TAWAFUQ BOYCOTT POLICY COMES UNDER PRESSURE FROM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003308 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR IZ SUBJECT: TAWAFUQ BOYCOTT POLICY COMES UNDER PRESSURE FROM WITHIN, HOLDS FIRM REF: A. BAGHDAD 3222 ¶B. BAGHDAD 3162 ¶C. BAGHDAD 3201 ¶D. BAGHDAD 3026 Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary and Comment -------------- ¶1. (C/NF) Deputy Prime Minister Salam Al Zoubai's recent meeting with Prime Minister Maliki set off alarm bells within the Tawafuq Coalition and highlighted internal wrangling among Sunni leaders over maintenance of its boycott of the Maliki government. Explanations for Zoubai's uncoordinated move vary, ranging between hubris and blackmail, but most believe the move damaged the DPM's credibility within the Sunni camp. Members of his own staff suggested his move may have been motivated by threats from the PM's office to cut funding for his staff. Whatever the motive, Tawafuq leader VP Tariq al Hashimi and his Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) may have actually benefited from Zoubai's move, as well as by continued boycott of the Maliki government. ¶2. (C/NF) Far from inactive during Tawafuq's boycott, Hashimi just announced a new "Iraqi National Compact" document aimed at prompting PM Maliki to either hold elections or rehaul his government (septel). Hashimi's close involvement with Coalition detainee Ramadan releases, various tribal outreach efforts, and creation of "Concerned Local Citizen" groups, along with the boost he is getting from party rank-and-file, have put him in a very confident frame of mind. The unwelcome side-effect has been to further harden the impasse between VP Hashimi and PM Maliki as Maliki interprets Hashimi's actions as a direct threat. There is at least a possibility that Tawafuq has no intention of returning to any Maliki-led government. In the meantime, Maliki's efforts to split the Sunni camp by peeling away individual members such as Zoubai and Baban, and by offering Cabinet positions to Anbar sheikhs, has deepened Tawafuq's view that Maliki is not a valid "partner." None of this bodes well for the 3-plus-1 leadership mechanism or the reconciliation process generally. End summary and comment. -------------- DPM Zoubai Breaks Rank; Line Holds -------------- ¶3. (C/NF) In a move that both surprised and angered his Tawafuq colleagues, DPM Zoubai met recently with Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki, joined by fellow Sunni politician and former Minister of Higher Education Abd Dhiyab Al Ajili (Ref D). The press reported that Maliki agreed to form a committee to explore Tawafuq's list of 11 demands for rejoining government. Within hours of the announcement, an angry group of Tawafuq leaders summoned Zoubai to explain his actions. According to private accounts of the meeting, Zoubai sought to defend himself, telling his Tawafuq colleagues that he was "encouraged by the U.S. Embassy" to meet the PM (Note: The Embassy has encouraged Zoubai and other Tawafuq members to return to government. End note). Within hours of the Tawafuq gathering, Sunni leaders Adnan Al Dulaymi and Khallaf Allyan publicly denounced Zoubai, noting that his effort was a "personal initiative." The following day, Zoubai held a press conference seemingly to justify his actions, claiming Adnan Al Dulaymi and others knew beforehand about the meeting, hinting that the U.S. Embassy was involved, and that Tawafuq was not considering "voting out the government." -------------- Blackmail or Hubris? -------------- ¶4. (C/NF) Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Tawafuq member Rafie El Essawi told poloff on September 24 that Zoubai and Ajeli decided on their own to meet Maliki, motivated perhaps by Zoubai's belief that he alone could persuade the Prime Minister to relent on Tawafuq's list of 11 unmet demands. Essawi believed Zoubai was unhappy being side-lined and inactive during the boycott, while Hashimi and Tawafuq parliamentarians continued meaningful work ("it's the tribal way; once you're in power, you can't give it up easily"). Essawi also accused Maliki and Zoubai of sleight-of-hand in organizing their meeting. Zoubai reportedly told his Sunni colleagues that Maliki invited six Tawafuq leaders for a discussion on substantive issues, when in fact only Zoubai and Ajeli received invitations. IIP Deputy Ayad Al Samarayie had been at an iftar the same evening with Maliki, but had departed before Zoubai arrived. BAGHDAD 00003308 002 OF 003 Maliki told the media he had reached out to Tawafuq and had agreed to form a "committee" to discuss issues, only days ahead of his departure for the UN General Assembly in NY and meetings in Washington, D.C. ¶5. (C/NF) On September 25, Zoubai's Chief of Staff Khaled Rasheed (strictly protect),offered poloff a different motive for his boss's actions. Pressed for clarification on why Zoubai broke ranks and met Maliki, Rasheed began by citing his boss's frustration with the lack of progress in the 5-party leadership talks in which VP Hashimi represented Sunni interests. Pressed harder, Rasheed stated that there was tremendous pressure being applied by the Prime Minister's office (PMO) on Sunni