FADHILA PARTY LEADER ON FEDERALISM, GOI INERTIA,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003430

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2017
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: FADHILA PARTY LEADER ON FEDERALISM, GOI INERTIA,
AND SHIA POLITICS

REF: A. BAGHDAD 3375 (SADR-BADR AGREEMENT)

B. BAGHDAD 3287 (ISCI'S AMAR AL-HAKIM)

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Fadhila Party CoR bloc leader Hassan
al-Shammari told the Ambassador on October 9 that his party
supports the broad concept of federalism but opposes
formation of sect-based regions as favored by the Islamic
Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). Complaining at length about
GOI "stagnation" and Prime Minister al-Maliki's leadership
style, Shammari said Maliki believes he does not need to work
with other political leaders as long as he enjoys USG
support. Shammari cautioned that Fadhila and other parties
will withdraw support from Maliki if he continues to ignore
their calls for a comprehensive cabinet reshuffle that
replaces political party loyalists with independent
technocrats. An occasional ally of the Sadrist Movement's
CoR bloc, Shammari surmised that the October 6 truce
agreement between the Sadrists and ISCI revealed ISCI's
relative weakness, and predicted the pact would not last long
(indeed, we have already heard reports of renewed
Sadrist-ISCI clashes). End summary.

No to "Sectarian" Federalism, Frustration with Maliki
-------------- --------------


2. (C) After a brief discussion of the recent Biden Amendment
in which the Ambassador clarified that the amendment did not
call for the partition of Iraq but rather suggested a federal
system, Shammari expressed support for the concept of Iraqi
federalism but opposed what he characterized as a plan for
"sectarian" federalism proposed by the Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq (ISCI). He predicted that regions formed on
the basis of sect would be undemocratic, economically
backward, prone to internal struggles between competing
groups such as ISCI and the Sadrists, and ripe for
interference and mischief from neighboring countries. While
Fadhila is not opposed to the concept of three broad
geographic Iraqi regions, the party insists on non-sectarian
sub-regional entities within each region that would function
somewhat like U.S. states.


3. (C) Shammari bemoaned current GOI "stagnation" and its
inability to deliver public services which has led to a
cholera epidemic in parts of Iraq. He said Fadhila would
have no objection to Prime Minister al-Maliki if only he
would listen to and interact with political parties: as
matters now stand, Maliki relies on USG support and sends a
message to the political class that he does not need them as
long as he has USG backing. Shammari, an erudite 42 year-old
lawyer, stated he had been talking to Saleh Al-Mutlaq of the
Sunni Hiwar Party about appealing directly to Maliki to work
with them and other party "symbols" to effect a comprehensive
cabinet reshuffle that would bring in experienced technocrats
loyal to the GOI as replacements for ineffective politicians
loyal to their parties. However, they were prevented from
presenting their ideas personally to the PM by Maliki's inner
circle who refused to grant them an appointment. Maliki's
door is open only to the Group of Four alignment, he
complained, and the Group of Four wishes to preserve the
status quo in order to distribute patronage largesse from the
ministries they control. Shammari noted that Fadhila, Hiwar
and other parties were still willing to join a "national
front" in support of Maliki, but only if he stops ignoring
the input of political parties. Otherwise, he may face a
no-confidence vote.

Shia Politics
--------------


4. (C) Fadhila often sides with the Sadrists in CoR voting,
but party leaders tell us that continuing rivalry between
Muqtada al-Sadr and Fadhila spiritual leader Mohammed
al-Yacoubi over the legacy of the Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr
(Moqtada's late father) populist movement limits closer
coordination between the two groups. In reply to the
Ambassador's question about the impact of a truce agreement
between the respective militias of ISCI and the Sadr Movement
(Ref A),Shammari said that ISCI's Badr militia stands to
lose more from continued clashes that Sadr's Jaysh al-Mahdi
(JAM) because JAM fighters are far more violent and zealous
than their Badr counterparts. He opined that ISCI sought the
agreement from a position of weakness, and predicted the pact
would not last long because the Sadrists feel threatened and
surrounded by the ISF and MNF. (Note: Less than a week after
the agreement was signed, we have already heard reports of
renewed JAM-Badr clashes. End Note.)


5. (C) With 15 CoR seats, Fadhila was a member of the United
Iraqi Alliance (UIA) but withdrew from the grouping earlier
this year over disagreement, mainly with ISCI, over UIA

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direction. Shammari said the UIA has lost its identity and
the once-strong and unified Shia coalition now consists only
of ISCI and Maliki's Dawa faction. He stated that Fadhila
would consider rejoining UIA if the alliance displayed
receptivity to new ideas. Shammari griped about nefarious
ISCI intermeddling in the Independent High Electoral
Commission (IHEC) through its "control" of a UN
representative who advises the Commission. (Note: As
detailed in Ref B, ISCI's Amar al-Hakeem and Maliki also
alleged shenanigans within IHEC, but they fingered the
Sadrists as culprits. End Note.) Fadhila is particularly
strong in Basrah, and Basrah's Governor Wa'eli is a Fadhila
leader. In reply to the Ambassador's question regarding
Basrah's security situation, Shammari again complained about
poor Maliki leadership and stated that security conditions
could easily be improved if a strong central government
appointed fair and competent officials to top security
positions in Basrah.
CROCKER