leader Andrew Passen for reasons 1.4 (b
,d).


1. (U) This is a Baghdad PRT/Embassy POL reporting cable.


2. (C) Summary: PRT Baghdad hosted a major inter-agency
meeting September 26 to coordinate, at the working level,
numerous initiatives launched to capitalize on the
opportunities created by the troop and civilian surge in
Baghdad. These initiatives include a pilot program to
counter militia influence; USG support for the Baghdad Forum;
the hiring of concerned local citizens (CLCs) to serve as
security guards; the transition period during which the USG
can help move CLCs into jobs in the civil service or private
sector; as well as on-going USG support for legislative and
institutional capacity-building. All of these USG efforts
aim to increase the fairness and effectiveness of service
provision in Baghdad by the Government of Iraq, thereby
augmenting the government's legitimacy and strengthening the
connection between Baghdad's neglected periphery and its
political and geographic core. This cable is the third in a
three-part series focused on service provision as a means to
achieve greater political unity in Baghdad. End Summary.

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Inter-Agency Development of a 'Surge Exploitation' Approach
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3. (C) On 26 September, Baghdad PRT hosted a Mission-wide,
inter-agency meeting to discuss collaborative means to
exploit the opportunities created by the troop and civilian
surge in Baghdad. Participants reviewed policies being
developed at the strategic level and initiatives being
launched at the tactical level. Representatives participated
from Baghdad PRT, several of Baghdad's Embedded PRTs, Embassy
political and economic sections, USAID, Iraq Transition
Assistance Office (ITAO),Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA),
Office of Regional Affairs (ORA),Joint Strategic Planning
and Assessments (JSPA),Multi-National Force Iraq Strategic
Effects (MNF-I Stateff),Force Strategic Engagement Cell
(FSEC),as well as units of Multi-National Division Baghdad
(MND-B),Multi-National Division Central (MND-C),and
Multi-National Division North (MND-N).

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Tactics to Counter Militia Influence
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4. (C) Meeting participants recognized that militia
domination over the provision of essential services poses a
major obstacle to progress toward political unity in Baghdad.
Discussion focused on an initiative to start a pilot program
designed to assist the Government of Iraq (GoI) in developing
and implementing a plan to improve the provision of a single
service into a single Baghdad neighborhood. Though this
pilot program, participants aim to assess GoI methods to
improve service delivery while reducing militia influence,
creating a body of knowledge to guide the roll-out of a wider
program across Baghdad. This project will fall under the
umbrella of broader, on-going inter-agency efforts, including
the Counter Militia Influence working group and the Baghdad
Security Plan support group.


5. (C) Participants devoted time to discussing non-violent
means to removing militia influence from service provision in
Baghdad. Various on-going efforts to improve civil service
capacity and the legislative process are inextricably linked
to the overall goal of protecting legitimate government
activity from the control of extremists, militias, and
criminals. Specific initiatives discussed include
modernizing payroll systems, improving financial
accountability, increasing transparency in contract bidding
procedures, and expanding anti-corruption programs.


6. (C) In addition, the meeting included discussion on USG
efforts to support the 'Baghdad Forum,' an initiative led by
Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih. The Baghdad Forum,
scheduled for November 14, will concentrate on economic
development of Baghdad province and on improving working
relationships between the national, provincial and local
government. The forum will announce tangible, pre-arranged
'deliverables' from the central government to the citizens of
Baghdad province.

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Reconciliation for Residents on the Periphery
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7. (C) Meeting participants also discussed the situation in
Abu Ghraib, a primarily Sunni, outlying qada (or county) on
the periphery of metropolitan Baghdad, where local government
is almost non-existent and residents suffer from a lack of
services provided by Baghdad's central government. Once a

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major source of the insurgency fighting against Baghdad and
attacking Coalition Forces, the local tribes currently seek
reconciliation. Coalition Forces, Baghdad PRT, and ePRToffs
have helped to bring Abu Ghraib residents to the bargaining
table with representatives of the provincial and national
government. The 1/1 CAV Brigade Combat Team covering Abu
Ghraib has begun to invest local residents in maintaining
their own security hiring 'Iraqi Security Volunteers,' or
'Concerned Local Citizens' (CLCs). Through this process,
Coalition Forces hire tribal members to serve as local
security guards on a temporary basis until they can be
brought on to serve in an official capacity under the
Ministry of the Interior. The Brigade has used Commander's
Emergency Response Program (CERP) to pay for 90-day CLC
contracts.


8. (C) Security, however, is only one among the many
government services that residents of Abu Ghraib require, and
security guard positions cannot meet the extensive demand for
employment. The Brigade thus seeks to build on the tactical
success represented by CLC deployment with a more
sustainable, strategic approach, by building the capacity of
Abu Ghraib's local government to provide better services to
the area, and by increasing Abu Ghraib's connections to
central Baghdad.


