KRG PRESIDENT BARZANI ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003416

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2017
TAGS: PREF PTER PBTS PGOV IZ SY
SUBJECT: KRG PRESIDENT BARZANI ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION,
TRIBES AND SYRIA

Classified By: Classified By Regional Coordinator Jess Baily for reason
s 1.4 (b) and (d).

This is a Regional Reconstruction Team (RRT) Cable.


1. (C) SUMMARY: Senior Adviser to Ambassador pressed KDP
Leader Barzani on need for cooperation on key national issues
like hydrocarbons and national political accommodation. He
also laid down a marker on Kurdish expansion in the Sinjar
area south of Mosul. Barzani struck a pessimistic note about
efforts at national political reconciliation but promised his
continued support to the process and floated the idea of a
national conference in Erbil sometime after the upcoming Eid
al-Fitr holidays. He described his own dialogue with tribal
leaders west of Kirkuk and intimated that the U.S. had been
slow to respond to their offer to combat Al-Qaeda. He also
claimed that the KDP did not want to spark sectarian conflict
and pledged to investigate a KDP leader,s letter requesting
the expulsion of 133 Arab families from Sinjar. He said Syria
continued to play a destructive role in Iraq as Bashar
Al-Asad has regained his confidence after initial fears
following the fall of Saddam,s regime. But Barzani believed
that only fear, money and the Hariri tribunal could affect
Syrian behavior.
END SUMMARY

National Reconciliation
--------------


2. (C) Senior Adviser Pearce, accompanied by Erbil RRT Team
Leader Baily, Colonel HR McMaster, and Major Joel Rayburn,
met for 90 minutes October 7 with Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) President Massoud Barzani at Barzani,s
office in Salahuddin. Barzani,s son, KRG intelligence
service head Masrur Barzani, also attended. Senior Adviser
explained that he had returned recently to Iraq and joined
Col. McMaster and Maj. Rayburn on a tour of the center and
north of the country. Ambassador Crocker had suggested that
Pearce visit with Barzani to review the political process and
seek KDP support on the many tough issues that lay ahead.


3. (C) Barzani began by expressing some chagrin that Crocker
and General Petraeus had made little mention of Kurdistan,s
achievements during last month,s congressional hearings.
But, Barzani said, the Kurds had no hesitancy about their
alliance with the United States. He went on to paint a
pessimistic picture of national reconciliation efforts.
Other Iraqi political leaders had not made clear choices.
Often they agree in private, then contact their foreign
sponsors, get a different signal, and then shift positions in
public. The current violence in Iraq had flared out of the
ashes of 1,400 years of history. It was time to extinguish
those fires. Before the war, the opposition to Saddam had
agreed to eliminate the causes of conflict by creating a
democratic, federal Iraq. But now, extremists dominated both
the Sunni and Shi,a parties and there was no place for
democratic and liberal forces. Asked whether that meant he
had concluded political accommodation was not possible,
Barzani replied only that nothing is impossible.


4. (C) The senior adviser said Kurdish help was essential on
important national issues. For example, on security, the
police academy in Erbil was an excellent model for similar
facilities in the rest of the country. Barzani replied that
Kurds were ready to help; many policemen from other parts of
the country had attended courses in Erbil. Despite this good
will, many Arabs resisted help from the Kurds. Such help
causes people who view Kurds as second class citizens to feel
shame.


5. (C) Barzani lashed out at comments by Minister of Oil
Sharistani questioning the legality of the KRG,s contracts
with international oil companies. &He is the one stealing
oil out of Iraq,8 he declared. Senior Adviser replied that
Ambassador Crocker had specifically requested that he raise
the hydrocarbons issue with Barzani. Crocker and Petraeus
had made a huge effort in Washington to maintain the US
commitment to Iraq. That meant we needed to engage all
Iraqis without exception. And we need the Kurds,
cooperation on hydrocarbon issues. Pearce said the
Ambassador would be engaging further with the Kurdish leader
on the issue.


6. (C) Later in the meeting, Barzani bemoaned the lack of
leadership among the Sunni. &They cannot have one leg in
terror and one in the political process,8 he said, pointing
to a recent statement of sympathy for Al-Qaeda made by Harith
al-Dhari, the leader of the Muslim Scholars Association, on
Al-Jazeera television. He also noted the particularly
negative effect of an Egyptian-sponsored conference in Cairo
in late April, at the time of the Sharm al-Shaykh Neighbors
Conference. He claimed the intelligence services of Egypt,

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Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey were behind
the conference and that they had invited Saddamists and
mercenaries. Former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi, he said,
later admitted to having made a mistake by attending.
Occurring at the same time as the Sharm meeting, the
conference had sent a discouraging negative message.

