Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD3323
2007-10-06 15:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

THE AMBASSADOR'S OCTOBER 4 MEETING WITH COR DEPUTY

Tags:  PGOV IZ 
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VZCZCXRO0333
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3323/01 2791559
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 061559Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3722
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003323 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: THE AMBASSADOR'S OCTOBER 4 MEETING WITH COR DEPUTY
SPEAKER KHALID ATTIYA


Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003323

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: THE AMBASSADOR'S OCTOBER 4 MEETING WITH COR DEPUTY
SPEAKER KHALID ATTIYA


Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador used his Oct. 4 meeting with
Sheikh Khalid Attiya, Deputy Speaker of the Council of
Representatives (CoR),to underscore the need for political
progress and for the 3 1 mechanism to work. Sheikh Khalid
agreed, and said the de-Baathification reform law might
receive its first reading within the next three days. He
predicted that the draft provincial powers law would be put
to a vote without further debate once it returns to the CoR
from the Shura Council, but said the Kurds were blocking
progress on the oil law. He stressed the need for PM Maliki
to appoint technocrats to run the ministries of Health,
Transportation, and Agriculture (previously held by
Sadrists). Sheikh Khalid was politely scornful of VP
Hashimi's "national compact," faulted Hashimi for any
problems in the 3 1, and said that Tawafuq's continued
refusal to return to the government would lead to a crisis.
He confirmed his acceptance of an MNF-I invitation to visit
Saydiya to see first-hand the status of the Concerned Local
Citizens (CLCs) program there. He was skeptical of the Jaysh
al-Mahdi ceasefire. End summary.

The Ambassador's Message
--------------


2. (C) In an October 4 meeting with Sheikh Khalid Attiya,
Deputy Speaker of the CoR, the Ambassador underscored the
urgent need for political progress. "We've bought some
time," said the Ambassador, who cited recent security gains
and the efforts made by Iraq's political leaders in late
August. He added: "Now we have to use this time to make
political progress over the next few months." He stressed
the role that the 3 1 mechanism (i.e., the Presidency Council
and the Prime Minister) could play and said the U.S. expected
to see renewed efforts after Eid. He also emphasized the
need for the GOI to focus on improving the delivery of basic
services, saying that the Iraqis needed to bring the same
level of energy and determination to that "civil campaign" as
they had to the military campaign of Fardh al-Qanoon.

Legislative Update
--------------


3. (C) Sheikh Khalid agreed, saying there was a somewhat
improved atmosphere in the CoR following the August recess,
and noting that attendance was up, with no less than 206
members present at the October 4 session. He said that the
de-Ba'athification reform law could receive its first reading
within the next three days. As for provincial powers, he
predicted that the draft law would go straight to its third
reading once it returns from the Shura Council and would be

voted on without further debate. He noted that there were a
few outstanding points to be resolved (e.g., salary levels
for provincial officials) and even some remaining
disagreements within the UIA, but indicated that these would
not be deal-breakers. In contrast, Sheikh Khalid said the
oil law was still being blocked by the Kurds, who were
insisting that the current draft be stripped of all
appendices (i.e., a return to the February 2006 draft).

Sheikh Khalid's Priority: Fix Cabinet
--------------


4. (C) Sheikh Khalid said that the GOI had a "great
opportunity" to appoint new cabinet ministers to posts
vacated by the Sadrists, Iraqiya and Tawafuq. He said that
rather than trying to replace all the vacant cabinet jobs, PM
Maliki should focus on the critical ministries of Health,
Transportation and Agriculture and should nominate
technocrats not beholden to any particular political party.
"We need to get away from the party quota system," said the
Deputy Speaker. Returning to this theme later in the
conversation, Sheikh Khalid added: "We must fix the
government (i.e., cabinet) before trying to pass laws -- the
laws will follow naturally afterwards."

