AMBASSADOR TO VICE PRESIDENT HASHIMI: SERVICE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003317

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR TO VICE PRESIDENT HASHIMI: SERVICE
DELIVERY, CABINET PARTICIPATION

BAGHDAD 00003317 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (S/NF) During an October 4 meeting with Vice President
Tariq al Hashimi, the Ambassador emphasized the importance of
GOI service delivery over the next six months in order to
sustain progress achieved by the "surge" and local/provincial
security arrangements. The absence of the Tawafuq bloc from
the cabinet hindered efforts at effective service delivery,
in particular the key empty position of Deputy Prime Minister
(Salam Zoubai's job). Hashimi repeated familiar complaints
about Prime Minister Maliki's "ignoring" Sunni demands, but
nevertheless offered his own services to improve service
delivery. The Ambassador also encouraged Hashimi and his
staff to cooperate with the Prime Minister's reconciliation
efforts, to help consolidate the progress made by tribal and
other groups in Baghdad and beyond to combat AQI. Hashimi
raised the issue of the Commission on Public Integrity,
saying that the PM was unjustly interfering in its activities
and management. End summary.

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Service Delivery, Leadership Crucial
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2. (S/NF) The Ambassador began an October 4 meeting with VP
Hashimi by noting the importance of ensuring effective
service-delivery by the Government of Iraq (GOI) to provinces
(particularly Baghdad),as well as taking advantage of the
political space created by the "surge," by local Iraqi
security arrangements, and by September Congressional
testimony. The U.S. role in Iraq, he said, "is at its
high-water mark;" the GOI must act to deliver services in
order to assert control over militias (who have usurped this
role in certain locales) and to show Iraqis that their
efforts to confront AQI are valued. The absence from
government of the Tawafuq bloc, he said, damaged the GOI,s
ability to deliver. The Ambassador encouraged Hashimi to put
personal grievances with Maliki aside, and seize upon this
critical moment to act -- even if it meant replacing certain
individuals. The absence of the Deputy Prime Minister
responsible for services (Salam al Zoubai) hamstrung the
government, he added. Similarly, long absences from Baghdad
of Iraq's senior leadership contributed to GOI
ineffectiveness. "You need truly effective individuals in
key places," the Ambassador said, especially in the DPM
position for services. The Ambassador encouraged VP Hashimi
to return to Iraq quickly following his Eid visit to Saudi
Arabia. (Note: Hashimi responded that he would return
immediately after the Eid, and added that Vice President Adel
Abdil Mahdi would return to Iraq on October 5. End note.)


3. (S/NF) Responding to the Ambassador's remarks, Hashimi
said Tawafuq was prepared to return to government, but that
PM Maliki "had done nothing" to respond to Sunni demands.
Hashimi said there were three "temporary" options available
to improve GOI performance on service delivery: first, Deputy
Prime Minister Barham Salih could absorb the services
portfolio within his portfolio; second, Hashimi as Vice
President could take on the task; or third, DPM Zoubai's
office could be empowered to carry on its responsibilities in
his absence. On the last option, Hashimi complained that the
PMO had "paralyzed" the work of Zoubai's staff, even sending
a letter to Zoubai's Chief of Staff telling him to cease and
desist.


4. (C) Hashimi said both he and DPM Salih were ready to
assume Zoubai,s responsibilities and had already begun to do
so. Dr. Salih, he said, visited Hashimi a "few days ago" to
discuss the VP's ideas on services for Anbar Province and the
provision of goods to Baghdad neighborhoods. Hashimi said he
paid USD 60 thousand to the Red Crescent a day earlier to
deliver food to refugees returning from Jordan to the Baghdad
neighborhood of Ghazaliya. The Ambassador welcomed the VP's
activism, but noted the need for a coordinated GOI strategy
to ensure longer-term sustainability ("for the next 6
months"),and the need to make the GOI the "address" for
those (like refugees and IDP's) who want to return to their
homes and neighborhoods. "If service delivery fails," the
Ambassador added, "security will also fail." Filling the
vacant DPM slot is crucial, along with creation of working
groups dealing with Baghdad Neighborhood leaders, to ensure
effective service delivery. Hashimi repeated his willingness
to step in to address the issue.

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VP and PM Need to Cooperate on Reconciliation
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5. (S/NF) Welcoming VP Hashimi's role in supporting CF
efforts in Baghdad and other provinces to stand up local
security groups, or "Concerned Local Citizens," to combat
AQI, the Ambassador encouraged Hashimi and the Iraqi Islamic
Party to coordinate their efforts with those of the Prime
Minister. The committee the PM created to deal with
reconciliation, he said, is doing good work, and its leaders
have taken political risks that perhaps have not been
recognized by the public. Sensitive issues, such as the
recent "hysteria" that occurred in the Baghdad neighborhood
of Sayidiya, could have been better handled had Hashimi's
people been linked up better with the PM's office. Hashimi
responded that the PM was opposed to mobilizing Iraq's
tribes, despite their success in confronting AQI. "It is
hard to deal with people," he added, "that aren't committed
to reconciliation." Further questioning the PM's sincerity,
Hashimi asked why the "Muthanna Brigade" (believed to be
strongly sectarian) was being sent to man checkpoints in
Sayidiya, where Sunni CLC's had earlier been stationed. The
Ambassador noted that he had checked into the story, and
learned that MNF was comfortable with the GOI battalion being
re-assigned to Sayidiya. The Ambassador also confirmed that
Hashimi knew of an upcoming meeting arranged by the Embassy
between the VP's tribal advisor, Omar Jaboori, and the
co-Chairs of the PM's reconciliation committee. Hashimi also
noted that he and VP Adil Abdel Mahdi planned to discuss a
"budget allocation" for reconciliation initiatives such as
ceremonies to highlight cross-sectarian (i.e., Sunni-Shia)
marriages.

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Different Views on "Resistance" in "Compact"
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6. (S/NF) The Ambassador told Hashimi that he was displeased
with the language used in point 24 of the VP's recently
circulated "National Compact" document. The language, he
said, appeared to legitimize armed "resistance" against
Coalition Forces. Hashimi and his Chief of Staff argued that
the language was necessary to bring armed groups back to the
negotiating table, similar to the efforts the U.S. was making
to talk with insurgency members. The language was used to
"attract" these people back to the political process, and
engage them in reconciliation efforts.

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Commission on Public Integrity
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7. (S/NF) Hashimi raised the subject of the Commission on
Public Integrity (CPI),asking if the U.S. Congress would
pursue its investigations and hearings on the topic. He
accused the PM of gutting the Commission of Sunni staff, as
well as taking other similarly "unconstitutional" steps which
undermined GOI effectiveness and credibility. Some of its
staff, he added, in both Baghdad and other provinces, were
ordered to take "forced vacations" or were transferred to
other government jobs. Since the Embassy had not responded,
he said, his office would take the matter up with the
Presidency Council. The Ambassador queried whether the
Council of Representatives had followed up on its oversight
responsibility to deal with the issue of the Commission.
Without answering the question directly, Hashimi cited as yet
another example of bad faith from the PM,s office the fact
that Hashimi,s deputy had inexplicably been prevented from
attending a parliamentary meeting on security issues the day
before.
CROCKER