JAAFARI AND QASSIM COOKING UP NEW COALITION TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003261 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2017 TAGS: PGOV IZ SUBJECT: JAAFARI AND QASSIM COOKING UP NEW COALITION TO OUST MALIKI Classified By: Pol Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In separate meetings, former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari and senior Shia Independent CoR legislator Qassim Daoud told us of their ongoing efforts to form a non-sectarian coalition with the aim of unseating Prime Minister al-Maliki. They claimed they have received the blessing of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and other senior Shia clerics to build a "new" United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), the Shia coalition formed in 2005, and Jaafari and Qassim want to move the "new" UIA away from a sectarian grouping into a nationalist-oriented coalition that includes Sunnis and Kurds. While they claimed to have made substantial progress in enlisting coalition partners, a Fadhila Party leader told us they have mustered only 60 seats. Qassim said Sistani confided he was "fed up" with the Sadrists and advised Qassim and Jaafari not to include them in the "new" UIA due to their troublemaking tendency. Qassim said the new coalition would not initiate a no confidence process against Maliki until it had already agreed on his replacement, since no one wants a repeat of the protracted leadership vacuum that led to Maliki's rise. Qassim told us that while he thinks Moqtada al-Sadr is under Iranian influence and his Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia is a "terrorist" group, he nonetheless favors including the Sadrists in mainstream politics as the only way to contain the movement. He warned of a widespread Shia street perception that MNF-I is attacking JAM while arming Sunni groups. Jaafari and Qassim both complained of Kurdish intransigence over the Hydrocarbons law and urged USG pressure to bring the Kurds to a reasonable position. End Summary. Seeking Sistani's Blessing for a "New" UIA to Oust Maliki -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) In our September 26 meeting with Qassim and September 27 meeting with Jaafari, both were unsparing in their criticism of the Maliki government and spoke at length of Maliki's perceived faults and failures. Qassim remarked that "even an artist can not change the dull to the bright" when describing Maliki's leadership record, and Jaafari alleged that Maliki's Group of Four alignment (of which both branches of the Da'wa party are members) violated the Iraqi Constitution by conferring executive power on a presidency council. Jaafari and Qassim are both reported to harbor ambitions to succeed Maliki, and Jaafari in particular appeared to use our meeting as an opportunity to preen and tout his claimed ability to unite Iraq and solve its many problems. For example, he rattled off a list of claimed accomplishments from his tenure as Prime Minister, adding with a tinge of bitterness that his opponents had brazenly usurped credit for his achievements. He maintained that while Maliki speaks of 2008 as the year in which he will begin to improve national security and delivery of services, Jaafari by contrast would take such steps immediately so that Iraq could enjoy the success of these measures in 2008. Qassim alleged that Maliki had been chosen as Prime Minister "as a compromise candidate known to have no ability, no vision, and a sectarian approach," and that recent USG statements of support for the Maliki government had "abused the present situation" and helped prolong Maliki's incompetent rule. Jaafari stated tartly that the USG must "face reality" about Maliki's limited leadership ability. ¶3. (C) Stating that the Iraqi Council of Representatives "needs a signal to change governments," Qassim explained that he and Jaafari are working to revamp the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA),the sect-based grouping that swept Shia politicians to power in 2005 elections, with the aim of toppling the Maliki government and helping to form a successor government. For his part, Jaafari said he sought to restore UIA unity but not with the aim of supporting the Maliki government. Both Jaafari and Qassim said the "new" UIA would have a nationalist rather than sectarian orientation, and would be open to Sunnis and Kurds as well as Shia in order to promote national unity. Qassim said he and Jaafari obtained blessing for this new alliance from Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani during a widely-publicized three-hour meeting on September 22, and he claimed they also received approval from the three other Najaf Marja'iyah as well as Fadhila Party spiritual leader Sheikh Muhammad al-Yaqubi. With the assistance of Sistani's son, Qassim averred he and Jaafari are in the process of establishing a 14-person committee comprised of two representatives from each of the seven original UIA partners (Da'wa, Da'wa Tanzim, Fadhila, the Sadrists, the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (ISCI),ISCI's Badr, and a bloc of independents led by Qassim) to chart a future course for the alliance. Qassim said he had first grown close to Sistani while serving as then-Prime Minister Ayad Allawi's Security Minister, an experience that also resulted in bad relations with Moqtada BAGHDAD 00003261 002 OF 003 al-Sadr due to his role in the 2004 security crackdown on Sadrists in Najaf. ¶4. (C) Qassim asserted that the Sadrists, Fadhila, Da'wa Tanzim and most Shia independents were already on board and that ISCI/Badr was positive about the project, leaving only Maliki's branch of Da'wa squarely on the outside. Hassan al-Shammari, bloc leader of Fadhila's 15 CoR members, disputed this assertion, however, telling