MUTHANNA: TRIBAL STRATEGY IN A PIC PROVINCE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003330 SIPDIS SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D COPY (ADDING SIPDIS) E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2017 TAGS: PINS PGOV PREL IR IZ SUBJECT: MUTHANNA: TRIBAL STRATEGY IN A PIC PROVINCE REF: A. BAGHDAD 2498 ¶B. BAGHDAD 2511 ¶C. BAGHDAD 3221 ¶D. HILLA 130 BAGHDAD 00003330 001.3 OF 002 Classified By: Muthanna Provincial Reconstruction Team Leader Paul O,Friel for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is a PRT Muthanna reporting cable. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY. The province of Muthanna offers an example of a coherent tribal strategy the Coalition can pursue in Shiite southern Iraq to combat militias and promote stability. In Muthanna, there are four key partners who can help us achieve these goals: 1) aggressively anti-militia Iraqi security force commanders who have strong tribal backing; 2) tribal sheikhs who support these commanders and help stabilize the province; 3) local political leaders who give their security commanders leeway and political cover to combat militias; and, 4) clerical representatives of Grand Ayatollah Sistani who act as a counterweight to the populist and militant clerics associated with Shiite militias. Tribal strength and backing underpin all of these elements. Individuals in these same four categories can be found in other southern Shiite provinces where there is a significant rural, and therefore tribal, dynamic. END SUMMARY. THE NEXUS OF STABILITY: KEY SECURITY COMMANDERS -------------- -- ¶3. (C) Strong and aggressive anti-militia Iraqi Security Force (ISF) commanders exist individually in many of Iraq,s southern provinces. Often it is powerful tribal backing that enables them to tackle Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and other Shiite militias (ref. A). (Comment: Some also enjoy Badr backing. But at the local level, Badr backing without tribal support is insufficient to sustain aggressive initiatives. End Comment.) In Muthanna, Colonel Ali al-Khawam, commander of the Criminal Intelligence Unit, is able to lead the fight against JAM and Iranian influence because his uncle is the sheikh of the influential Bani Zraige tribe and able to rally Muthanna,s other tribes to support Colonel Ali,s security forces. In Dhi Qar, Colonel Abu Liqa, commander of the Tactical Support Unit, relies heavily on his al-Juwabir tribesmen for backing against JAM. In Wasit, Lieutenant Aziz, commander of al-Kut SWAT Team, operates under the protection of his Rabiah tribal confederation. �0A;¶4. (C) These professional, nationalistic, and charismatic elite police unit commanders must still operate within a poorly led and heavily infiltrated Interior Ministry superstructure. He and his forces receive inadequate logistical support and training. Worse, they risk becoming the targets of political reprisals from Baghdad precisely because of their effectiveness in countering militias (ref. B). But with our support they can greatly expand their capabilities. At the provincial level, U.S. Special Forces detachments have proven highly effective in training and then operating alongside the units led by these commanders. MNSTC-I training teams have also played a vital role in establishing basic skills. Close quarter and urban combat, forensics and crime scene investigation, vehicle maintenance, and evidence-based prosecution are all areas in which additional training would make a tremendous difference. Coalition provision of focused training, aid in overcoming logistical bottlenecks, and political cover in Baghdad for these commanders and their units will help expand the areas of security these forces generate. TRIBAL SHEIKHS -------------- 5.(C) Powerful tribal sheikhs committed to opposing the militias provide the needed backing to these effective ISF commanders. Sheikhs such as Thamer al-Khawam of the Bani Zraige tribe, Raysaan Mutasher of the Zayad tribe, and Falih Hadi of the Juwabir tribe have repeatedly mustered Muthanna,s tribes to suppress JAM. Sheikh Thamer in particular has purged JAM members from the ranks of the Bani Zraige and persuaded sheikhs of other tribes to deny tribal protection to tribesmen who are militiamen. Moreover, he has been instrumental to Colonel Ali's success by convincing fellow sheikhs to suspend the right of tribal revenge when deaths or detentions result from legitimate security force operations. In the political realm, these sheikhs support moderate mayors, city councilmen, and provincial officials who authorize operations against militias and bear the political pressure that redounds upon them. Our strategy should aim to support sheikhs who take such pro-active stands and encourage others to emulate their example. CIVILIAN LEADERS -------------- ¶6. (C) Civilian leaders willing to combat militias are also BAGHDAD 00003330 002.3 OF 002 critical to success. In Muthanna, former governor Hassani took a strong stand against the militias and Iranian influence, a position that likely led to his August 20 assassination (ref. C). Hassani repeatedly used his Baghdad contacts to counter Sadrist efforts to fire Colonel Ali al-Khawam. Such political top cover is absolutely essential to sustain any anti-militia initiative. Hassani also used his powerful tribal connections to muster tribal support for crackdowns on JAM. Political leaders like Hassani, who interact closely with the sheikhs to provide stability, need our support. MODERATE CLERICS -------------- ¶7. (C) The final elements of this nexus are the clerics who represent Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and the Marja,iyya, the traditional Shiite religious leadership. These clerics are students or agents of the four grand ayatollahs of Najaf, and form the backbone of their influence in society (ref. D). The Sistani-allied imams, as voices of moderation, oppose the tactics of the Shiite militias and the demagoguery of the imams which enables them. The sway of these Marja,iyya representatives with the populace can help generate popular support for key tribal sheikhs, ISF leaders, and civilian leaders, while undermining the legitimacy of the militias. PATRONAGE ENHANCES AUTHORITY OF KEY ACTORS -------------- ¶8. (C) The authority of the Marja,iyya clerics and the sheikhs is based on their ability to deliver goods and services to their followers. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) can enhance the authority of anti-militia clerics and sheikhs by channeling funds to projects selected by these leaders. Quick Response Funds (QRF) are particularly well-suited to this purpose because of their flexibility. By helping moderate sheikhs and clerics satisfy the basic needs of their constituents we will strengthen their grip on their followers and deprive the militias of one of their principal recruitment tools, the popular frustration at the lack of essential services. &BOTTOM-UP8 STRATEGY -------------- ¶9. (S) Comment: These nodes of stability exist not only in Muthanna, but also to varying degrees in other southern provinces. PRT and Coalition support to all four types of key leaders, and especially to the tribal sheikhs, can be tailored to the unique dynamics of each province. Moreover, the strategy fits within the constraints imposed by the transition of provinces to &Provincial Iraqi Control.8 In building institutions around key individuals, our focus should be on quality, ensured by thorough vetting, rather than quantity, and we should resist the temptation to expand the numbers of security force units quickly. This type of &bottom-up8 strategy from the periphery may offer our best chance to achieve stability in southern Iraq. CROCKER