ministries. Continuing, he said "Iraq is like no other country, where ministers need huge security details to protect them." The DPM, he said, had between 100-200 security guards, whose salaries and benefits are provided for by the PMO. This office, he said, threatened to cut funds to pay the DPM's staff and protective detail, leaving Zoubai in a delicate predicament. A letter, he said, arrived from the PMO a day earlier curtly stating that Rasheed was a Zoubai staffer -- not a civil servant. Rasheed said this was an inaccurate statement on civil service law, and was a less-than-subtle threat that the PM controlled the DPMO's operations. Zoubai and his staff simply wanted to continue their work to provide services to Iraqis, especially in the midst of a cholera epidemic and other problems. Asked to explain why Zoubai had referenced the U.S. Embassy during his press conference and in discussions with Tawafuq cohorts, Rasheed confirmed that Zoubai was speaking of the Embassy's general "encouragement" for the Tawafuq bloc to return to government. -------------- Hashimi and His New Social Compact -------------- ¶6. (C/NF) The Zoubai incident clearly touched a raw nerve within the Tawafuq leadership, particularly coming so close on the heels of Planning Minister Ali Baban's defection (Ref C). Nevertheless, the rapid public denunciations by senior Sunni stalwarts of Zoubai and Maliki's reported chicanery, and Zoubai's own seeming clumsiness may have actually hardened Tawafuq's determination to remain outside government. VP Hashimi's Chief of Staff told poloff on September 25 that he believed Coalition detainee releases -- had they begun before Tawafuq's walk-out in early August -- likely would have been enough to keep Tawafuq in government. But now, he asked, "how can we return when Maliki has done nothing to respond to our demands and nothing to entice our return?" Instead, he continued, the PM has since gutted the Commission on Public Integrity of Sunni staff without consultation, and failed to pay the salaries of 9,000 police recruits in Fallujah that the GOI promised to hire (Comment: Maliki did agree to funding for 6,000 additional government jobs in Anbar, of which 3,000 will be police. End comment). ¶7. (C/NF) Tawafuq, instead of capitulating or negotiating its return to a static government, will launch a public appeal for the Prime Minister to either stand down and hold early elections, or fundamentally reform his government. Specifics of his "Social Compact" (Ref B) were detailed in his press conference of September 26. The document enumerates 25 principles of national unity, along with the two options for implementation. President Talabani approved the idea in principle, Hashimi's staff informed us. The Vice President will now try to build consensus among the major party blocs to move it forward. -------------- Are We Prolonging the Tawafuq Boycott? -------------- ¶8. (C/NF) Hashimi and all but a handful of senior Tawafuq politicians appear content to wait on the sidelines as Maliki's government comes under increasing pressure to reform or step aside. For Hashimi, in particular, his stature and that of his party, the Iraqi Islamic Party (the mild-mannered Muslim Brotherhood of Iraq) is benefiting with each day Tawafuq remains outside government. There is some reason to believe that the conditions for a return to government Tawafuq announced when it withdrew were intended to be unmeetable by Maliki. His own stock has risen among the Sunni faithful as a result of our decision to closely associate him with Coalition Ramadan detainee releases. He and his staff are also deeply engaged with MNF-I in creating Concerned Local Citizen's (CLC) groups in Baghdad and beyond, gaining appreciation from both CF and average Iraqis for the improved security CLC's have wrought. Hashimi has also benefited politically from the USG-supported Anbar Awakening through his ties to the late Sheikh Sattar, and through his BAGHDAD 00003308 003 OF 003 role in encouraging implementation of GOI promises made at the Anbar Forum II. Hashimi has also inserted himself in the effort to create tribal support councils, like the one in Anbar, where local sheikhs are encouraged to help maintain security and battle Al Qaida. Hashimi's recent decision to pay the salaries of 9,000 police cadets in Fallujah who are awaiting induction into national security services, is yet another shrewd political move intended to highlight the Maliki government's failure to deliver on its promises. ¶9. (C/NF) In other evidence of Hashimi's confidence in directly challenging the Prime Minister, he visited Ayatollah Sistani in Najaf to present his National Compact (septel) and he continues to pay high profile visits to detention centers (although the PM told the Ambassador on September 29 that he was putting a stop to that). Hashimi has also threatened to resign over the handling of the court case and death sentence of Sultan Hashim, a former Defense Minister who is well liked and respected in the Sunni heartland, particularly in his home province of Ninewa (a region where the IIP is attempting to establish a more secure foothold). This activism in increasingly putting him and the Prime Minister in direct conflict. CROCKER