9. (C) Meeting participants discussed several proposed
initiatives to target the underlying problems faced in
'peripheral' Abu Ghraib. The GoI could open and expand in
Abu Ghraib much needed local offices of the national
ministries that deliver essential services to the Baghdad
qadas. The offices of these ministries can be co-located
with the local council and local executive official in a
'Consolidated Governance Center,' creating a geographic nexus
for local government that does not currently exist in Abu
Ghraib. This centralized location can be protected more
easily by the Iraqi Security Forces or by newly-hired CLCs.

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A Civil Service Initiative in Abu Ghraib
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10. (C) A civil service initiative could be launched to hire
locals to work as civil servants in this newly created
Governance Center, much in the same way that the Brigade
currently hires volunteers to serve as CLCs. A temporary
contract funded by USG sources can be followed by a
commitment from the Baghdad provincial government to hire
these employees on a contractual or permanent basis.
Training and support for these new civil servants and their
offices can be provided by ePRTs and through USAID programs.
Significant consideration must be paid to the GoI's
capability to absorb these employees, and to simultaneous
efforts to grow Abu Ghraib's private sector labor market for
such an initiative to have sustainable success.


11. (C) In addition to any civil service initiative, a
'bridge' program could also train CLCs for employment in the
private sector or civil society. The Consolidated Governance
Center can provide job counseling, employment referrals,
links to vocational training institutions, and financial
support for the bridge period between service as a CLC and
eventual employment in the private sector or non-governmental
organizations. Successes in Abu Ghraib can be replicated in
other areas where significant momentum has begun to turn
locals away from insurgency and towards taking an active part
in their own government and community.

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Promoting the Moderate Citizens in the Middle
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12. (C) Discussion at the meeting also revolved around
ambiguity in the legal relationships between councils,
executive officials, and ministry offices, which has
significantly hampered governance in Baghdad since 2003. The
rule of law is not attainable without a comprehensive
legislative framework for governance activity. Unclear
regulations, procedures, and lines of authority have played
into the hands of extremists willing to operate according to
their own rules, especially when government officials do not
have the clear authority to hold them accountable to any
reasonable interpretation of existing law.


13. (C) The USG can help moderate citizens by continuing to
support several draft laws and policy initiatives designed to
diminish the current confusion. As Baghdad's government
officials draft and enforce legal mechanisms to clarify the
relationships among their institutions, and the procedures
for operating within them, they can bring order to the
ambiguous and unpredictable environment in which extremists
currently thrive. The forthcoming passage of provincial
powers legislation, the 'Law of Governorates Not Organized

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into a Region,' will better define the roles and
responsibilities of provincial government, although it will
leave final clarification of Baghdad's status to later
legislation. Baghdad's 15 local councils recently codified
their by-laws, which may contribute to more efficient and
uniform governance at the local level, and to the improvement
of service-delivery and infrastructure development. The
Baghdad Provincial Council recently completed its Provincial
Development Strategy (PDS) and submitted it to the Ministry
of Planning. The successful implementation of this ambitious
plan will provide the Provincial Council a strong basis for
seeking future funding from the Ministry of Finance for
provincial development projects.


14. (C) The USG can also help secular moderates in Baghdad by
assisting them to build collaborative forums. One such forum
is the 'Baghdad League,' currently being developed by the
former Governor of Baghdad and several key local leaders with
the support of the Baghdad PRT. The former Governor has
designed the Baghdad League as a lobbying organization for
better local government policy in Baghdad. The League, a
nominee for a Quick Reaction Fund (QRF) grant from Baghdad
PRT, will voice the concerns of the nearly 1,500 local
council members of Baghdad - and of the independent,
technocratic officials in provincial government - to the
Provincial Council and the national Council of
Representatives.

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Impact of Building GoI Capacity to Deliver Services
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15. (C) Comment: All of these USG efforts aim to increase the
fairness and effectiveness of the GoI in providing services
to the residents of Baghdad, thereby augmenting the
government's legitimacy and strengthening the connection
between Baghdad's neglected periphery and its provincial
core. USG efforts to eliminate the environment of fear and
intimidation in Baghdad created by extremists, militias, and
criminals will prevent these malign actors from furthering
their agendas by preying on service providers. USG attempts
to provide reconciliation opportunities for tribal sheikhs,
and others on the outside of legitimate governance, will
address many of their paramount concerns by offering them a
larger role in providing and prioritizing services for their
communities. In supporting moderate citizens, the USG will
assist in the implementation of transparent and predictable
procedures for the provision of services. The security surge
in Baghdad has provided a window of opportunity to locate and
engage the willing Iraqi partners necessary to achieve these
ends. End Comment.
CROCKER