MUTHANNA: TRIBAL STRATEGY IN A PIC PROVINCE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003330

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2017
TAGS: PINS PGOV PREL IR IZ
SUBJECT: MUTHANNA: TRIBAL STRATEGY IN A PIC PROVINCE

REF: A. BAGHDAD 2498

B. BAGHDAD 2511

C. BAGHDAD 3221

D. HILLA 130

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Classified By: Muthanna Provincial Reconstruction Team Leader
Paul O,Friel for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is a PRT Muthanna reporting cable.


2. (C) SUMMARY. The province of Muthanna offers an
example of a coherent tribal strategy the Coalition can
pursue in Shiite southern Iraq to combat militias and promote
stability. In Muthanna, there are four key partners who can
help us achieve these goals: 1) aggressively anti-militia
Iraqi security force commanders who have strong tribal
backing; 2) tribal sheikhs who support these commanders and
help stabilize the province; 3) local political leaders who
give their security commanders leeway and political cover to
combat militias; and, 4) clerical representatives of Grand
Ayatollah Sistani who act as a counterweight to the populist
and militant clerics associated with Shiite militias. Tribal
strength and backing underpin all of these elements.
Individuals in these same four categories can be found in
other southern Shiite provinces where there is a significant
rural, and therefore tribal, dynamic. END SUMMARY.

THE NEXUS OF STABILITY: KEY SECURITY COMMANDERS
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3. (C) Strong and aggressive anti-militia Iraqi Security
Force (ISF) commanders exist individually in many of Iraq,s
southern provinces. Often it is powerful tribal backing that
enables them to tackle Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and other Shiite
militias (ref. A). (Comment: Some also enjoy Badr backing.
But at the local level, Badr backing without tribal support
is insufficient to sustain aggressive initiatives. End
Comment.) In Muthanna, Colonel Ali al-Khawam, commander of
the Criminal Intelligence Unit, is able to lead the fight
against JAM and Iranian influence because his uncle is the
sheikh of the influential Bani Zraige tribe and able to rally
Muthanna,s other tribes to support Colonel Ali,s security
forces. In Dhi Qar, Colonel Abu Liqa, commander of the
Tactical Support Unit, relies heavily on his al-Juwabir
tribesmen for backing against JAM. In Wasit, Lieutenant
Aziz, commander of al-Kut SWAT Team, operates under the
protection of his Rabiah tribal confederation.


4. (C) These professional, nationalistic, and charismatic
elite police unit commanders must still operate within a
poorly led and heavily infiltrated Interior Ministry
superstructure. He and his forces receive inadequate
logistical support and training. Worse, they risk becoming
the targets of political reprisals from Baghdad precisely
because of their effectiveness in countering militias (ref.
B). But with our support they can greatly expand their
capabilities. At the provincial level, U.S. Special Forces
detachments have proven highly effective in training and then
operating alongside the units led by these commanders.
MNSTC-I training teams have also played a vital role in
establishing basic skills. Close quarter and urban combat,
forensics and crime scene investigation, vehicle maintenance,
and evidence-based prosecution are all areas in which
additional training would make a tremendous difference.
Coalition provision of focused training, aid in overcoming
logistical bottlenecks, and political cover in Baghdad for
these commanders and their units will help expand the areas
of security these forces generate.

TRIBAL SHEIKHS
--------------

5.(C) Powerful tribal sheikhs committed to opposing the
militias provide the needed backing to these effective ISF
commanders. Sheikhs such as Thamer al-Khawam of the Bani
Zraige tribe, Raysaan Mutasher of the Zayad tribe, and Falih
Hadi of the Juwabir tribe have repeatedly mustered
Muthanna,s tribes to suppress JAM. Sheikh Thamer in
particular has purged JAM members from the ranks of the Bani
Zraige and persuaded sheikhs of other tribes to deny tribal
protection to tribesmen who are militiamen. Moreover, he has
been instrumental to Colonel Ali's success by convincing
fellow sheikhs to suspend the right of tribal revenge when
deaths or detentions result from legitimate security force
operations. In the political realm, these sheikhs support
moderate mayors, city councilmen, and provincial officials
who authorize operations against militias and bear the
political pressure that redounds upon them. Our strategy
should aim to support sheikhs who take such pro-active
stands and encourage others to emulate their example.

CIVILIAN LEADERS
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6. (C) Civilian leaders willing to combat militias are also

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critical to success. In Muthanna, former governor Hassani
took a strong stand against the militias and Iranian
influence, a position that likely led to his August 20
assassination (ref. C). Hassani repeatedly used his Baghdad
contacts to counter Sadrist efforts to fire Colonel Ali
al-Khawam. Such political top cover is absolutely essential
to sustain any anti-militia initiative. Hassani also used
his powerful tribal connections to muster tribal support for
crackdowns on JAM. Political leaders like Hassani, who
interact closely with the sheikhs to provide stability, need
our support.

MODERATE CLERICS
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7. (C) The final elements of this nexus are the clerics who
represent Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and the Marja,iyya,
the traditional Shiite religious leadership. These clerics
are students or agents of the four grand ayatollahs of Najaf,
and form the backbone of their influence in society (ref. D).
The Sistani-allied imams, as voices of moderation, oppose
the tactics of the Shiite militias and the demagoguery of the
imams which enables them. The sway of these Marja,iyya
representatives with the populace can help generate popular
support for key tribal sheikhs, ISF leaders, and civilian
leaders, while undermining the legitimacy of the militias.

PATRONAGE ENHANCES AUTHORITY OF KEY ACTORS
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8. (C) The authority of the Marja,iyya clerics and the
sheikhs is based on their ability to deliver goods and
services to their followers. Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs) can enhance the authority of anti-militia clerics and
sheikhs by channeling funds to projects selected by these
leaders. Quick Response Funds (QRF) are particularly
well-suited to this purpose because of their flexibility. By
helping moderate sheikhs and clerics satisfy the basic needs
of their constituents we will strengthen their grip on their
followers and deprive the militias of one of their principal
recruitment tools, the popular frustration at the lack of
essential services.

&BOTTOM-UP8 STRATEGY
--------------


9. (S) Comment: These nodes of stability exist not only in
Muthanna, but also to varying degrees in other southern
provinces. PRT and Coalition support to all four types of
key leaders, and especially to the tribal sheikhs, can be
tailored to the unique dynamics of each province. Moreover,
the strategy fits within the constraints imposed by the
transition of provinces to &Provincial Iraqi Control.8 In
building institutions around key individuals, our focus
should be on quality, ensured by thorough vetting, rather
than quantity, and we should resist the temptation to expand
the numbers of security force units quickly. This type of
&bottom-up8 strategy from the periphery may offer our best
chance to achieve stability in southern Iraq.
CROCKER