BAGHDAD: BUILDING GOI CAPACITY TO DELIVER SERVICES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003545 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2017 TAGS: KDEM PGOV PINR PINS IZ SUBJECT: BAGHDAD: BUILDING GOI CAPACITY TO DELIVER SERVICES Classified By: Baghdad PRT Team Leader Andrew Passen for reasons 1.4 (b ,d). ¶1. (U) This is a Baghdad PRT/Embassy POL reporting cable. ¶2. (C) Summary: PRT Baghdad hosted a major inter-agency meeting September 26 to coordinate, at the working level, numerous initiatives launched to capitalize on the opportunities created by the troop and civilian surge in Baghdad. These initiatives include a pilot program to counter militia influence; USG support for the Baghdad Forum; the hiring of concerned local citizens (CLCs) to serve as security guards; the transition period during which the USG can help move CLCs into jobs in the civil service or private sector; as well as on-going USG support for legislative and institutional capacity-building. All of these USG efforts aim to increase the fairness and effectiveness of service provision in Baghdad by the Government of Iraq, thereby augmenting the government's legitimacy and strengthening the connection between Baghdad's neglected periphery and its political and geographic core. This cable is the third in a three-part series focused on service provision as a means to achieve greater political unity in Baghdad. End Summary. -------------- -------------- Inter-Agency Development of a 'Surge Exploitation' Approach -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) On 26 September, Baghdad PRT hosted a Mission-wide, inter-agency meeting to discuss collaborative means to exploit the opportunities created by the troop and civilian surge in Baghdad. Participants reviewed policies being developed at the strategic level and initiatives being launched at the tactical level. Representatives participated from Baghdad PRT, several of Baghdad's Embedded PRTs, Embassy political and economic sections, USAID, Iraq Transition Assistance Office (ITAO),Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA), Office of Regional Affairs (ORA),Joint Strategic Planning and Assessments (JSPA),Multi-National Force Iraq Strategic Effects (MNF-I Stateff),Force Strategic Engagement Cell (FSEC),as well as units of Multi-National Division Baghdad (MND-B),Multi-National Division Central (MND-C),and Multi-National Division North (MND-N). -------------- Tactics to Counter Militia Influence -------------- ¶4. (C) Meeting participants recognized that militia domination over the provision of essential services poses a major obstacle to progress toward political unity in Baghdad. Discussion focused on an initiative to start a pilot program designed to assist the Government of Iraq (GoI) in developing and implementing a plan to improve the provision of a single service into a single Baghdad neighborhood. Though this pilot program, participants aim to assess GoI methods to improve service delivery while reducing militia influence, creating a body of knowledge to guide the roll-out of a wider program across Baghdad. This project will fall under the umbrella of broader, on-going inter-agency efforts, including the Counter Militia Influence working group and the Baghdad Security Plan support group. ¶5. (C) Participants devoted time to discussing non-violent means to removing militia influence from service provision in Baghdad. Various on-going efforts to improve civil service capacity and the legislative process are inextricably linked to the overall goal of protecting legitimate government activity from the control of extremists, militias, and criminals. Specific initiatives discussed include modernizing payroll systems, improving financial accountability, increasing transparency in contract bidding procedures, and expanding anti-corruption programs. ¶6. (C) In addition, the meeting included discussion on USG efforts to support the 'Baghdad Forum,' an initiative led by Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih. The Baghdad Forum, scheduled for November 14, will concentrate on economic development of Baghdad province and on improving working relationships between the national, provincial and local government. The forum will announce tangible, pre-arranged 'deliverables' from the central government to the citizens of Baghdad province. -------------- Reconciliation for Residents on the Periphery -------------- ¶7. (C) Meeting participants also discussed the situation in Abu Ghraib, a primarily Sunni, outlying qada (or county) on the periphery of metropolitan Baghdad, where local government is almost non-existent and residents suffer from a lack of services provided by Baghdad's central government. Once a BAGHDAD 00003545 002 OF 003 major source of the insurgency fighting against Baghdad and attacking Coalition Forces, the local tribes currently seek reconciliation. Coalition Forces, Baghdad PRT, and ePRToffs have helped to bring Abu Ghraib residents to the bargaining table with representatives of the provincial and national government. The 1/1 CAV Brigade Combat Team covering Abu Ghraib has begun to invest local residents in maintaining their own security hiring 'Iraqi Security Volunteers,' or 'Concerned Local Citizens' (CLCs). Through this process, Coalition Forces hire tribal members to serve as local security guards on a temporary basis until they can be brought on to serve in an official capacity under the Ministry of the Interior. The Brigade has used Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) to pay for 90-day CLC contracts. ¶8. (C) Security, however, is only one among the many government services that residents of Abu Ghraib require, and security guard positions cannot meet the extensive demand for employment. The Brigade thus seeks to build on the tactical success represented by CLC deployment with a more sustainable, strategic approach, by building the capacity of Abu Ghraib's local government to provide better services to the