ZEBARI DOUBTS TURKISH MILITARY MOVE IMMINENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003498

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: ZEBARI DOUBTS TURKISH MILITARY MOVE IMMINENT

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4
d/b.


1. (C) SUMMARY. In an October 18 meeting with the
Ambassador, Foreign Minister Zebari acknowledged the
seriousness of border tensions with Turkey, but thought it
unlikely that a Turkish cross-border operation (CBO) was
imminent. Zebari confirmed that the GOI had authorized Iran
to establish consulates in Erbil and Suleymanieh, but agreed
to allow Embassy Baghdad to vet the names of the proposed
staff. A clearly upset Zebari also reported that Prime
Minister Maliki was deliberately stalling on releasing the
USD 25 million the GOI pledged to assist Iraqi refugees in
Jordan and Syria. END SUMMARY.

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BORDER TENSION
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2. (C) The Foreign Minister opened by informing the
Ambassador that Turkish Foreign Minister Babacan will not be
coming to Baghdad as scheduled. The Ambassador urged Zebari
to encourage Babacan to make the trip and Zebari agreed to
raise the issue during a meeting with Turkish Ambassador
Kanbay scheduled later in the day. Zebari acknowledged the
seriousness of the border situation, which, he said, the
House Armenian Genocide Resolution had made even worse. But
he brushed aside the idea of an imminent CBO, reasoning that
it would disrupt the Istanbul ministerial and mar Prime
Minister Erdogan's upcoming visit to Washington. He pointed
out that "mother nature"--the onset of winter--also made
operations unlikely in the short-term. Zebari explained that
the Kurdish populace would consider a CBO more as an attack
on the KRG than on Iraq and warned that the they were
prepared to resist.


3. (C) The Ambassador emphasized that a solution to the
crisis depended on direct Kurd/Turkish dialogue and pushed
for the GOI to move against PKK offices, movements, and
financing. Both agreed that if GOI action did not change the
situation's basic elements, a crisis would sooner or later
occur. Zebari thought the GOI could take more effective
measures against PKK elements whom he described as
"terrorists and gangsters."


4. (C) Zebari repeated a familiar charge that the Turkish
mission in Baghdad, and Ambassador Kanbay in particular,
circumvented the Foreign Ministry in their dealings with the
GOI. Zebari complained that the Turks refused to activate
the tri-partite commission (Note: President Talabani and
others have previously alleged this is because the Iraqi
delegation to the commission includes Kurds. End Note) He
said the Turks were reluctant to deal with the KRG directly
on the issue. The Turks may prefer to deal with the GOI, and
the KRG had to stand &behind the Iraqi flag8, but as a
practical matter the KRG would have to be involved in any GOI
discussion of the issue. Crocker agreed that it would be
helpful if Turkish and Kurdish officials were in direct
contact. Zebari closed by asking Ambassador Crocker to
mention to the Turks the need to also deal directly with the
MFA on bilateral issues.

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ISTANBUL MINISTERIAL
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5. (C) The Ambassador said he would be visiting Iraq's
neighbors in advance of the Istanbul ministerial. After the
Foreign Minister reported there had been no GOI-GOT contact
on the ministerial, the Ambassador strongly urged Zebari
reach out to the Turkish side on all conference issues,
particularly the communique. The Foreign Minister said he
would cover these points during his afternoon meeting with
Ambassador Kanbay.


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IRANIAN CONSULATES
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6. (C) Zebari confirmed that the GOI had approved Iran's
request to establish consulates in the northern cities of
Erbil and Suleymanieh, and told the Ambassador that Iran also
wanted to establish one in the southern city of Najaf.
Zebari mentioned that he had cautioned the Iranians both
orally and in writing on the need to staff the posts with
professional diplomats, not Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
officers. He said it was particularly important that the
consul general be a diplomat, not an IRGC officer. These
warnings reportedly made the Iranians "furious." Zebari
agreed to share with the Embassy the names of the consulates'
proposed staff for assistance in vetting.


BAGHDAD 00003498 002 OF 002


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GOI UNHCR PLEDGE
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7. (C) A visibly troubled Zebari told the Ambassador that the
Prime Minister was deliberately stalling on releasing the USD
25 million the GOI pledged during a March UNHCR conference in
Switzerland. Zebari said the decision was "political" and
explained that Maliki considers Iraqi refugees to be mainly
(Sunni) Ba'athist insurgents who should not receive
assistance from the Iraqi state.
CROCKER