EPRT-WASIT: IP CHIEF KEY TO TRIBAL ENGAGEMENT IN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003415 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2017 TAGS: PGOV IZ SUBJECT: EPRT-WASIT: IP CHIEF KEY TO TRIBAL ENGAGEMENT IN WASIT REF: BAGHDAD 2910 Classified By: PRT Team Leader Wade Weems for reasons 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) Summary. On 25 September ePRT met with recently-appointed IP Chief Major General (MG) Hannin Abd Al Haninn Hamud Faysal Al Amir, Third Georgian BDE (3GB) CDR Major Shavlago Tabatadze, and fourteen influential Wasit shayikhs (selected by MG Haninn). Executive Officer of 214th Fires BDE was the senior US military representative. The objectives were to inform shayikhs of 3GB activities in Operation Marne Sentry, solicit input from the shayikhs on the security situation and affirm CF support of MG Haninn (MGH). The meeting concluded with an agreement to continue to meet regularly and ePRT arranged future meetings with individual shayikhs. In a subsequent meeting on 2 October, ePRT and MGH sketched details of a combined tribal engagement plan. EPRT emphasized that no commitments had been made to tribal leaders to date as ePRT was waiting for MGH's selection of tribal leaders and preferred areas of emphasis. MGH agreed with CF security priorities in Wasit-- the border; local security around 3GB checkpoints and ASRs Desna, Bucharest and Kiev-- and committed to arrange meetings with the key shayikhs that will work with ePRT and him in those areas. End summary. Shayikhs, IP Chief, Georgian Commander and ePRT -------------- -- ¶2. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) Shayikhs selected and invited by MGH at the request of the ePRT attended a 25 September meeting held at the 3GB command post on FOB Delta. ePRT Team Leader explained the principles and objectives of tribal security arrangements, the intent to eventually integrate tribal volunteers into ISF uniformed service, and the need for robust communication between the shayikhs and CF. In an appeal to the shayikhs' strong Arab identity and disillusionment with the Provincial Government, EPRT Team Leader noted that Iranian influence, like "adding fuel to fire," was considerably damaging the Province's security situation and therefore the future wealth and prosperity of the Iraqi people. Is an Anbar Model Possible? -------------- ¶3. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) Several shayikhs noted ePRT Team Leader's reference to the possibility of an "Anbar-like" model in Wasit, and agreed that militia activity (especially Jaysh Al Mahdi) and Iranian influence are destructive forces in the Province and MG Haninn requires assistance to improve security. Four or five outspoken shayikhs emphatically offered to provide men to serve under "our son" MG Haninn. ¶4. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) After the shayikhs departed, ePRT and CDR GB continued discussions with MG Haninn. Tabatadze and Hannin planned to coordinate future Georgian operations in Wasit. (Note. As part of Operation Marne Sentry, 3GB is deploying troops to six static checkpoints on main roads throughout Wasit. Each checkpoint will have 150-200 Georgian troops searching vehicles for accelerants from Iran. The Georgians have occupied two checkpoints to date. End note.) Major Tabatadze invited MG Haninn to contact him at any time with any request. ¶5. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) Team leader and MG Haninn discussed ePRT's tribal engagement strategy and opportunities for collaboration on security issues. Haninn noted that only four or five of the attending shayikhs would be promising candidates for future security arrangements. He advised a deliberate approach to avoid dealing with incapable or unreliable shayikhs, or creating inter-tribal rivalry and tension that could worsen overall security conditions. MG Haninn Supports Tribal Engagement Plan -------------- ¶6. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) On 3 October, ePRT Team Leader met privately with MGH to discuss specific proposals regarding the involvement of Wasit tribes in addressing security concerns. Team Leader noted that no commitments have been made to tribal leaders to date, as we awaited MGH's input. He also noted that MGH's support was critical in order to (1) select the right tribal leaders, (2) ensure chosen tribal leaders ally themselves and coordinate with MGH, (3) ensure MGH could monitor and control the tribes chosen for security roles, and (4) ensure that when volunteers are integrated into ISF in the future, the IP force receives volunteers loyal to MGH. ePRT Team Leader outlined the principal areas of concern where tribal leaders might begin local security operations: (1) ASRs Bucharest, Kiev and Desna, (2) Georgian BAGHDAD 00003415 002 OF 002 checkpoints one and five near Jassan and Numaniyah respectively, and (3) the border. Pending the success of the tribal volunteers there, the areas could expand to include all 3GB checkpoints, l arger areas of the border, and select neighborhoods in towns near the checkpoints, in particular, Jassan, Badrah, Shayikh Saad and Numaniyah. MGH agreed with emphasis on those areas, but questioned the location of checkpoints three and four to the south and west of Al Kut, strongly arguing that those be relocated to the border to address the threat from Iran at its source. MGH will identify "Tier 1" shayikhs best-suited to address tribal engagement priorities of ASRs Desna, Kiev-Bucharest, CPs 1 and 5, and the border area will arrange meetings with those shayikhs. Comment -------------- ¶7. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) MGH is the key to our tribal engagement on several levels. First, he is a prominent member of the Al Ammari tribe of the Rabi'ah Confederation and reportedly has close ties to Prince Rabi'ah- the paramount Prince of the Confederation. Second, he has a reputation as a tough and effective IP Chief stemming from his performance as chief during the Coalition Provincial Authority. Third, he has been willing to work with ePRT and 3GB, setting meetings with key tribal leaders, welcoming our security proposals, and indicating that he fully supports our tribal engagement plans. In turn, we are depending on him to act as the tribal subject matter expert and honest broker and guide us to the right shayikhs for the work we want done. We have been clear that in future Concerned Local Citizens (CLC) contracts he ultimately will be taking command of the best tribal volunteers. Our hope is that we will build successful relationships in the most troublesome areas including Operation Marne Sentry c heckpoints, the aforementioned ASRs and the border. Early indications are that MGH and the tribes recognize that it is their best interest to work with ePRT/CF to combat JAM and Iranian influence in Wasit. With anecdotal evidence and history as a judge, it seems clear that there is an exceedingly strong anti-Iranian sentiment among the Wasit tribes that we can harness. We intend to begin relatively small-- an initial volunteer group of 200-300 -- and grow only with proven success. We will continue to work closely with our CF colleagues to ensure all parties are closely coordinated. End comment. CROCKER