CONFESSIONS OF AN ANTI-MALIKI COR CONSPIRATOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003432

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ IR
SUBJECT: CONFESSIONS OF AN ANTI-MALIKI COR CONSPIRATOR

REF: BAGHDAD 3261 (COOKING UP NEW COALITION)

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Rob Waller for reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Prominent independent Shia CoR legislator
Qassim Daoud told us October 10 that he is working overtime
to build a coalition to oust and replace Prime Minister Nuri
al-Maliki. Claiming he was acting with the full support of
Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani to save Iraq from "further
tragedy and misery," Qassim said he is trying to broker and
sell a Maliki ouster package that features current Vice
President Adel Abdel Mehdi as replacement Prime Minister and
former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari as new Vice
President (even though neither Adel nor Jaafari had expressly
agreed to this arrangement). Qassim claimed the Iranian
Ambassador told him that Tehran would continue to support
Maliki in spite of his ineffectual leadership, and asked
Qassim to travel to Iran to discuss any ouster plans. On key
benchmark legislation prospects, he predicted the
De-Baathification Law could be passed as early as
mid-November but opined that lingering CoR anger over the
Biden Amendment would prevent passage this year of the
Provincial Powers bill. Qassim advised us to move early to
gain support for a bilateral long-term strategic relationship
agreement from Sunni parties and the Shia Fadhila Party, as
their support would isolate certain Sadrist opposition to any
arrangement that expressly permits an American presence in
Iraq, the one thing the Sadrists believe could stymie their
goal of total future domination of Iraq. End Summary.

Playing Kingmaker to Replace Despised Rival
--------------


2. (C) During a meeting held at his request, Qassim made no
effort to mask his visceral contempt for Maliki and his
government, repeatedly uttering words like "illiterate,"
"silly," and "stupid" to describe the PM and his policies.
He said he has had no direct contact with Maliki since a
tense meeting one month ago in which he claims to have
accused the PM of "leading Iraq to tragedy and misery."
Qassim quipped with a grim half-smile that he made sure prior
to the meeting that his household electric generators were in
working condition for fear that Maliki would order his grid
electricity cut off after the meeting. He said that Maliki
will now only accept input and advice from a six-person
circle of Dawa Party loyalists, and his isolation has deluded
him into mistaking his weakness for strength which in turn
reinforced his natural inclination to act alone and in a
capricious manner.


3. (C) Qassim provided an update on his plans to put together
a coalition to oust Maliki and install a new government
(reftel). He said he was working feverishly to broker an
ouster package that would feature current Vice President Adel
Abdel Mehdi as replacement Prime Minister and former Prime
Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari as new Vice President. Qassim
explained that such an arrangement would enable him to build
a "new" United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) since Adel's inclusion
would ensure the support of the Islamic Supreme Council of
Iraq (ISCI),and Jaafari would deliver not only the
anti-Maliki wing of Dawa and Dawa Tanzim, but would also
convince Fadhila and, most important, the Sadrists to return
to the UIA fold. Qassim said the Sadrists and their 28 CoR
seats were key to the success of this plan, and he is
dangling the VP position as bait to Jaafari so that he will
use his strong ties to the Sadrists to gain their support
(even though Qassim faults Jaafari for bringing the Sadrists
into the Ministry of Interior during his tenure as PM, a move
for which Iraq "is still paying a high price.") To round out
the anti-Maliki mix, Qassim would bring along independent
Shia CoR members, and said he was deep in negotiations with
the Sunni Tawafuq bloc, Ayad Allawi supporters, and Saleh
al-Mutlaq's Hiwar Party over their participation. He claimed
to have Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani's full support in this
undertaking and said Sistani told him he "would shed no
tears" to see Maliki ousted or the UIA dissolved, as both
have proved extremely disappointing. Qassim opined that
Moqtada al-Sadr listens only to Sistani, and said that
Sistani would weigh in with Moqtada about Maliki's ouster at
an opportune time.


4. (C) Stating that he would pitch the Adel-Jaafari package
deal to ISCI boss Abdel Aziz al-Hakeem at an October 10
meeting (the same day the ailing al-Hakim arrived from Iran
for an Eid al-Fitr visit to Iraq),Qassim confided that he
harbored reservations about Adel's qualifications for the PM
position. He said that Adel is "far from an ideal
candidate," alleging that he is "semi-secular" and slavishly
obedient to al-Hakim's orders. Furthermore, he said the
Sadrists do not like Adel and the Sunnis believe he is too
close to Iran. As for Jaafari, he said the former Prime
Minister did not immediately agree to the offer of the Vice

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Presidency, and Qassim opined that Jaafari still believes he
can somehow muster support to serve once again as PM. Qassim
ruled out this possibility, however, claiming that ISCI views
Jaafari as "the devil" and, in any event, Sistani would
intervene to enforce a promise Jaafari made to him to seek
neither the PM nor the UIA leader position. Qassim recounted
a recent visit to his home by the Iranian Ambassador, who
told him Tehran realized Maliki is an ineffective leader but
would continue to support him. He claimed the Iranian
Ambassador told him that if he were intent on ousting Maliki,
he should travel to Tehran to discuss the matter further.
Qassim further claimed to have balked angrily at this
suggestion, stating he told the Iranian he would not go to a
foreign country to discuss internal Iraqi political matters.

Long-Term Strategic Relationship, Pending Legislation
-------------- --------------


5. (C) In reply to our question regarding current CoR
attitudes about a long-term bilateral strategic relationship
agreement, Qassim advised "as a friend of America" that we
move early to gain support for such a plan from the Sunni
Hiwar Party and Tawafuq bloc, and from the Shia Fadhila
Party. If we line up the support of these potential
opponents, we would thereby isolate certain Sadrist
opposition to any arrangement that expressly permits an
American presence in Iraq. The Sadrists want to dominate and
rule Iraq, he intoned, and they believe a U.S. presence is
the only thing that can keep them from this goal. As for key
pending benchmark legislation, he predicted that the
De-Baathification Law could be passed by a large CoR majority
over Sadrist objection as early as mid-November. He said
prospects for passage this year of the Provincial Powers Law
appear bleak, opining that the recent Biden Amendment on
federalism had soured the CoR mood on this draft bill.
CROCKER