OCTOBER 21 MCNS: AMBASSADOR CALLS FOR GOI ACTION

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003521 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2017 TAGS: MARR MOPS PGOV PHUM PREL PTER TU IZ SUBJECT: OCTOBER 21 MCNS: AMBASSADOR CALLS FOR GOI ACTION AGAINST PKK; MALIKI CALLS FOR RESTRAINED USE OF FORCE, AGAIN; BASRAH PIC ON TRACK REGARDLESS REF: REFTEL BAGHDAD 03472 NOTAL Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) PM Maliki opened the Ministerial Council on National Security (MCNS) with a call for Coalition Forces to exercise restraint in military operations to avoid civilian casualties, noting that the Council of Representatives (COR) was questioning the sovereignty and purpose of the government. Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus responded that the GOI cannot allow itself to be misled by militia disinformation and not allow rhetoric to overcome significant and costly security advances. Ambassador Crocker called on the GOI to strongly condemn the PKK actions in Turkey. General Mohan, in command of the Operations Center in Basrah province, reported the situation is improving steadily, but insisted that Basrawis cannot be relied on for security operations in Basrah. END SUMMARY. -------------- Dispelling Innuendo, Maintaining Trust -------------- ¶2. (S) Prime Minister Maliki opened the October 21 MCNS with a reference to recent deaths in Sadr City during an MNF-I operation. During his remarks, he also raised the issue of Blackwater, conflating Coalition Operations against identified terrorists and criminals with private security firms' protective actions. Maliki opined that the deaths of a handful or more of innocent civilians to kill one terrorist or criminal undermined support for the coalition. With negotiations for an extension of the UNSCR on the horizon, he must be able to demonstrate to the Council of Representatives (COR) that Coalition forces are helping Iraq attain sovereignty, stating several times that the COR was questioning his government's effectiveness and sovereign control of Iraq. ¶3. (C) Ambassador Crocker noted that Coalition and Iraqi forces had brought down the level of violence significantly over the last few months at a very high price - the lives of hundreds of U.S. and Iraqi soldiers. Now was not the time to be distracted by the noise from our enemies. General Petraeus elaborated, pointing out that violence in Baghdad was down to late January/early February 2006 levels and that the militias may now be relatively more dangerous than Al-Qaeda Iraq (AQI). Echoing Ambassador Crocker, he insisted to Maliki that the extremists cannot be allowed to direct the debate or drive us apart. ¶4. (C) Maliki returned to the point, again, arguing that success against the terrorists cannot be called success if many innocent civilians die to get one terrorist. The Minister of Defense noted that the use of air strikes against a target in an urban center only happens when the target is clearly identified and resistance is strong. General Petraeus noted that a Bradley had been disabled - not the work of lightly armed militants or innocent civilians, but the work of multiple IEDs and RPGs shot at our forces during their exfiltration. The air strike against those firing on CF soldiers was required to break resistance and extricate the vehicle and crew. He also noted that Iraqi police in Sadr city are apparently doing nothing to identify and remove IEDs, many of which were encountered by the team targeting the identified terrorist targeted in this operation. ¶5. (C) After further discussion, which included Maliki's reports that members of COR believe the MNF-I is arming tribes and General Petraeus' immediate and sharp rebuttal of such allegations, all parties agreed that the Sadr city operation should be investigated, and that the COR should be advised of the results. General Petraeus noted that MNF-I would investigate; pointing out that he takes the loss of life very seriously. Reminding Maliki that he regretted the death of any innocent civilian, he emphasized the need to avoid pre-judgments and pre-dispositions against Coalitions forces who are allies of the GOI. -------------- Turkey-PKK -------------- ¶6. (C) Ambassador Crocker told the MCNS that it must take action immediately in response to the recent PKK attack in Turkey that had killed at least 17 Turkish soldiers. He BAGHDAD 00003521 002 OF 002 stressed the need for immediate concrete GOI action in response, calling on PM Maliki to have the GOI and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) immediately issue strong public statements condemning the PKK's actions. He underlined the gravity of the situation caused by this provocative attack, noting that it comes on the heels of significant efforts by the most senior U.S. officials to dissuade the GOT from making an incursion (REFTEL). ¶7. (C) UK Ambassador Prentice reinforced those points, urging the PM to take immediate measures to establish an atmosphere for discussions with Turkey. Taking the points, Maliki asked if a planned October 22 visit to Turkey of senior Iraqis, which the GOI was now delaying until after the October 23 visit to Baghdad of Turkish FM Babacan, should take place tomorrow. General Petraeus responded that Maliki should ask PM Erdogan for his views on how Maliki could help him defuse this crisis. Taking the need for urgent action on board, Maliki instructed his staff to prepare a public statement condemning the attacks. ¶8. (C) The GOI intended to hold a Crisis Meeting October 22 to discuss both allegations of Excessive Force and the Turkish Situation. PM Maliki described the former as a threat to the core of the political process. He also gave an oblique reference to the COR's concerns and UNSCR negotiations. -------------- Basrah Security Situation -------------- ¶9. (S) Iraqi Army MG Mohan reported a steadily improving security situation. He underscored that the soldiers and police under his operational command who were not natives of the Basrah region had been taking the fight to the militias and terrorists. He emphasized that Basrawis could not be relied on to provide security in Basrah. He explained that threats against their families prevented them from fully exercising their duties. When it was suggested that especially hand-picked police who were "clean" of militia influence were available, he insisted that if they were from Basrah, he could not use them, "In two years maybe, but not now." -------------- Prison Use Pending -------------- ¶10. (C) In response to UK Ambassador's inquiry about the return of the Baghdad Central prison to the Justice Ministry so that renovation could begin, Mohan stated that the facility was inappropriate due to its location in central Basrah and its structural layout of halls instead of cells. There ensued a lively discussion about which facility was actually being considered for renovation. General Petraeus reminded the MCNS that the funding to renovate the old facility into a modern 1,200 bed facility was available, that the bids had been submitted, and that a contract needed to be awarded in the next two months or the bids would no longer be valid. The PM then told Mohan to vacate the facility and the MCNS to proceed with the renovation. -------------- PIC Basrah in December -------------- ¶11. (C) Mohan suggested a slight delay in the ceremony marking the turn over of Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) for Basrah from December 2007 until January 2008. PM Maliki concurred with the UK Ambassador Prentice's observation that momentum for PIC should not be lost and that a date had already been agreed upon by the Governments of Iraq and the UK. Prentice also observed that he would have to discuss with PM Brown a delay beyond December 2007. CROCKER