OCTOBER 21 MCNS: AMBASSADOR CALLS FOR GOI ACTION

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003521

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2017
TAGS: MARR MOPS PGOV PHUM PREL PTER TU IZ
SUBJECT: OCTOBER 21 MCNS: AMBASSADOR CALLS FOR GOI ACTION
AGAINST PKK; MALIKI CALLS FOR RESTRAINED USE OF FORCE,
AGAIN; BASRAH PIC ON TRACK REGARDLESS

REF: REFTEL BAGHDAD 03472 NOTAL

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
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Summary
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1. (S) PM Maliki opened the Ministerial Council on National
Security (MCNS) with a call for Coalition Forces to exercise
restraint in military operations to avoid civilian
casualties, noting that the Council of Representatives (COR)
was questioning the sovereignty and purpose of the
government. Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus
responded that the GOI cannot allow itself to be misled by
militia disinformation and not allow rhetoric to overcome
significant and costly security advances. Ambassador Crocker
called on the GOI to strongly condemn the PKK actions in
Turkey. General Mohan, in command of the Operations Center
in Basrah province, reported the situation is improving
steadily, but insisted that Basrawis cannot be relied on for
security operations in Basrah. END SUMMARY.

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Dispelling Innuendo, Maintaining Trust
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2. (S) Prime Minister Maliki opened the October 21 MCNS with
a reference to recent deaths in Sadr City during an MNF-I
operation. During his remarks, he also raised the issue of
Blackwater, conflating Coalition Operations against
identified terrorists and criminals with private security
firms' protective actions. Maliki opined that the deaths of
a handful or more of innocent civilians to kill one terrorist
or criminal undermined support for the coalition. With
negotiations for an extension of the UNSCR on the horizon, he
must be able to demonstrate to the Council of Representatives
(COR) that Coalition forces are helping Iraq attain
sovereignty, stating several times that the COR was
questioning his government's effectiveness and sovereign
control of Iraq.


3. (C) Ambassador Crocker noted that Coalition and Iraqi
forces had brought down the level of violence significantly
over the last few months at a very high price - the lives of
hundreds of U.S. and Iraqi soldiers. Now was not the time to
be distracted by the noise from our enemies. General
Petraeus elaborated, pointing out that violence in Baghdad
was down to late January/early February 2006 levels and that
the militias may now be relatively more dangerous than
Al-Qaeda Iraq (AQI). Echoing Ambassador Crocker, he insisted
to Maliki that the extremists cannot be allowed to direct the
debate or drive us apart.


4. (C) Maliki returned to the point, again, arguing that
success against the terrorists cannot be called success if
many innocent civilians die to get one terrorist. The
Minister of Defense noted that the use of air strikes against
a target in an urban center only happens when the target is
clearly identified and resistance is strong. General
Petraeus noted that a Bradley had been disabled - not the
work of lightly armed militants or innocent civilians, but
the work of multiple IEDs and RPGs shot at our forces during
their exfiltration. The air strike against those firing on
CF soldiers was required to break resistance and extricate
the vehicle and crew. He also noted that Iraqi police in
Sadr city are apparently doing nothing to identify and remove
IEDs, many of which were encountered by the team targeting
the identified terrorist targeted in this operation.


5. (C) After further discussion, which included Maliki's
reports that members of COR believe the MNF-I is arming
tribes and General Petraeus' immediate and sharp rebuttal of
such allegations, all parties agreed that the Sadr city
operation should be investigated, and that the COR should be
advised of the results. General Petraeus noted that MNF-I
would investigate; pointing out that he takes the loss of
life very seriously. Reminding Maliki that he regretted the
death of any innocent civilian, he emphasized the need to
avoid pre-judgments and pre-dispositions against Coalitions
forces who are allies of the GOI.

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Turkey-PKK
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6. (C) Ambassador Crocker told the MCNS that it must take
action immediately in response to the recent PKK attack in
Turkey that had killed at least 17 Turkish soldiers. He

BAGHDAD 00003521 002 OF 002


stressed the need for immediate concrete GOI action in
response, calling on PM Maliki to have the GOI and the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) immediately issue strong
public statements condemning the PKK's actions. He
underlined the gravity of the situation caused by this
provocative attack, noting that it comes on the heels of
significant efforts by the most senior U.S. officials to
dissuade the GOT from making an incursion (REFTEL).


7. (C) UK Ambassador Prentice reinforced those points, urging
the PM to take immediate measures to establish an atmosphere
for discussions with Turkey. Taking the points, Maliki asked
if a planned October 22 visit to Turkey of senior Iraqis,
which the GOI was now delaying until after the October 23
visit to Baghdad of Turkish FM Babacan, should take place
tomorrow. General Petraeus responded that Maliki should ask
PM Erdogan for his views on how Maliki could help him defuse
this crisis. Taking the need for urgent action on board,
Maliki instructed his staff to prepare a public statement
condemning the attacks.


8. (C) The GOI intended to hold a Crisis Meeting October 22
to discuss both allegations of Excessive Force and the
Turkish Situation. PM Maliki described the former as a
threat to the core of the political process. He also gave an
oblique reference to the COR's concerns and UNSCR
negotiations.

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Basrah Security Situation
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9. (S) Iraqi Army MG Mohan reported a steadily improving
security situation. He underscored that the soldiers and
police under his operational command who were not natives of
the Basrah region had been taking the fight to the militias
and terrorists. He emphasized that Basrawis could not be
relied on to provide security in Basrah. He explained that
threats against their families prevented them from fully
exercising their duties. When it was suggested that
especially hand-picked police who were "clean" of militia
influence were available, he insisted that if they were from
Basrah, he could not use them, "In two years maybe, but not
now."

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Prison Use Pending
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10. (C) In response to UK Ambassador's inquiry about the
return of the Baghdad Central prison to the Justice Ministry
so that renovation could begin, Mohan stated that the
facility was inappropriate due to its location in central
Basrah and its structural layout of halls instead of cells.
There ensued a lively discussion about which facility was
actually being considered for renovation. General Petraeus
reminded the MCNS that the funding to renovate the old
facility into a modern 1,200 bed facility was available, that
the bids had been submitted, and that a contract needed to be
awarded in the next two months or the bids would no longer be
valid. The PM then told Mohan to vacate the facility and the
MCNS to proceed with the renovation.

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PIC Basrah in December
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11. (C) Mohan suggested a slight delay in the ceremony
marking the turn over of Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) for
Basrah from December 2007 until January 2008. PM Maliki
concurred with the UK Ambassador Prentice's observation that
momentum for PIC should not be lost and that a date had
already been agreed upon by the Governments of Iraq and the
UK. Prentice also observed that he would have to discuss
with PM Brown a delay beyond December 2007.
CROCKER