BAGHDAD: EPRT SEEKS LINK TO SADR THROUGH LOCAL

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 003543

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR PINS IZ
SUBJECT: BAGHDAD: EPRT SEEKS LINK TO SADR THROUGH LOCAL
ENGAGEMENT IN SADR CITY

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Ellen Germain for reasons 1.4
(b,d).


1. (S) On September 28, the EPRT and Brigade covering
Baghdad's most populous district, Sadr City, met with local
tribal leaders with close ties to representatives of Muqtadar
Al-Sadr (MAS). Months of engagements designed to gain trust
among less influential Sadr City leaders culminated in a
series of meetings since late September with senior tribal
sheikhs, civic leaders and the representatives of two key
leaders in Sadr City: Salman al Faraji, director of the
Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS) in Sadr City, and Raheem al
Alak, a senior representative of MAS to the tribal sheikhs of
Sadr City. The EPRT and Brigade aim through these
engagements to establish ties with senior leaders in Sadr
City, such as al Faraji, who can help the Government of Iraq
(GoI) and Coalition Forces (CF) improve governance and
security in the district. The EPRT has sought out key
leaders who have strong ties to the three power centers that
matter most in Sadr City: MAS (through his representatives
and his office); informal leadership structures (such as
tribes); and formal governance institutions (District and
Neighborhood Councils, Directors General, Qaim Makams).


2. (S) If engagements with key leaders succeed, the EPRT and
Brigade aim, more broadly, to forge a better working
relationship with Sadrists in the movement's Baghdad
heartland - Sadr City - in order to press MAS and his
movement toward more constructive and direct engagement with
the USG. As a near-term tactic, the EPRT seeks to coax the
leaders who represent al Faraji and Alak to begin meeting USG
civilians in the open instead of in private, as they
currently do. A public meeting between the USG and
representatives truly associated with MAS and OMS would
implicitly grant to non-Sadrist officials in Sadr City the
political permission also to meet with USG officials.
Without fear of reprisal from Jaysh Al-Mahdi (JAM),local
council members and technocrats could begin cooperating with
the EPRT and Brigade in the reconstruction of Sadr City.


3. (S) The process of identifying and engaging Sadr City's
real power brokers has been excruciatingly slow and complex.
The broader national context constrains the freedom of Sadr
City's local leaders to engage with the USG, as they struggle
to understand complicated and shifting Sadrist positions
vis--vis the GOI, USG, Sunni groups, and other Shia
movements. Local leaders also endure unpredictable eruptions
of violence from JAM and the special groups and criminals who
operate under the banner of JAM. Thus the Sadr City local
engagement process remains vulnerable to any event that
diminishes the political cover Sadr City leaders require to
engage with the USG. The widely publicized October 21 raids
by CF into Sadr City will likely slow but not stop the
forward momentum built over the past six months.


4. (S) Three other specific, complicating factors may also
impede progress in the coming weeks. Firstly, a General in
the National Police who is directly associated with JAM
currently represents the Government of Iraq in the on-going
engagements. Secondly, early discussions have been tempered
by continued local anger over CF actions in Sadr City during
April 2004. Finally, all of the Sadr City sheikhs who met
with the EPRT and Brigade on September 28 made clear that
they represent JAM (which, they claimed, "is made up of our
brothers and sons"),and that they want CF night raids to
stop and the Coalition to leave Iraq immediately. Despite
these tensions, the EPRT and Brigade continue to develop
relationships with Sadr City leaders who may provide the
vital, direct link to MAS necessary to stabilize and develop
one of Baghdad's most important and volatile areas.
CROCKER