Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD3438
2007-10-16 13:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

DIYALA PRT: SUNNIS CALL FOR SHIITE POLICE CHIEF

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINS PTER IZ 
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VZCZCXRO0647
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3438/01 2891331
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 161331Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3873
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003438 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PTER IZ
SUBJECT: DIYALA PRT: SUNNIS CALL FOR SHIITE POLICE CHIEF
REMOVAL

Classified By: Diyala PRT Team Leader John Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) an
d (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003438

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PTER IZ
SUBJECT: DIYALA PRT: SUNNIS CALL FOR SHIITE POLICE CHIEF
REMOVAL

Classified By: Diyala PRT Team Leader John Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) an
d (d).


1. (U) This is a Diyala PRT reporting cable.

SUMMARY
--------------


2. (C) On September 17, approximately 400 residents of
Baqubah in the Diyala province gathered in front of the
Government Center (GC) to peacefully demonstrate for the
removal of Shiite Iraq Police (IP) Chief Staff Major Ghanem
Abass Ibrahim al-Qureshy Abass Ibraham al-Qureshy.
Demonstrators consisted primarily of Sunni members of the
Concerned Local Nationals (CLN),a group that has recently
enjoyed some support from Coalition Forces (CF) and retains
armed cadres in several Diyala neighborhoods. The CLN has
accused Ghanem of arbitrarily arresting and murdering CLN
members, holding them in lengthy pre-trial detention, and
refusing to accept CLN members as part of the Iraq Security
Forces (ISF). During the month of September, the Diyala IP
reported over 17 "violations," including murder, kidnapping,
assault, and extortion by the CLN. The demonstration is yet
another indication of the increasing divide between Shi'a and
Sunnis in Diyala. The demonstration also encompassed several
features unique to recent political dynamics in Diyala, and
raises several important questions about the current role of
CLN, CF support for this group, and the possible impact of
the group on future political discourse in the provinces. END
SUMMARY.

CLN CALLS FOR REMOVAL OF SHIITE POLICE CHIEF
--------------


3. (C) On September 17, nearly 400 Baqubah residents held a
peaceful demonstration to call for the removal of Shiite Iraq
Police Chief Staff Major General Ghanem Abass Ibrahim
al-Qureshy Abass Ibraham al-Qureshy. The protesters,
primarily comprised of Sunni members of the CLN, accused
Ghanem of conspiring against the CLN. Previous to the
demonstration, on September 16, four CLN representatives met
with Sunni Deputy Governor Auwf Rahoumi Majeed al-Rabi'a to
request permission to hold a march through Baqubah to call
for Ghanem's removal. Auwf quickly approved the request.

4. (C) The CLN has accused Ghanem of promoting sectarianism,
including murdering and arbitrarily arresting CLN members,
holding them for lengthy pre-trial detention, and committing
large-scale fraud. CLN also accuses Ghanem of creating death
squads, refusing to hire CLN members into the IP, and meeting
with Iranian embassy officials in secret. CLN Kataab leader
Jaji Omar told PRT officials that on September 15 eight IP
officers from the Emergency Response Force (ERF) shot and
killed a member of the 1920s Revolutionary Brigade and a

retired Iraqi Army General. Both were allegedly CLN members.
Omar told us that several ex-police officers, who the IP
claims were fired for dereliction of duty and related
offenses by Ghanem, are reportedly CLN members.

POLICE CHIEF FIRES BACK
--------------


5. (C) Ghanem has refused to accept the CLN as a legitimate
partner in the law enforcement community; he refers to them
as the 1920s Revolutionary Brigade, and has accused them of
being a sectarian militia that unlawfully terrorizes citizens
and acts with impunity. In a September 22 memorandum, Ghanem
listed 17 "violations" committed by what he referred to as
this "armed group in the city of Baqubah from September 1 to
September 20." The list includes the kidnapping of eight
policemen, kidnapping at least seven civilians, opening fire
on an IP patrol that refused to surrender its weapons
(killing one policeman),and a small arms attack on a police
headquarters in Tahrer. Ghanem also alleges CLN members have
created a province-wide extortion ring. In meetings with CLN
representatives arranged by CF and the Governor's office,
Ghanem has repeatedly stated that he sees the arrest and
detention of CLN members as a primary law enforcement
objective. During a September 24 interview with Associated
Press reporter Lauren Frayer, Ghanem stated that the CLN
assisted CF to identify AQI, but that now an element within
CLN has reverted back to terrorist activities, including
terror finance. Ghanem insists that CLN must either join ISF
or disarm. While praising those from CLN who have already
joined the IP, he lamented the fact that he does not
currently have the capacity to hire new IPs at this time. He
did offer solutions, including the federal government
providing regular jobs for CLN members, or offerering CLN
members limited six months security contracts. Ghanem also
inquired how the CF planned to engage the CLN.