us that Fadhila had not agreed to either rejoin the UIA (the party withdrew from the alliance earlier this year) or to join any other alliance. Shammari claimed that "the Jaafari Bloc" currently had about 60 CoR seats comprised of the Sadrists, Jaafari's Da'wa allies, Da'wa Tanzim, and Qassim's "Solidarity Bloc" of independents. Qassim also claimed to be in discussions with leaders of Sunni parties regarding their inclusion in the new alliance, noting that Saleh al-Mutlaq of the National Dialogue Front had agreed to join provided the new alliance adopted a name other than the UIA. Qassim emphasized that, once formed, the new alliance would not move to take down Maliki until they had sorted out in advance an orderly succession process, noting that he wishes to avoid a repeat of the protracted post-Jaafari leadership vacuum, a "tragic period" that permitted the bombing of Samarra's Askari Mosque and led to Maliki's rise. Iran-Influenced Sadrists No Good, But Better In Than Out -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) While Jaafari asserted flatly that Maliki's Group of Four had destroyed the UIA, Qassim averred that friction between the "refined" ISCI and the "aggressive" Sadrists had caused the latter to play a "destructive" role within the alliance. Qassim says he has long argued with Sistani and other Shia leaders for the inclusion of Sadrists in mainstream Shia politics in order to contain their movement and "help them understand the meaning of democracy." While the Sadrists "are far from being exemplary politicians," their behavior has improved since the 2005 elections. Jaafari sounded a similar theme, arguing that Sadrists must be brought into the political fold, even though there are criminals among them, because they represent the voice of the poor. Qassim confided that Sistani is "fed up" with the Sadrists and advised him and Jaafari not to bring the Sadrists into the "new" UIA because they would continue to be unreliable and troublesome alliance partners. Sistani told Qassim that Sadr had asked him for advice on whether the CoR Sadrist bloc should rejoin the UIA, and that he refused to provide such advice because Sadr had not asked for guidance prior to withdrawing his bloc from the UIA. Qassim further stated that Sistani had even used an Arab proverb that can best be translated as "in some circumstances the wastrel is preferable to the man of faith" to convey the notion that the GOI needs people who can deliver to the people, using the example that it would be preferable to bring back Saddam's Minister of Trade, who has a proven track record of competence, than the current Minister who delivers nothing to an impoverished and needy people. ¶6. (C) Jaafari did not broach the issue of Iran's role in Iraq, but Qassim stated that Moqtada al-Sadr and the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) are under Teheran's influence. He denounced JAM as a terrorist group, noting with a wry grin that even though al-Qaeda and JAM are the same type of group, Iraqis call the former "terrorists" and the latter "a militia." Qassim claimed to have warned Iran's Ambassador to Iraq not to create another Hezbollah through the JAM, and that he told Iranian Qods Force leader Sulaimani that Iran was playing a dangerous game in Iraq that threatened the welfare of Iraqi Shia, the very people Tehran claims to support. After meeting with Iranian government officials such as a top National Security official, the Foreign Minister, and former President Rafsanjani during an official December 2006 visit to Iran, Qassim said he concluded that the extent of Iranian influence in Iraq was far greater than he had previously suspected. He said the Iranian Ambassador had told him Iran played "an important role" in bringing about Sadr's JAM freeze order, but Qassim opined that JAM elements that do not comply with the order are funded and armed by Iran. Shia Street, Police Plan, Pressure the Kurds -------------- ¶7. (C) Like many Shia politicians we meet with, Qassim exhibited an imperfect understanding of MNF-I efforts to encourage local citizens in Anbar to battle al-Qaeda, and we clarified for him - as we have done with others - that MNF-I is not arming Sunni militias in Anbar. Nonplused, Qassim warned that it is "very dangerous" to allow Sunnis to form militias, particularly Sunnis of unknown loyalties and motivations, and he expressed doubt that such fighters could be integrated into Iraqi Security Forces. He warned that a BAGHDAD 00003261 003 OF 003 common perception exists among the Shia masses that MNF-I is creating Sunni militias while at the same time MNF-I is hitting hard at JAM, the only Shia group that stepped in to protect the Shia from rampaging Sunni bands after the 2006 Sammara mosque bombing. He said that this was unfortunate, particularly as it builds undue sympathy for JAM at a "historic moment" in which JAM prestige is extremely low after the August Karbala mayhem and the assassination of two southern governors. On the topic of police, Qassim said he agrees with the conclusions of a Congressional report on the Iraqi police by retired Gen. James Jones. He floated a plan to recruit 1000 new future police leaders from among Iraq's 40,000 new and mostly unemployed college graduates, and then ship them off to European - not Arab - capitals to train and observe how paramilitary police forces function in a democratic society. (We note that this plan seems to be making the rounds, as VP Abdel Mehdi advisor Zuhair Hamadi recently told us he is pushing for a similar approach). Finally, both Qassim and Jaafari complained at length about the uncooperative and allegedly unconstitutional approach of the Kurds on the Hydrocarbons law, and both implored the USG to pressure the Kurds to take a reasonable position on the draft bill. CROCKER