TAWAFUQ BOYCOTT POLICY COMES UNDER PRESSURE FROM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003308

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR IZ
SUBJECT: TAWAFUQ BOYCOTT POLICY COMES UNDER PRESSURE FROM
WITHIN, HOLDS FIRM

REF: A. BAGHDAD 3222

B. BAGHDAD 3162

C. BAGHDAD 3201

D. BAGHDAD 3026

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary and Comment
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1. (C/NF) Deputy Prime Minister Salam Al Zoubai's recent
meeting with Prime Minister Maliki set off alarm bells within
the Tawafuq Coalition and highlighted internal wrangling
among Sunni leaders over maintenance of its boycott of the
Maliki government. Explanations for Zoubai's uncoordinated
move vary, ranging between hubris and blackmail, but most
believe the move damaged the DPM's credibility within the
Sunni camp. Members of his own staff suggested his move may
have been motivated by threats from the PM's office to cut
funding for his staff. Whatever the motive, Tawafuq leader
VP Tariq al Hashimi and his Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) may
have actually benefited from Zoubai's move, as well as by
continued boycott of the Maliki government.


2. (C/NF) Far from inactive during Tawafuq's boycott,
Hashimi just announced a new "Iraqi National Compact"
document aimed at prompting PM Maliki to either hold
elections or rehaul his government (septel). Hashimi's close
involvement with Coalition detainee Ramadan releases, various
tribal outreach efforts, and creation of "Concerned Local
Citizen" groups, along with the boost he is getting from
party rank-and-file, have put him in a very confident frame
of mind. The unwelcome side-effect has been to further
harden the impasse between VP Hashimi and PM Maliki as Maliki
interprets Hashimi's actions as a direct threat. There is at
least a possibility that Tawafuq has no intention of
returning to any Maliki-led government. In the meantime,
Maliki's efforts to split the Sunni camp by peeling away
individual members such as Zoubai and Baban, and by offering
Cabinet positions to Anbar sheikhs, has deepened Tawafuq's
view that Maliki is not a valid "partner." None of this
bodes well for the 3-plus-1 leadership mechanism or the
reconciliation process generally. End summary and comment.

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DPM Zoubai Breaks Rank; Line Holds
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3. (C/NF) In a move that both surprised and angered his
Tawafuq colleagues, DPM Zoubai met recently with Prime
Minister Nouri Al Maliki, joined by fellow Sunni politician
and former Minister of Higher Education Abd Dhiyab Al Ajili
(Ref D). The press reported that Maliki agreed to form a
committee to explore Tawafuq's list of 11 demands for
rejoining government. Within hours of the announcement, an
angry group of Tawafuq leaders summoned Zoubai to explain his
actions. According to private accounts of the meeting,
Zoubai sought to defend himself, telling his Tawafuq
colleagues that he was "encouraged by the U.S. Embassy" to
meet the PM (Note: The Embassy has encouraged Zoubai and
other Tawafuq members to return to government. End note).
Within hours of the Tawafuq gathering, Sunni leaders Adnan Al
Dulaymi and Khallaf Allyan publicly denounced Zoubai, noting
that his effort was a "personal initiative." The following
day, Zoubai held a press conference seemingly to justify his
actions, claiming Adnan Al Dulaymi and others knew beforehand
about the meeting, hinting that the U.S. Embassy was
involved, and that Tawafuq was not considering "voting out
the government."

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Blackmail or Hubris?
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4. (C/NF) Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Tawafuq
member Rafie El Essawi told poloff on September 24 that
Zoubai and Ajeli decided on their own to meet Maliki,
motivated perhaps by Zoubai's belief that he alone could
persuade the Prime Minister to relent on Tawafuq's list of 11
unmet demands. Essawi believed Zoubai was unhappy being
side-lined and inactive during the boycott, while Hashimi and
Tawafuq parliamentarians continued meaningful work ("it's the
tribal way; once you're in power, you can't give it up
easily"). Essawi also accused Maliki and Zoubai of
sleight-of-hand in organizing their meeting. Zoubai
reportedly told his Sunni colleagues that Maliki invited six
Tawafuq leaders for a discussion on substantive issues, when
in fact only Zoubai and Ajeli received invitations. IIP
Deputy Ayad Al Samarayie had been at an iftar the same
evening with Maliki, but had departed before Zoubai arrived.

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Maliki told the media he had reached out to Tawafuq and had
agreed to form a "committee" to discuss issues, only days
ahead of his departure for the UN General Assembly in NY and
meetings in Washington, D.C.