VP Hashimi: The Fly in the 3 1 Ointment?
--------------


5. (C) Turning to Vice President (VP) Hashimi's recent visit
to Najaf (during which Hashimi claims to have sold Grand
Ayatollah Sistani on his proposed "national compact"),Sheikh
Khalid noted that Sistani spoke in generalities after the
meeting -- the implication being that Sistani had not given
Hashimi's plan any specific blessing. The Ambassador noted
US dissatisfaction with a couple of points in the proposal,
especially its references to the "occupation" of Iraq. Later
in the conversation, responding to the Ambassador's point
that mutual understanding and trust among the 3 1 members
would facilitate progress, Sheikh Khalid said: "Let me be
frank -- Hashimi's role makes reaching an understanding

BAGHDAD 00003323 002 OF 002


difficult. Even his friends in the Iraqi Islamic Party
complain about his dictatorial style." Continuing on this
theme, Sheikh Khalid observed that the negative atmosphere
generated by Hashimi's comments about the GOI's performance
did not help matters. The GOI is in a difficult period; it
is very easy under the circumstances for someone to identify
mistakes and focus media attention on them. The Ambassador
assured Sheikh Khalid that he made this very point to VP
Hashimi earlier in the day.


6. (C) Ratcheting his argument up a notch, Sheikh Khalid said
that the status quo was unsustainable: the GOI must resolve
the question of Tawafuq's return to the unity government, or
the country would face a crisis. "If they (Tawafuq) have
specific requests, then fine. But if not, they should let
the government get on with its work," he said.

Saydiya and Sadrists
--------------


7. (C) The Ambassador noted the recent misunderstandings
surrounding the situation in Saydiya and the role played
there by CLCs, and said that an October 4 visit to Saydiya
organized by MNF-I for leading Shia political figures
(including PM Advisor Sami al-Askari and Badr Commander Hadi
al-Amari) should help to dispel the misconceptions. Sheikh
Khalid confirmed that he planned to join a follow-up MNF-I
visit on October 6 and said that the situation in Saydiya was
of real concern to the PM and other Shia politicians. "They
are worried about (the U.S.) arming militias that are outside
the law . . . even if they are not a threat now, what about
in the future?" he asked rhetorically. The Ambassador
clarified that the US is not/not arming the CLCs, and is
working in close coordination with the GOI and especially the
Implementation and Follow-up Committee on National
Reconciliation (IFCNR). The Ambassador acknowledged the need
to proceed deliberately, and noted that after having
discussed the program in some detail with the PM and Gen.
Petraeus earlier in the day, the PM was comfortable with the
situation.


8. (C) Sheikh Khalid said he doubted that the JAM ceasefire
represented a serious effort by Muqtada al-Sadr to reform the
Sadrist trend/JAM. "The Sadrist trend is a mix of many
things; Muqtada al-Sadr is just one wing inside a group of
many wings," he said. Consequently, even though he thought
it obligatory to go through the motions of welcoming the
ceasefire and trying to nurture it into something meaningful,
Sheikh Khalid remained skeptical of the ceasefire's practical
import. Moreover, he argued that the GOI and Coalition
Forces should continue to hit "certain JAM elements" that did
not observe the ceasefire. "We can't allow organizations to
carry weapons and challenge the government -- we must
confront this situation with force," said the Sheikh.

CoR Member Gets the Boot
--------------


9. (C) Sheikh Khalid gleefully recounted how the CoR, at
Tawafuq's behest, had voted earlier in the day to strip Abdul
Nasr al-Janabi of his membership in the Council. (Al-Janabi,
who is currently outside of Iraq, is a prominent defender of
the Sunni insurgency.) "They (Tawafuq) wanted to let him
submit his resignation, but of course there was no written
letter of resignation and besides, allowing him to resign
would mean that he kept his pension. So we voted him out,"
chuckled the Deputy Speaker, who noted that none of this
would have been possible if not for the fact that CoR Speaker
Mahmoud Mashadani is currently out of the country. Sheikh
Khalid said that al-Janabi's seat has been awarded to former
Iraqi soccer star Ahmed Rathi.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) A first reading of the de-Baath law this week would
be a welcome development, although given the CoR's track
record we are taking Sheikh Khalid's prediction with a grain
of salt. Perhaps more noteworthy is his assessment that the
new draft of the provincial powers law will not re-set the
legislative clock; because a previous draft of the law has
already been through two readings in the CoR, it appears that
the version approved by the leaders will move (once it
returns from the Shura Council) straight to a third and final
reading and vote. Post will continue to track both bills and
use every engagement with CoR members to emphasize the need
for rapid passage.
CROCKER

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