AMBASSADOR TO VICE PRESIDENT HASHIMI: SERVICE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003317 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR TO VICE PRESIDENT HASHIMI: SERVICE DELIVERY, CABINET PARTICIPATION BAGHDAD 00003317 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) During an October 4 meeting with Vice President Tariq al Hashimi, the Ambassador emphasized the importance of GOI service delivery over the next six months in order to sustain progress achieved by the "surge" and local/provincial security arrangements. The absence of the Tawafuq bloc from the cabinet hindered efforts at effective service delivery, in particular the key empty position of Deputy Prime Minister (Salam Zoubai's job). Hashimi repeated familiar complaints about Prime Minister Maliki's "ignoring" Sunni demands, but nevertheless offered his own services to improve service delivery. The Ambassador also encouraged Hashimi and his staff to cooperate with the Prime Minister's reconciliation efforts, to help consolidate the progress made by tribal and other groups in Baghdad and beyond to combat AQI. Hashimi raised the issue of the Commission on Public Integrity, saying that the PM was unjustly interfering in its activities and management. End summary. -------------- Service Delivery, Leadership Crucial -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) The Ambassador began an October 4 meeting with VP Hashimi by noting the importance of ensuring effective service-delivery by the Government of Iraq (GOI) to provinces (particularly Baghdad),as well as taking advantage of the political space created by the "surge," by local Iraqi security arrangements, and by September Congressional testimony. The U.S. role in Iraq, he said, "is at its high-water mark;" the GOI must act to deliver services in order to assert control over militias (who have usurped this role in certain locales) and to show Iraqis that their efforts to confront AQI are valued. The absence from government of the Tawafuq bloc, he said, damaged the GOI,s ability to deliver. The Ambassador encouraged Hashimi to put personal grievances with Maliki aside, and seize upon this critical moment to act -- even if it meant replacing certain individuals. The absence of the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for services (Salam al Zoubai) hamstrung the government, he added. Similarly, long absences from Baghdad of Iraq's senior leadership contributed to GOI 
ineffectiveness. "You need truly effective individuals in key places," the Ambassador said, especially in the DPM position for services. The Ambassador encouraged VP Hashimi to return to Iraq quickly following his Eid visit to Saudi Arabia. (Note: Hashimi responded that he would return immediately after the Eid, and added that Vice President Adel Abdil Mahdi would return to Iraq on October 5. End note.) ¶3. (S/NF) Responding to the Ambassador's remarks, Hashimi said Tawafuq was prepared to return to government, but that PM Maliki "had done nothing" to respond to Sunni demands. Hashimi said there were three "temporary" options available to improve GOI performance on service delivery: first, Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih could absorb the services portfolio within his portfolio; second, Hashimi as Vice President could take on the task; or third, DPM Zoubai's office could be empowered to carry on its responsibilities in his absence. On the last option, Hashimi complained that the PMO had "paralyzed" the work of Zoubai's staff, even sending a letter to Zoubai's Chief of Staff telling him to cease and desist. ¶4. (C) Hashimi said both he and DPM Salih were ready to assume Zoubai,s responsibilities and had already begun to do so. Dr. Salih, he said, visited Hashimi a "few days ago" to discuss the VP's ideas on services for Anbar Province and the provision of goods to Baghdad neighborhoods. Hashimi said he paid USD 60 thousand to the Red Crescent a day earlier to deliver food to refugees returning from Jordan to the Baghdad neighborhood of Ghazaliya. The Ambassador welcomed the VP's activism, but noted the need for a coordinated GOI strategy to ensure longer-term sustainability ("for the next 6 months"),and the need to make the GOI the "address" for those (like refugees and IDP's) who want to return to their homes and neighborhoods. "If service delivery fails," the Ambassador added, "security will also fail." Filling the vacant DPM slot is crucial, along with creation of working groups dealing with Baghdad Neighborhood leaders, to ensure effective service delivery. Hashimi repeated his willingness to step in to address the issue. -------------- VP and PM Need to Cooperate on Reconciliation -------------- BAGHDAD 00003317 002.2 OF 002 ¶5. (S/NF) Welcoming VP Hashimi's role in supporting CF efforts in Baghdad and other provinces to stand up local security groups, or "Concerned Local Citizens," to combat AQI, the Ambassador encouraged Hashimi and the Iraqi Islamic Party to coordinate their efforts with those of the Prime Minister. The committee the PM created to deal with reconciliation, he said, is doing good work, and its leaders have taken political risks that perhaps have not been recognized by the public. Sensitive issues, such as the recent "hysteria" that occurred in the Baghdad neighborhood of Sayidiya, could have been better handled had Hashimi's people been linked up better with the PM's office. Hashimi responded that the PM was opposed to mobilizing Iraq's tribes, despite their success in confronting AQI. "It is hard to deal with people," he added, "that aren't committed to reconciliation." Further questioning the PM's sincerity, Hashimi asked why the "Muthanna Brigade" (believed to be strongly sectarian) was being sent to man checkpoints in Sayidiya, where Sunni CLC's had earlier been stationed. The Ambassador noted that he had checked into the story, and learned that MNF was comfortable with the GOI battalion being re-assigned to Sayidiya. The Ambassador also confirmed that Hashimi knew of an upcoming meeting arranged by the Embassy between the VP's tribal advisor, Omar Jaboori, and the co-Chairs of the PM's reconciliation committee. Hashimi also noted that he and VP Adil Abdel Mahdi planned to discuss a "budget allocation" for reconciliation initiatives such as ceremonies to highlight cross-sectarian (i.e., Sunni-Shia) marriages. -------------- Different Views on "Resistance" in "Compact" -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) The Ambassador told Hashimi that he was displeased with the language used in point 24 of the VP's recently circulated "National Compact" document. The language, he said, appeared to legitimize armed "resistance" against Coalition Forces. Hashimi and his Chief of Staff argued that the language was necessary to bring armed groups back to the negotiating table, similar to the efforts the U.S. was making to talk with insurgency members. The language was used to "attract" these people back to the political process, and engage them in reconciliation efforts. -------------- Commission on Public Integrity -------------- ¶7. (S/NF) Hashimi raised the subject of the Commission on Public Integrity (CPI),asking if the U.S. Congress would pursue its investigations and hearings on the topic. He accused the PM of gutting the Commission of Sunni staff, as well as taking other similarly "unconstitutional" steps which undermined GOI effectiveness and credibility. Some of its staff, he added, in both Baghdad and other provinces, were ordered to take "forced vacations" or were transferred to other government jobs. Since the Embassy had not responded, he said, his office would take the matter up with the Presidency Council. The Ambassador queried whether the Council of Representatives had followed up on its oversight responsibility to deal with the issue of the Commission. Without answering the question directly, Hashimi cited as yet another example of bad faith from the PM,s office the fact that Hashimi,s deputy had inexplicably been prevented from attending a parliamentary meeting on security issues the day before. CROCKER