area, and by increasing Abu Ghraib's connections to central Baghdad. ¶9. (C) Meeting participants discussed several proposed initiatives to target the underlying problems faced in 'peripheral' Abu Ghraib. The GoI could open and expand in Abu Ghraib much needed local offices of the national ministries that deliver essential services to the Baghdad qadas. The offices of these ministries can be co-located with the local council and local executive official in a 'Consolidated Governance Center,' creating a geographic nexus for local government that does not currently exist in Abu Ghraib. This centralized location can be protected more easily by the Iraqi Security Forces or by newly-hired CLCs. -------------- A Civil Service Initiative in Abu Ghraib -------------- ¶10. (C) A civil service initiative could be launched to hire locals to work as civil servants in this newly created Governance Center, much in the same way that the Brigade currently hires volunteers to serve as CLCs. A temporary contract funded by USG sources can be followed by a commitment from the Baghdad provincial government to hire these employees on a contractual or permanent basis. Training and support for these new civil servants and their offices can be provided by ePRTs and through USAID programs. Significant consideration must be paid to the GoI's capability to absorb these employees, and to simultaneous efforts to grow Abu Ghraib's private sector labor market for such an initiative to have sustainable success. ¶11. (C) In addition to any civil service initiative, a 'bridge' program could also train CLCs for employment in the private sector or civil society. The Consolidated Governance Center can provide job counseling, employment referrals, links to vocational training institutions, and financial support for the bridge period between service as a CLC and eventual employment in the private sector or non-governmental organizations. Successes in Abu Ghraib can be replicated in other areas where significant momentum has begun to turn locals away from insurgency and towards taking an active part in their own government and community. -------------- Promoting the Moderate Citizens in the Middle -------------- ¶12. (C) Discussion at the meeting also revolved around ambiguity in the legal relationships between councils, executive officials, and ministry offices, which has significantly hampered governance in Baghdad since 2003. The rule of law is not attainable without a comprehensive legislative framework for governance activity. Unclear regulations, procedures, and lines of authority have played into the hands of extremists willing to operate according to their own rules, especially when government officials do not have the clear authority to hold them accountable to any reasonable interpretation of existing law. ¶13. (C) The USG can help moderate citizens by continuing to support several draft laws and policy initiatives designed to diminish the current confusion. As Baghdad's government officials draft and enforce legal mechanisms to clarify the relationships among their institutions, and the procedures for operating within them, they can bring order to the ambiguous and unpredictable environment in which extremists currently thrive. The forthcoming passage of provincial powers legislation, the 'Law of Governorates Not Organized BAGHDAD 00003545 003 OF 003 into a Region,' will better define the roles and responsibilities of provincial government, although it will leave final clarification of Baghdad's status to later legislation. Baghdad's 15 local councils recently codified their by-laws, which may contribute to more efficient and uniform governance at the local level, and to the improvement of service-delivery and infrastructure development. The Baghdad Provincial Council recently completed its Provincial Development Strategy (PDS) and submitted it to the Ministry of Planning. The successful implementation of this ambitious plan will provide the Provincial Council a strong basis for seeking future funding from the Ministry of Finance for provincial development projects. ¶14. (C) The USG can also help secular moderates in Baghdad by assisting them to build collaborative forums. One such forum is the 'Baghdad League,' currently being developed by the former Governor of Baghdad and several key local leaders with the support of the Baghdad PRT. The former Governor has designed the Baghdad League as a lobbying organization for better local government policy in Baghdad. The League, a nominee for a Quick Reaction Fund (QRF) grant from Baghdad PRT, will voice the concerns of the nearly 1,500 local council members of Baghdad - and of the independent, technocratic officials in provincial government - to the Provincial Council and the national Council of Representatives. -------------- -------------- Impact of Building GoI Capacity to Deliver Services -------------- -------------- ¶15. (C) Comment: All of these USG efforts aim to increase the fairness and effectiveness of the GoI in providing services to the residents of Baghdad, thereby augmenting the government's legitimacy and strengthening the connection between Baghdad's neglected periphery and its provincial core. USG efforts to eliminate the environment of fear and intimidation in Baghdad created by extremists, militias, and criminals will prevent these malign actors from furthering their agendas by preying on service providers. USG attempts to provide reconciliation opportunities for tribal sheikhs, and others on the outside of legitimate governance, will address many of their paramount concerns by offering them a larger role in providing and prioritizing services for their communities. In supporting moderate citizens, the USG will assist in the implementation of transparent and predictable procedures for the provision of services. The security surge in Baghdad has provided a window of opportunity to locate and engage the willing Iraqi partners necessary to achieve these ends. End Comment. CROCKER