Help with the Tribes
--------------


7. (C) Pearce said the Ambassador also sought Barzani,s
views and assistance regarding signs that tribes to the west
of Kirkuk seemed increasingly interested in helping Coalition
Forces to combat Al-Qaeda. Barzani said that four or five
months ago, tribal leaders from these areas and those
southeast of Mosul had met with him in Erbil to gain support
for clearing those areas where no U.S. or Iraqi forces
operate. Asked whether these tribes were ones enjoying
traditionally good relations with the KDP, he said KDP meets
with all tribes, except those who are &terrorists or
Baathists.8 (Kurdish region interior minister Karim Sinjari
told the group in a separate meeting that the tribal
representatives included leaders of the Jiburi and Ubayd
tribes.) The tribes felt they had two choices: receive
support and deny a safe haven to terrorists or pick up their
bags and leave. These contacts were followed up with a
meeting in Baghdad in mid-August that Barzani claimed was
attended by MND-N BG Wiercinski and a representative from
MNC-I. Barzani wondered why the U.S. had procrastinated for
three or four months in responding to their requests for
support. Senior Adviser assured Barzani that the U.S. was
looking into the issue, would like the KDP,s support and
cooperation in the process, and would be back in touch with
him.

Avoid Flashpoints like Sinjar
--------------


8. (C) Pearce raised with Barzani a potential flash point in
the Sinjar district of Ninewa. On U.S. delegation,s October
6 visit to Tal Afar, they had learned that local KDP leader
Sarbast had issued a letter calling on GOI authorities in the
region to expel 113 Sunni Arab families from Sinjar. Sarbast
had claimed this was within Kurdish rights under Article 58
of the Constitution, and the KDP would continue to press the
issue. Senior adviser had told Sarbast that he was not going
to debate the Constitution with him. But we do not expect
the KDP, an important national political force in Iraq, to do
anything that will exacerbate communal tensions at a time
when the focus of our political efforts is to reduce them.
Barzani, Masrur, and other KDP officials in the room all
maintained that this was the first they had heard of the
Sarbast order. Local officials, Barzani said, do not have
the authority to make such decisions. He pledged an
immediate investigation into the matter because the letter
did not reflect the KDP policy. &The KDP will not be a
cause of sectarian problems.8

Role of Syria
--------------


9. (C) Asked about Syrian policy on Iraq, Barzani indicated
that Damascus continued to play a &destructive role.8 He
recalled meeting President Bashar Al-Asad two times after the
U.S. invasion in 2003. At that time, Asad was shaken by the
toppling of Saddam,s regime and worried that Syria would be
next. Syria began playing a particularly negative role in
early 2004 as the situation deteriorated in Iraq. Syrian
self-confidence grew as Iraq,s difficulties increased. Asad
had come to believe that the U.S. would not touch him,
because the U.S. was convinced that the only alternative
would be a government led by the Muslim Brotherhood or
similar groups. He noted that Syria,s relationship with Iran
played a role in Asad,s calculations, but said Syria is now
the junior partner. Pressed as to what might induce Syria to
change its behavior, he replied, &fear and money.8 Barzani
said the tribunal investigating the Hariri assassination also
had Syria worried.

Possible National Conference in Erbil
--------------


10. (C) Discussing the prospects for national political
accommodation, Barzani floated the idea of hosting a national
conference of political parties in Erbil after the holidays.
The moderate parties must unite, he said. &There is no
other solution.8 He said that the conference idea was in
its initial stages and offered no details. Nor did Barzani
seek U.S. endorsement. (Note: the KDP paper &Khabat8
published a photo of the meeting with a caption highlighting
that Barzani discussed his idea for such a conference as well
as &arming the tribes.8) On the broader issue of

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reconciliation, he offered his full support but added ¬
to expect much8 from a &humble ally.8

Comment
--------------


11. (C) Barzani reiterated the same themes about national
reconciliation efforts as he did when CODEL Baucus visited on
September 16, with the Kurds being caught in an intractable
struggle between extremist Sunni and Shi,a foes who have not
yet decided whether they want to get along. He pledged his
commitment to the process and floated the idea of a national
conference in Erbil, perhaps a way of highlighting his role
as a powerbroker. On more local reconciliation issues, we
will need to coordinate with him to ensure his dialogue with
tribes west of Kirkuk dovetails with coalition efforts. The
meeting served to lay down a marker on KDP expansionism in
Ninewa. We will follow up to see if Barzani,s intervention
defuses local tensions in Sinjar over the KDP expulsion
request We find it hard to believe Barzani really knew
nothing about the Sinjar 113 families list. We had raised it
earlier in the day with Mosul,s KDP vice governor, Khosro
Goran. Goran presumably briefed Masrur and Massoud
immediately afterward. Our guess is that they got caught
with their hands in the cookie jar, and feigned surprise at
the supposedly rogue actions of a local official.
CROCKER