WHERE DID THE CLN COME FROM AND WHERE IS IT GOING?
-------------- --------------

BAGHDAD 00003438 002 OF 002




6. (C) There is confusion about the origin of the CLN. Some
claim the CLN is an offshoot of the "Baqubah Guardians," that
aided CF to locate weapons caches and identify AQI members
during Operation Arrow Head Ripper in Diyala. Others, like
Ghanem, view them as members of the old 1920s Brigade. The
organization appears to have supporters in Baqubah, Kataab,
Tahrer, Khalis, and other areas where AQI formerly held
influence. Others insist the CLN was formerly aligned with
AQI in Diyala, but fell out of with them over administrative,
disciplinary and ideological differences.


7. (C) Currently, CLN is secular and is comprised mainly of
unemployed youth. Although viewed in a positive light for its
previous actions to oust AQI, more recent behavior has drawn
criticism from Baqubah residents. Haji Uday, Haji Omar of
Kataab, Dr. Hussein al-Zubaidi, and Thaha Aziz have been
identified as the circle of leaders within the organization.
At a September 18 meeting between the DCG, MNC-I, senior ISF
leaders and CLN leadership in the Diyala Operations Center
(DOC),Haji Uday declared himself the overall leader of CLN.
Also during this meeting, Haji Uday said the provincial
government (primarily the IP) is biased against the CLN, and
CLN members would be inclined to not join the IP. In the
interim, CLN repeatedly stated that ISF is the sole
legitimate security force in Diyala and called for the CLN to
either join the ISF or disarm. Some community members
speculate that CLN lacks a charismatic leader, and that one
of two senior Sunni members of the Diyala government seemed
poised to assume power. (Deputy Governor Auwf Rahoumi Majeed
al-Rabi,a and Assistant Governor Hafeth Abdul-Azeez Jum,a
Saleh al- Jubouri)

COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) Given Diyala's notoriety for lawlessness and
insecurity in the past, it is notable that the CLN was able
to hold a relatively peaceful demonstration, and even more
surprising that the protesters requested and received
permission from the Government and protection from the IP.
However, serious concerns remain about increasing Sunni-Shi'a
tensions fueled by allegations of IP bias against CLN members
and the uncertainty of CLN intentions. A serious
re-examination of the current utility of CLN is necessary for
CF to determine its position on the CLN's existence as an
armed group with para-legal/extralegal authority. The
political ambitions of individual Sunni leaders within the
Diyala government, and their possible connection to the CLN
are also areas to be addressed. A failure to determine a
timely USG/CF and GOI response to the CLN situation could
result in the establishment of another largely Sunni militia
and could lead to reprisals by Shi'a groups, causing even
great sectarian strife. END COMMENT.

BIO NOTE
--------------


9. (C) Ghanem became IP Chief following the removal of SMG
Ghassan al-Bawi in December 2006 for inefficiency and
compelling evidence of sectarianism. Ghanem came out of
retirement to take the post, and his qualifications, while
entirely military, seemed to represent an excellent choice
for a police force pre-occupied primarily with
security-related issues. A retired General in the Iraqi Army,
he was hailed as a national hero and reportedly decorated for
bravery on sixteen occasions by Saddam personally. Like many
senior officers during Saddam's tenure, Ghanem is secular; in
contrast to most however, he is a Shi'a and does not fast
during Ramadan. His Iraqi nationalist credentials are strong
and his reported hatred of Iran, Iranians, and their agents
(possibly a reference to Shi'a clergy) is well-known. He is
known as a disciplinarian with a will to win and has been
known to summarily dismiss policemen who flee in the face of
danger. He is also alleged to have executed Iraqi soldier
deserters during the Iran-Iraq war.
CROCKER

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