VICE PRESIDENT HASHIMI UNVEILS SOCIAL COMPACT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003286

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2027
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR IZ
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT HASHIMI UNVEILS SOCIAL COMPACT
FOLLOWING MEETING WITH SISTANI

REF: A. BAGHDAD 3222 (HASHIMI AND AMBASSADOR CROCKER)


B. BAGHDAD 3162 (HASHIMI AND POLCOUNS)

C. FBIS GMP20070928642002 (TEXT OF NATIONAL COMPACT)

D. FBIS GMP20070927648003 (HASHIMI PRESS CONF
POST-SISTANI MTG)

Classified by Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

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Summary and Comment
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1. (C) During a Baghdad press conference on September 26,
Vice President Tariq al Hashimi unveiled his draft "Iraqi
National Compact" document, aimed at creating a new "vision"
for Iraq. One day after its public circulation, Hashimi made
a highly publicized trip to meet Grand Ayatollah Sistani in
Najaf, reportedly receiving the cleric's endorsment for the
Compact. Hashimi has widely circulated the document which
contains an introduction, a list of 25 "principles," and
ideas on how to reach national consensus on those principles.
Left out of the document circulated to the media (but shared
with the Embassy and others) are two options for the
Compact's implementation: early elections or substantial
overhaul of the current government. Hashimi hopes the
document will stimulate national debate on governance and
reconciliation, and is looking for a favorable USG reaction.
Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, the compact has fed PM
Maliki's long-standing conviction that Hashimi is not a true
political partner, as expressed to the Ambassador in a
September 29 meeting (septel). While we can welcome some
elements of Hashimi's vision, overall we will tell him and
others that by calling for a change of government, he has
made traction on the "Compact" unlikely.


2. (C) Hashimi's Compact launch is a sharp pull on the plug
keeping the 3 1 mechanism on life support. The deep and
mutual distrust between PM Maliki and VP Hashimi makes it
extremely difficult to envision movement forward on
reconciliation with this leadership team in place. Release
of the Compact was timed to highlight the stalemate in
national government, and to corner Maliki. While Hashimi may
have calculated that his Compact would cast him in the role
of statesman in contrast to the Prime Minister, the actual
impact will be to highlight Maliki's assertion that he has no
Sunni partner, just Sunni opposition. It is increasingly
clear that for both of them the political calculus is
absolutely zero-sum. Since neither Hashimi nor Maliki appear
ready to compromise with the other, it will require our
efforts to find a way to broker an arrangement that at a
minimum will allow filling critical Cabinet vacancies so the
government can focus on the horribly neglected task of
governance. Hashimi's staff insist to us in private that
Tawafuq would return to government if Maliki made "any
effort" to reach out on its list of 11 demands. It may be
too late for that. In Maliki's view, Hashimi has pocketed
every offer and upped his demands. With the confidence
Maliki feels post-September review, he probably believes he
can select more pliant Sunni partners and marginalize
Tawafuq. End summary and Comment.

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Public Launch of the "National Compact"
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3. (C) Vice President Tariq al Hashimi held a press
conference on September 26 to unveil his new draft "Iraqi
National Contract," a three-page document that includes an
introduction, a list of 25 "principles," and six suggestions
for reaching national consensus on the list of principles
(Text in Ref C). Missing from the document given to the
media (but shared privately with the Embassy and others),
were a pair of options for implementing the compact: early
elections, or a major overhaul of executive and legislative
institutions (Ref A/B). Hashimi, reading from a prepared
statement, told the press that his draft was intended to help
"arrest the deteriorating situation in Iraq by eradicating
its causes." His staff told us earlier that President
Talabani offered his (non-written) endorsement to Hashimi,
and that many regional governments had offered their
endorsements during Hashimi's August travel.

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Sistani Endorsement?
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4. (C) Iraqi Islamist Party deputy leader Ayad Al Samaraie
and a senior Hashimi staffer provided poloff on September 29
with a readout of the Vice President's September 27 meeting
with Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani in Najaf (Ref D). The
meeting, they said, lasted for two hours, an hour longer than

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scheduled. Topics of discussion were Hashimi's "Compact,"
detainees, militias, and elections. Sistani reportedly
offered his endorsement in principle on the Compact, offering
only "minor" edits. (Comment: Sistani does not speak
publicly; his representative Abd al-Mahdi al Karbala'i said
of the Hashimi visit in a September 28 sermon only that
Sistani is "the protector of the interests of all Iraqis.")
According to Hashimi's staffer, Sistani's son Mohammed Ridha
al Sistani attended the meeting, and was a dominant force,
doing much of the talking. At one point, the son explained
how his father encouraged Maliki to do more on GOI detainee
releases. The PM reportedly balked, stating that the
government had "intelligence information" on all the
detainees, which explained their lengthy incarcerations.
Hashimi appealed to Sistani to continue pressuring Maliki on
detainee issues, to which Sistani reportedly committed to
"studying." In a discussion on militias, Sistani conveyed
his position that only the State has the right to bear
weapons, not militia members. On elections, Sistani said his
election fatwa had been "misused." He told Hashimi that he
had not endorsed any particular party, but rather encouraged
people to vote for the person who would "best protect voters'
religion and worldly goods."


5. (C) In general, Hashimi's staff member said, the
meeting/trip was "very good" as it convinced the IIP/Sunni
side that Sistani was quite practical and reasonable.
Second, the meeting provided Sistani with "a more realistic
picture of Sunni thinking" than some of his Shia colleagues
may have conveyed. Vice President Hashimi, he said, was
"positively affected" by the meeting. The staff member said
Sistani told Hashimi that he feared Iraq may "soon be lost,
as Andalusia was lost." Sistani also lamented to Hashimi
that he was "not being listened to;" possibly referring to
the Sadrists and others within the Unified Iraqi Coalition.
Other parties seeking Sistani's endorsement for a new
governing coalition report varying levels of endorsement as
well, further complicating a political dynamic where
virtually every party is engaged in talks with every other
party in hopes of coming out on the "winning" side.
CROCKER