SURGE STAFFING II: MINISTERIAL CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003322 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR S/I, NEA AND NEA/EX E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2017 TAGS: AMGT APER IZ SUBJECT: SURGE STAFFING II: MINISTERIAL CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) CONFIDENTIAL SIPDIS -------------- Summary -------------- (C) 1. The success or failure of the Iraqi government will depend in large part on its ability to function well and to deliver services to Iraqi citizens. That makes ministerial capacity building an essential part of our strategy. In August 2007, we determined that we needed a total of 214 people, working in many of the Mission's sections, to do ministerial capacity building, 75 more than our staff at the time. Since then, we have increased our staff by 36 to a total of 175. We are awaiting the arrival of an additional 39 people. Current action for 18 of those rests with the Energy Fusion Cell (EFC); 8 with our Political Section and NEA/I; 7 with DOD; 3 with our Rule of Law Office; 2 with our Agricultural Attache's Office; and 1 with our Health Attache's Office - in coordination with their home agencies. USAID and its contractors have been playing a key role in recruiting and hiring. (C) 2. Correct staffing is only one step. In September 2007, we created a Ministerial Engagement Coordinating Committee (MECC),comprising USM-I, USAID, MNF-I, MNC-I, GRD, DFID (the UK's development agency) and other international donors. The MECC is co-chaired by USAID and ITAO. Its task is to develop common assessments, performance goals, policy objectives, and to coordinate USG engagement with the Iraqi government. -------------- Ministerial Capacity Development Staffing -------------- (C) 3. "Ministerial Capacity Development" is an umbrella term that covers a variety of Mission activities ) some ongoing, some new. Some projects, such as improving procurement methods, clearly fall under the rubric of ministerial capacity building. Others, such as work with the Ministry of Electricity on improving power generation at plants, have the effect of improving ministerial capacity without having that as their main objective. We also draw a distinction among: -- (a) "ministerial capacity building" which is a long-term (several year) project -- (b) "ministerial performance" which is focused on assisting ministries in their immediate workings, and -- (c) "ministerial engagement" which refers to our internal 
coordination to ensure that we are engaged with key ministries at every appropriate level and that we are coordinated in our approach towards them (e.g. sparing Iraqi officials from dealing with several Embassy and MNF-I officials on the same subject). (C) 4. Retrospectively, we estimate that in April 2007, U.S. Mission Baghdad had 139 people working on Iraqi ministerial capacity development (64 from USAID and 75 from other Mission elements, primarily ITAO). Following the August 2007 decision to review our overall ministerial capacity building effort, we decided to increase this number to 214. Since then, 36 additional staff members have arrived in Baghdad bringing the total to 175. (C) 5. The original number established in August for our ministerial capacity staffing was 220 (an additional 81). The reduction by six (from 81 to 75) was the result of: one position which was mistakenly double-counted, four that were slated to be part of a contracted ministerial assessment project which has been terminated, and one which the Rule of Law Office determined was redundant with existing work. We now intend for the ministerial assessment project to be conducted by our new Ministerial Engagement Coordinating Committee (MECC) (see below). -------------- Current Staffing Status -------------- (C) 6. Therefore, 75 people in addition to our April 2007 staffing numbers are needed to work on ministerial capacity development. Of these: -- 36 have arrived in Iraq (32 USAID contractors to work in key ministries, 1 Health position to work with the Ministry of Health, 2 Treasury positions to support the Ministry of Finance, and 1 DOS Energy Fusion Cell position to work with the Ministry of Oil and others on mines and unexploded ordnance). -- Hiring is being carried out for five personnel: the Rule of Law office (3 to support the Ministry of Justice),USDA (2 to support the Ministry of Agriculture),and Health Attache (1 to support the Ministry of Health. -- USAID and its contractor are prepared to recruit 18 positions to support the Ministries of Oil and Electricity. USAID,s contractor is working with the MNF-I's Energy Fusion Cell (EFC) for final determination of job descriptions. The requirement is for technical and contractual skill sets. Logistics arrangements for supporting the new personnel are being reviewed with the Management Section. -- DOS requested that DOD provide 6 military officers to support our ministerial performance and capacity development efforts. These positions are intended to support the Rule of Law office, the Political Section, and ITAO. Our latest knowledge is that this request has recently been approved. DOD has offered one additional EFC position to work on unexploded ordnance. -- NEA is in the process of approving and recruiting the other 8 positions for Embassy POL. We intend to devote all 8 to the legislative process but the exact disposition to the Prime Minister's office, Deputy Prime Ministers' offices, and Council of Representatives is under discussion. -------------- The Ministerial Capacity Engagement Committee (MECC) -------------- (C) 7. In September 2007, we established a "Ministerial Engagement Coordinating Committee" (MECC) including members from the U.S. Mission, MNF-I, MNC-I, GRD, DFID (the UK's development agency),and other international donors. MECC's purpose is to establish shared ministry engagement objectives, to reduce duplication of requests to key Iraq ministry interlocutors, and to coordinate USG engagement with senior ministry officials. The MECC is co-chaired by USAID and ITAO. (C) 8. The MECC's work plan includes conducting rapid ministry assessments to determine priority actions to improve the ministries' performance; developing plans to assist the ministries to achieve performance benchmarks; and developing potential demarches for senior USG officials to deliver to senior GOI officials, if needed, to overcome obstacles that cannot be surmounted at working levels. (C) 9. As a historic note, the May 2007 Kennedy Report on Mission staffing reflected the abolition of 26 ministerial capacity building positions as the mission transitioned the Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office (IRMO) into ITAO. The current and ongoing surge of 75 staff will yield a net increase to the Mission of 49 people working on the issue. (C) 10. Comment: As with the staffing problems with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (septel),the difficulties in staffing the ministerial capacity building positions have been reviewed by the interagency process this past week. The guidelines post and Washington have agreed to should make the staffing process more reliable, efficient and faster. End comment. CROCKER