SADR AND BADR KISS AND MAKE-UP, BUT FOR HOW LONG?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003375

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2017
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: SADR AND BADR KISS AND MAKE-UP, BUT FOR HOW LONG?

REF: A. BAGHDAD 2906 (KARBALA CRISIS)

B. BAGHDAD 3367 (VP ON SADRIST SPLITS)

Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary: Iraq's two most powerful Shia political
entities, the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (ISCI) and the
Sadr Movement, have entered into a formal written agreement
that seeks to avoid armed conflict between their respective
militias, ISCI's Badr and Sadr's Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM). (Note:
While Badr Corps maintains that it has fully transitioned to
social/political organization status, it has not moved too
far from its origins as an armed group. End Note),Signed
on October 6 by Moqtada al-Sadr and ailing ISCI Chairman
Abdel Aziz al-Hakeem, the agreement calls upon the "cultural,
media, and educational organizations" of both parties (read
Badr and JAM) to promote rapprochement and desist from
divisive actions, and provides for the establishment of a
"Joint High Commission" with provincial branches that will
attempt to prevent disputes from escalating into armed
clashes similar to those which erupted after JAM's ill-fated
August attempt to seize some of Shia Islam's holiest shrines
in Karbala. Issued a little over one month after Moqtada's
order to "freeze" JAM activities, the Hakeem/Sadr agreement
gives further credence to the view that widespread Shia
street disgust over the Karbala incident unsettled the Sadr
Movement and compelled Moqtada to adopt a more accommodating
public posture and assert control over JAM activities. The
parties have not yet named members of the "Joint High
Commission" to implement the agreement, and it remains
unclear whether and for how long the JAM and Badr militias
will abide by the terms and spirit of the pact. If the
agreement is implemented in a sincere and effective manner,
however, the Hakeem/Sadr deal has the potential to greatly
reduce Shia-on-Shia violence while ISCI and the Sadrists
compete for supremacy among Iraq's Shia majority. End
Summary.


2. (C) Already bad, relations between the two rival groups
threatened to degenerate into full-scale warfare six weeks
ago in the wake of armed JAM-Badr clashes at the gates of
Shia shrines during an important Shia pilgrimage in Karbala,
ensuing JAM attacks on ISCI/Badr offices in Baghdad and
Southern Iraq, and JAM's assassination of two
ISCI/Badr-affiliated southern provincial governors (ref A).
ISCI official Haitham al-Husseini told us the level of
violence surprised senior leaders from both sides and
motivated them to begin negotiations several weeks ago to
reduce tensions. In an October 6 meeting with the Ambassador
just hours before public announcement of the agreement (ref
B),Iraqi Vice President - and senior ISCI official - Adel
Abdel Mehdi characterized the deal as something akin to a
mutual non-aggression pact and said it had been concluded
directly with Moqtada, since agreements with lower-ranking
Sadrists have limited scope of effect and validity.
Concluded "in the atmosphere of Ramadan to strengthen
relations between the two parties and to preserve noble
Islamic and national interests," the pact consists of three
provisions. First, it upholds "the necessity to respect and
protect Iraqi blood of any side or sect" because violence
("an offense upon the sanctity of blood") violates law and
morality. Second, it calls upon "all cultural, media, and
educational organizations" of the two parties to advance the
spirit of friendship and rapprochement and to not engage in
any activity that leads to division and hatred or is
otherwise against agreement principles. Although neither
Sadr's JAM nor ISCI's Badr would ever be confused for a
"cultural, media, or educational organization" in the
ordinary meaning of the terms, it is clear that this article
was directed at the two blood-stained militias and their
violent activities. Third, the agreement provides for the
establishment of a "Joint High Commission" with branches in
all provinces "to work toward rapprochement, prevent
disorder, control potential problems, and implement all
aspects of the agreement."


3. (C) The agreement drew effusive public praise from Prime
Minister al-Maliki, who hailed it an important step toward
national unity and alleviating conflict between "sons of
religion (presumably Shia Islam) and the nation." Given that
ISCI/Badr fighters were reportedly badly outgunned and
overpowered during August attacks by the Sadrists, it came as
little surprise that ISCI official al-Husseini told us his
organization is extremely pleased with the agreement as a
step forward in ISCI's long-term goal of "containing" the
Sadrists. He and other ISCI contacts maintained that the
most important agreement element is formation of the
commissions that, through dialogue, can prevent minor
disputes from escalating into violent altercations, and can
investigate and apportion responsibility for clashes that do
occur. Contacts from the Fadhila Party told us their Sadrist
Council of Representative colleagues characterized the pact

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as strictly a "security agreement" that has no bearing on the
Sadrist Movement's political direction or decision to
withdraw from the Shia United Iraqi Alliance in parliament.
The head of Sadr's Karbala office told the Iraqi media that
while he welcomes the agreement, he has not received any
instructions from Sadr regarding implementation and
commission formation, and ISCI officials confirmed that
committee members from either side have not been named.


Comment
--------------


4. (C) Issued a little over one month after Moqtada's order
to "freeze" JAM activities, the Hakeem/Sadr agreement gives
further credence to the view that widespread Shia street
disgust over JAM's audacious late-August attempt to seize the
sacred Shia shrines of Karbala unsettled the Sadr Movement
and compelled Sadr to adopt a more accommodating public
posture and attempt to assert control over JAM activities.
As with any agreement, particularly those to which a party as
erratic as Sadr is a signatory, follow-on implementation is
key and it remains very much an open question whether and for
how long the "cultural, media, and educational organizations"
of the two parties will abide by the agreement terms and
uphold its "spirit of friendship and rapprochement." If the
agreement is implemented in an effective manner, however, the
Hakeem/Sadr deal has the potential to greatly reduce
Shia-on-Shia violence and avert a "War for the South" between
Iraq's two largest Shia political entities.
CROCKER