BAGHDAD: EXPLOITING SURGE SUCCESS THROUGH SERVICES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003540 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2017 TAGS: KDEM PGOV PINR PINS IZ SUBJECT: BAGHDAD: EXPLOITING SURGE SUCCESS THROUGH SERVICES REF: A. BAGHDAD 3342 ¶B. BAGHDAD 3045 ¶C. BAGHDAD 3526 ¶D. BAGHDAD 2728 Classified By: Baghdad PRT Team Leader Andrew Passen for reasons 1.4 (b ,d). ¶1. (U) This is a Baghdad PRT/Embassy POL reporting cable. ¶2. (C) Summary: Improvement in service provision by the Government of Iraq (GoI) can play a critical role in converting the security gains of the Baghdad Security Plan into progress toward political unity in Baghdad. A focus on services has already begun to provide tribal leaders a powerful role in their communities by allowing them to identify local service priorities. Through more effective service delivery, moderate technocrats and the leaders who guide them will generate more local trust in the Government of Iraq. Over time, they may accrue the political capital necessary to persuade Baghdad's divided communities to seek resources through government institutions rather than through extra-legal entities, and to resolve differences through political dialogue rather than through sectarian violence. Successes on the security front have already been accompanied by increased cooperation between and greater capacity within the institutions providing services to Baghdad's residents, such as the Joint Planning Commission, the Provincial Council, and the Amanat. This cable is the second in a three-part series focused on service provision as a means to achieve greater political unity in Baghdad. End Summary. -------------- --- Working to Bring a Divided Baghdad towards Unity -------------- --- ¶3. (C) Building on September 21 discussions held between Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki and Ambassador Ryan Crocker about the crucial importance of improving service provision in Baghdad (reftel A),Baghdad PRT hosted a Mission-wide meeting September 26 in which participants proposed the following aims to exploit the security successes of the Baghdad Security Plan (BSP): (1) counter the behavior of extremists seeking to dominate the 'core' of Baghdad's politics and government; (2) reconcile those on the 'periphery' of Baghdad politics inclined to insurgency, and connect them to legitimate government institutions; and (3) empower moderates to support the legitimacy of the state and the development of pluralistic politics. ¶4. (C) These three aims contribute to the broader strategic mission of forging unity in Iraq's divided capital. Unity in Baghdad may be achieved when a critical mass of political actors decide to become full stakeholders in a sustainable, pluralistic democracy where the rule of law is respected, violence as a method of political discourse is rejected, and political goods - essential services, social welfare, economic opportunity and security ) are distributed equitably and effectively regardless of sectarian identity. -------------- -- A Focus on Services Can Achieve Political Gains -------------- -- ¶5. (C) A common thread connects the political goals described above - improvement of the GoI capacity to provide essential services. While always an end in itself, USG efforts to enhance GoI service provision can provide the government a powerful political lever to achieve a greater sense of belonging and inclusion among Baghdad's divided communities. Indeed, increased access to services can move peripheral communities closer to the provincial core. For example, a focus on service provision by several key national and provincial government leaders has already begun to enable tribal leaders to help identify the critical service needs of their communities. This consultative process has connected Baghdad's leading tribes more closely to the central government, and it has provided them a constructive alternative to insurgency. ¶6. (C) Improvement in service provision by the Government of Iraq (GoI) can play a critical role in converting the security gains of the Baghdad Security Plan into progress toward political unity in Baghdad. USG efforts to strengthen the GoI capacity to deliver services may also diminish the power over services wielded by militias and extremists, which could in turn weaken their influence on local residents and political parties. Enhancing the legal and policy framework of service-delivery institutions can enhance the stature of Baghdad's political moderates, whose efficiency and credibility will increase in a well-structured system. Through more effective service delivery, moderate technocrats and the leaders who guide them may generate more local trust BAGHDAD 00003540 002 OF 002 in the GoI. Over time, they may accrue the political capital necessary to persuade Baghdad's political communities to seek resources through government institutions rather than through extra-legal entities, and to resolve differences through political dialogue rather than through sectarian violence. -------------- -- GoI Service Institutions Show Signs of Progress -------------- -- ¶7. (C) Successes on the security front have already been accompanied by increased cooperation between and greater capacity within the institutions providing services to Baghdad's residents. During the past six months, the Joint Planning Commission (JPC) and Joint Reconstruction Operations Center (JROC) facilitated substantive institutional cooperation between the local, provincial and national leaders who currently provide services to Baghdad. Co-directed by a Sunni official who recently lost his son to terrorists, the JROC and JPC have already yielded political results by creating an inclusive forum for debate and collaboration on services (reftel B). ¶8. (C) Additionally, in a major milestone, Baghdad's Provincial Council announced on October 10 a five-year strategic vision for Baghdad's future development, the Provincial Development Strategy (PDS). The PDS reflects unprecedented collaboration among local, provincial, national and civil society leaders. It outlines goals for major infrastructure planning and capital investment in Baghdad. Most importantly, the PDS represents for Baghdad a significant step forward in institutional collaboration, political cooperation and policy development (reftel C). ¶9. (C) At the same time, the Baghdad Amanat (City Hall) has independently improved earlier USG capacity-building projects. Amanat officials now operate a city Training Center to provide technical and management classes to Amanat professional staff (reftel D). This program has helped to focus Amanat officials on professional skills rather than party loyalty. -------------- -------------- Services Can Help Connect the Core and the Periphery -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) Comment: As the surge continues to produce security gains, the story of Baghdad in late 2007 has become the story of the relationship between those at its core and those at its periphery. Further progress will depend on the extent which the Government of Iraq can improve this relationship both rapidly and effectively. Post and Baghdad PRT seek to help the GoI to prevent extremists from dominating the core, and to ensure that those who control the core distribute the resources they command more equitably and effectively to Baghdad's political periphery. Improving the GoI capacity to deliver essential services competently and fairly can significantly help to connect the disconnected, and bring unity to a divided Baghdad. End Comment. CROCKER