5. (C/NF) On September 25, Zoubai's Chief of Staff Khaled
Rasheed (strictly protect),offered poloff a different motive
for his boss's actions. Pressed for clarification on why
Zoubai broke ranks and met Maliki, Rasheed began by citing
his boss's frustration with the lack of progress in the
5-party leadership talks in which VP Hashimi represented
Sunni interests. Pressed harder, Rasheed stated that there
was tremendous pressure being applied by the Prime Minister's
office (PMO) on Sunni ministries. Continuing, he said "Iraq
is like no other country, where ministers need huge security
details to protect them." The DPM, he said, had between
100-200 security guards, whose salaries and benefits are
provided for by the PMO. This office, he said, threatened to
cut funds to pay the DPM's staff and protective detail,
leaving Zoubai in a delicate predicament. A letter, he said,
arrived from the PMO a day earlier curtly stating that
Rasheed was a Zoubai staffer -- not a civil servant. Rasheed
said this was an inaccurate statement on civil service law,
and was a less-than-subtle threat that the PM controlled the
DPMO's operations. Zoubai and his staff simply wanted to
continue their work to provide services to Iraqis, especially
in the midst of a cholera epidemic and other problems. Asked
to explain why Zoubai had referenced the U.S. Embassy during
his press conference and in discussions with Tawafuq cohorts,
Rasheed confirmed that Zoubai was speaking of the Embassy's
general "encouragement" for the Tawafuq bloc to return to
government.

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Hashimi and His New Social Compact
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6. (C/NF) The Zoubai incident clearly touched a raw nerve
within the Tawafuq leadership, particularly coming so close
on the heels of Planning Minister Ali Baban's defection (Ref
C). Nevertheless, the rapid public denunciations by senior
Sunni stalwarts of Zoubai and Maliki's reported chicanery,
and Zoubai's own seeming clumsiness may have actually
hardened Tawafuq's determination to remain outside
government. VP Hashimi's Chief of Staff told poloff on
September 25 that he believed Coalition detainee releases --
had they begun before Tawafuq's walk-out in early August --
likely would have been enough to keep Tawafuq in government.
But now, he asked, "how can we return when Maliki has done
nothing to respond to our demands and nothing to entice our
return?" Instead, he continued, the PM has since gutted the
Commission on Public Integrity of Sunni staff without
consultation, and failed to pay the salaries of 9,000 police
recruits in Fallujah that the GOI promised to hire (Comment:
Maliki did agree to funding for 6,000 additional government
jobs in Anbar, of which 3,000 will be police. End comment).


7. (C/NF) Tawafuq, instead of capitulating or negotiating
its return to a static government, will launch a public
appeal for the Prime Minister to either stand down and hold
early elections, or fundamentally reform his government.
Specifics of his "Social Compact" (Ref B) were detailed in
his press conference of September 26. The document
enumerates 25 principles of national unity, along with the
two options for implementation. President Talabani approved
the idea in principle, Hashimi's staff informed us. The Vice
President will now try to build consensus among the major
party blocs to move it forward.

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Are We Prolonging the Tawafuq Boycott?
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8. (C/NF) Hashimi and all but a handful of senior Tawafuq
politicians appear content to wait on the sidelines as
Maliki's government comes under increasing pressure to reform
or step aside. For Hashimi, in particular, his stature and
that of his party, the Iraqi Islamic Party (the mild-mannered
Muslim Brotherhood of Iraq) is benefiting with each day
Tawafuq remains outside government. There is some reason to
believe that the conditions for a return to government
Tawafuq announced when it withdrew were intended to be
unmeetable by Maliki. His own stock has risen among the
Sunni faithful as a result of our decision to closely
associate him with Coalition Ramadan detainee releases. He
and his staff are also deeply engaged with MNF-I in creating
Concerned Local Citizen's (CLC) groups in Baghdad and beyond,
gaining appreciation from both CF and average Iraqis for the
improved security CLC's have wrought. Hashimi has also
benefited politically from the USG-supported Anbar Awakening
through his ties to the late Sheikh Sattar, and through his

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role in encouraging implementation of GOI promises made at
the Anbar Forum II. Hashimi has also inserted himself in the
effort to create tribal support councils, like the one in
Anbar, where local sheikhs are encouraged to help maintain
security and battle Al Qaida. Hashimi's recent decision to
pay the salaries of 9,000 police cadets in Fallujah who are
awaiting induction into national security services, is yet
another shrewd political move intended to highlight the
Maliki government's failure to deliver on its promises.


9. (C/NF) In other evidence of Hashimi's confidence in
directly challenging the Prime Minister, he visited Ayatollah
Sistani in Najaf to present his National Compact (septel) and
he continues to pay high profile visits to detention centers
(although the PM told the Ambassador on September 29 that he
was putting a stop to that). Hashimi has also threatened to
resign over the handling of the court case and death sentence
of Sultan Hashim, a former Defense Minister who is well liked
and respected in the Sunni heartland, particularly in his
home province of Ninewa (a region where the IIP is attempting
to establish a more secure foothold). This activism in
increasingly putting him and the Prime Minister in direct
conflict.
CROCKER