OCTOBER 7 MCNS: MALIKI CALLS FOR RESTRAINED USE OF

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003417

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2017
TAGS: MOPS PGOV PHUM PTER IZ
SUBJECT: OCTOBER 7 MCNS: MALIKI CALLS FOR RESTRAINED USE OF
FORCE; CLARIFIES POSITION OF BASRAH GOVERNOR

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (S) PM Maliki opened the Ministerial Council on National
Security (MCNS) with a call for U.S. forces to exercise
restraint when engaged in military operations; General
Petraeus vigorously defended the actions of U.S. forces and
said that GoI is being unduly influenced by militia and
terrorist fabrications of events. The DefMin and IntMin gave
a generally positive overview of developments in Basrah, with
Maliki acknowledging that Waeli remains governor of Basrah
pending legal appeals of his dismissal. The MCNS also
discussed the need for more detention space, the newly formed
committee on displaced persons, reluctance of former Iraqi
officers and NCOs to continue military service, improvements
to security on the road to Samarra to facilitate
re-construction of the Golden Dome Mosque, and coordination
of intelligence. END SUMMARY.

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Dispelling Innuendo, Maintaining Trust
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2. (S) Prime Minister Maliki opened the October 7 MCNS with a
reference to recent deaths during an MNF-I pursuit operation
in Khalis. Maliki called for an investigation into the
reported deaths of non-combatants, expressing serious concern
that MNF-I had killed innocent civilians by using excessive
force. He strongly urged development of standard operating
procedures which would require proportional use of force by
coalition forces (CF) and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).


3. (S) MNF-I Commanding General Petraeus strongly rejected
the notion that CF forces in Khalis had operated
irresponsibly. He said MNF-I had tracked down and destroyed
militia extremists in this engagement and had the video and
intelligence to prove that these were not innocent civilians.
With considered restraint, he expressed outrage at the
insinuation that CF acted without regard for innocent life or
that the GOI would put more faith in the word of extremists
than that of General Petraeus and those under his command.

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Basrah Security Forces
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2. (S) Minister of Defense Qadr, joined principally by
Minister of Interior al-Bolani, described what they believed
was an improving situation in Basrah that will allow Iraqi
authorities to assume control of security and administration
in the near future. After prompting from Deputy Prime
Minister (DPM) Salih and Deputy National Security Advisor
(NSA) Safa, they admitted that coordination between the
security forces and the local administration still left much
to be desired. The DefMin stated that the security forces
could not tolerate interference from the local authorities,
but that the security forces would support the
administration,s development plans and service delivery to
assure local acceptance of the administration.


3. (S) The IntMin spent considerable time detailing efforts
to gain control of the local border police, including
transfers and re-training of almost 200 officers. He said
this program mirrored a successful MOD program. Maliki noted
that the police and the Army are not the same. The IntMin
voiced concern that his ministry urgently needed equipment
and the personnel to stand up a mechanized force for border
control in the Basrah area, telling the PM that all of his
forces were under command of General Mohan. The Minister of
State for National Security Affairs (MSNS) al-Waeli noted
that improved border security on the border with Iran must
also include a specific force -- two battalion-sized units
that included undersea divers -- for the Shatt al Arab.


4. (S) The Deputy Minister of Justice (MOJ) appealed to the
DefMin and IntMin to relinquish their recent appropriation of
a newly-constructed prison in Basrah as barracks for Iraqi
police. The Ambassador concurred and urged the ministers to
quickly resolve the problem due to a critical shortage of
prison space. The DefMin and IntMin agreed to review the ISF
decision and report back to the MCNS.


BAGHDAD 00003417 002 OF 002


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Basrah Governor Holds On
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5. (S) Turning to a recent administrative court decision
overturning the Basrah Provincial Council,s (PC) firing of
Governor Waeli, UK Ambassador Prentice asked for the GOI
position and guidance. Maliki reluctantly acknowledged that
al-Waeli remains the provincial governor but questioned the
authority of an administrative court to overturn a PC
decision. He vowed a government appeal to national-level
courts in order to sustain the decision of the PC to remove
Governor Waeli.


6. (S) DefMin told PM Maliki that the ministerial committee
on displaced persons was fully formed and ready to begin
work. IntMin proposed transfer of responsibility of the
committee from the Prime Minister -- who had ordered its
formation at the last MCNS (reftel) -- to the Ministry of
Displacement and Migration. With minimal discussion, members
of the MCNS agreed to the transfer.


7. (S) Deputy NSA Safa lamented that recent recruitment
efforts towards former military officers and NCOs had failed
to attract as many people as was expected. He pointed out
that many of these former soldiers still received government
stipends or would soon become eligible for retirement
pensions, but subject to their continued service. Commander
of Iraqi Joint Forces, General Babakir, said he had expected
three-quarters of these personnel to return to duty, but few
had done so. He said that many feared for their safety or
safety of their families should they return to government
service. The Deputy PM, DefMin, and IntMin acknowledged this
problem but emphasized these former soldiers were still
receiving government paychecks; they needed to make a
decision to either return to duty or forfeit their benefits.
Deputy PM Salih tasked the Ministry of Defense (MOD) to
assess the scope of the problem and report the results to the
MCNS.


8. (S) As requested by the Prime Minister at the September 30
MCNS, DefMin Qadr presented his assessment on Samarrah
security (reftel). He described the ISF brigade stationed
there at 90 percent strength and ready to assume security
duties. According to Qadr, the major security concern was the
highway linking Samarrah to Baghdad. The DefMin said his
deadline for securing the road and city was January 1, 2008
following completion of fifteen new security checkpoints by
the end of December.


9. (S) Although a scheduled briefing on al-Qaeda (AQI) by the
Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) was supposed to be
a straight-forward information exchange, it soon turned into
a vigorous discussion about inadequacies of INIS analysis and
its intelligence sharing among the security ministries.
Deputy PM Salih criticized the briefing as lacking strategic
vision, focusing instead on tactical-level intelligence. As
the Deputy PM, he wanted to know answers to questions about
the current commanders of AQI, their operational command
centers, and level of foreign involvement. This briefing, he
said, failed to answer any of these questions. The Deputy MOJ
expressed concern that the briefing made no mention of AQI
operations in Syria, which he called a significant problem.
Deputy NSA Safa interrupted the discussion and apologized to
the group, saying it was he who had tasked the INIS with the
briefing, but had failed to give them specific requirements.
Unfortunately, he said, this omission was not limited to his
office but was common to all the security ministries in their
taskings to INIS. DefMin Qadr said his complaint about the
INIS had more to do with process than substance -- they often
went directly to the Prime Minister with their intelligence,
bypassing both MOD and MOI. IntMin al-Bolani and Deputy PM
Salih concluded the discussion by calling for development of
a national-level coordination element for intelligence that
would provide strategic-level briefings at least once a month
to the MCNS.
CROCKER